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Summary
This thesis consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 are com-
pleted by my own. Chapter 3 is a joint work with Professor Alberto Salvo.
Chapter 1 examines mechanism of resource allocation within households
using the Brazil Family Expenditure Survey. Using monetary income share 1
as a measure of bargaining power, I evaluate its impacts on children’s cloth-
ing expenditure share and female clothing expenditure share by estimating a
Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System. I test the income pooling hypothesis
and examine whether the data supports the unitary setting or the collective
setting. To deal with potential endogeneity issue, I control unobserved het-
erogeneity by mimicking Olley and Pakes (1996) control function approach.
The results confirm with literature that using income share and expenditure
share to examine resource allocation mechanism within households may lead
to biased conclusions. Further, this work complements literature by suggesting
such bias favors the collective setting and the approach adopted in this paper
could mitigate such bias.
Chapter 2 compares married households and cohabiting households by de-
veloping and estimating a dynamic household collective model with limited
1Specifically, monetary income share of women.
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commitment. I examine differences between union dissolution rates of mar-
ried households and cohabiting households. Three differences are considered
between married and cohabiting households: different matching qualities, dif-
ferent outside options2, and different demographic characteristics. I quantify
to what extent the different union dissolution rates between married and co-
habiting households can be attributed to each factor by using Mexican Family
Life Survey. Cohabitation in Mexico is more common compared with many
other countries. Given emerging trend of cohabitation, conclusions drawn from
Mexico could be relevant for countries where cohabitation is still not common,
but is expected to boom in next few decades.
Chapter 33 examines four discontinuities in the ethanol content in blended
gasoline fuel, mandated by Brazil’s central government over the period 2010
to 2013, to test the joint hypotheses that (1) atmospheric ozone production
in the Sao Paulo metropolitan area is limited by the volume and reactivity of
hydrocarbons (”hydrocarbon limited”), and (2) increased ethanol use in the
gasoline-ethanol vehicle fleet leads to higher ozone concentrations in urban
Sao Paulo’s ambient air. We adopt a regression discontinuity design (RDD)
and flexibly test each discontinuity separately. Our finding that ozone levels
2In general, this is referred as utility from living alone.
3This paper has been submitted and is forthcoming in Journal of the Association of
Environmental and Resource Economists
ix
actually increased with ethanol penetration on each of the four occasions is
consistent with a recent empirical study that used different identifying vari-
ation, and contrasts with a modeling study of Sao Paulo’s atmosphere that
predicted significant ozone abatement from hypothetical ethanol use. We find
no significant relationship between ethanol versus gasoline use and PM2.5 lev-
els. Current tailpipe emissions standards prescribe the exclusion of the mass
of unburned ethanol that is emitted. Our result suggests that this standard
should be reviewed. Following decades of hydrocarbon emissions control, ur-
ban areas in the US and elsewhere that are currently hydrocarbon-limited may
see ozone levels rise if and when they adopt mid-level ethanol gasoline blends,
whether to meet the Renewable Fuel Standard or Intended Nationally Deter-
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Resource allocation within households has been examined extensively in liter-
ature. The unitary setting considers a household as that which functions like
an individual and makes optimal decisions. For example, it aggregates individ-
ual preferences into some kind of social preference function (Samuelson, 1956),
or considers that there is a dictator of sorts within the family (Becker, 1974,
1991). The non-unitary approach assumes each member in a household has
her own preference. These individuals bargain over consumption allocation
according to various mechanisms, which could be categorized into two gen-
eral frameworks: cooperative models and non-cooperative models. On the one
1
hand, the cooperative models assume that outcomes within a household are
Pareto efficient. There are models based on the axiomatic theory of bargain-
ing with symmetric information such as the Nash Bargaining Model, which
maximizes the product of individual surplus (Manser and Brown, 1980; McEl-
roy and Horney, 1981). Individual surplus is defined as the difference between
utility within the household and outside options, such as utility from divorce
or living alone. There is also the collective model which does not impose any
assumption on specific bargaining form (Chiappori 1988, 1992). Considering
that household members interacting with each other closely, the efficiency as-
sumption seems intuitive. On the other hand, the non-cooperative models use
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium concept, and the outcome within a household
could be inefficient. Outside options for individuals are defined as outcomes
of non-cooperative games. When household members cannot reach consensus,
they may act non-cooperatively, rather than getting divorced. The existence
of abuse within a household may also support such models.
A growing body of literature rejects the unitary model for intrahouse re-
source allocation. Males and females tend to have different preferences and
different ways of allocating resources. One important factor for the non-unitary
setting is the bargaining power of individuals. With higher bargaining power,
individuals can get more resources within a household. However, with the
2
unitary model, there is no such concept as the household makes decisions as
one individual. Researchers use different indicators to measure the bargaining
power of individuals within a household and examine how this affects resource
allocation within households. In general, women are found to allocate more
resources to health related products, nutrition, and children as they gain more
bargaining power, whereas men tend to allocate more on private consumption
products like tobacco and alcohol (Lundberg, Pollak and Wales, 1997; Li and
Wu 2011). Such a fact is important for policy makers when they consider using
policy intervention to improve children’s welfare or equality within households.
Control over economic resources has been considered an important and
reliable indicator for bargaining power within a household. One idea is to
examine whether the source of income within a household; that is, who earns
the income, affects resource allocation. In the unitary setting, the source of in-
come does not matter, whereas in the non-unitary setting, the source of income
matters.1 Labor income and non-labor income have been used extensively to
represent the bargaining power of individuals. However, they may not be ex-
ogenous to the outcomes under investigation. Labor supply and consumption
could be jointly determined. Some researchers use non-labor income such as
1In the unitary setting, a household makes decision as one individual. It pools all the
income together. Hence, the source of income does not matter for resource allocation.
However, in the non-unitary setting, individuals within a household are allowed to have
different preferences. Individuals with higher income can allocate more resources according
to their own preferences.
3
assets brought into the house when married (Thomas, Contreras, and Franken-
burg 2002). Other researchers use policy interventions. Lundberg, Pollak and
Wales (1997) examined the effects of changing the recipient of welfare benefits
from the man to the woman in the United Kingdom, which is determined out-
side the domain of the household. Some other measurements have also been
suggested to indicate bargaining power, such as marriage market sex ratio, and
divorce law (Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix 2002), as well as gender of chil-
dren (Li and Wu 2011). Marriage market sex ratio and divorce law may affect
individuals’ outside options; for example, the probability of getting married
again after divorce or financial benefits one can get from divorce. Hence, it can
affect individuals’ bargaining power within a household. Regarding gender of
children, certain societies may have strong preferences for a specific gender of
children. By having that gender of children, female bargaining power within
household could strengthen.
In this paper, I adopt the commonly applied assumption in this literature
that resource allocation within household is efficient. Hence, I focus on the
unitary model and the cooperative model. For the cooperative model, I use
the collective model which is more general in the sense of not imposing any
restrictions on bargaining form. The unitary model can be considered as a
special case for the collective model. I use monetary income share of house-
4
hold members as an indicator for bargaining power. I deal with the potential
endogeneity issue by employing control function approach. The framework is
based on Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (2009), and Browning and
Chiappori (1998). Under the unitary setting, monetary income share should
not affect resource allocation within households. Under the collective setting,
monetary income share affects the resource allocation. My main objectives
are to test whether the data supports the unitary setting or the collective
setting within a household using income share and expenditure share, and
provide new empirical evidence. There are two reasons for considering mone-
tary income share of individuals as an indicator for bargaining power. First,
this indicator is reliable and widely applicable. It is directly correlated with
control over economic resources within households. Some indicators may only
work for specific societies or regions; for example, gender of children. Secondly,
this indicator is widely and publicly available, for example, from census data
for many countries, as well as the consumption data. However, as suggested
by literature, this indicator may not be exogenous to the outcome variables
under investigation, which in this case, is consumption. One contribution of
this work deals with the issue of endogeneity, and here, I refer it as individual
unobserved characteristics
. I employ control function approach proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996)
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to control for unobserved characteristics, which helps solve the endogeneity
issue between labor supply and consumption. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the first work to adopt such an approach in studying the mechanism of
household resource allocation.
The data is based on the Brazil Family Expenditure Survey. By using the
Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System, I examine how female income share
affects budget allocation toward clothing within households. Without control-
ling unobserved individual characteristics, as female income share increases
from 0 to 1, children’s clothing expenditure share increases by 8 percentage
point. Female clothing expenditure share increases by 8.6 percentage point for
households with one child, and 8.4 percentage point for households without
any children2. All the results are significant. The unitary setting is rejected.
However, after controlling for unobserved individual characteristics, children’s
clothing expenditure share only increases by 5.4 percentage point. Female
clothing expenditure share increases by 3.6 percentage point for households
with one child, and increases by 7.9 percentage point for households with no
children. Moreover, all the results are insignificant and the unitary setting can-
not be rejected. Without controlling for unobserved individual characteristics,
2To be more specific, without children means with no children living in households.
Couples could have children, but they may live outside of households. This applies to
remaining sections of this paper.
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the effects of female income share on clothing expenditures tend to be over-
estimated, which favors the collective setting. Hence, I concur with literature
that using income share and expenditure share to explore the mechanism of
intrahouse resource allocation may result in misleading conclusions. Further,
my findings complement existing literature by showing that the results bias
towards the collective setting. I find that the control function approach can
mitigate such bias. I also explore the effects by considering rich households and
poor households, rural households and urban households, and households in
both north and south Brazil. The effects vary among the different groups, and
suggest that different types of households may require different indicators and
outcome variables for examining the mechanism of resource allocation within
households.
The remaining sections of the paper are as follows: Section 2 reviews rel-
evant literature, including that relating to the collective setting and demand
system. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses potential endogene-
ity issues. Section 5 explains the model, and Section 6 discusses the estimation
strategy. Section 7 lists the results, and Section 8 concludes.
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1.2 Literature review
The unitary model assumes a household makes decisions like an individual. Ac-
cording to Samuelson (1956), one may aggregate individual preferences within
a household into the following household utility function:
U˜(Q, qa, qb) = H(Ua(Q, qa, qb), U b(Q, qa, qb)) (1.1)
where Q is public good. q is private consumption. a and b indicate different
individuals. H is strictly increasing in individual utilities, Ua and U b. The
demand functions derived from such household utility function satisfy Slutsky
condition, adding-up, and homogeneity. Moreover, it preserves income pool-
ing, which means the distribution of income within a household does not affect
resource allocation within the household. Another possible mechanism is due
to Rotten Kid Theorem (Becker, 1974, 1991). If there is an altruistic adult
in the household, who has much more income compared with other household
members and can make monetary transfer, then the household members will
internalize decisions and behave like one individual.
The non-unitary model considers the fact that household consists of several
individuals. Decisions are made through the interactions among each member.
It could be a solution of bargaining game; for example, the Nash bargaining
models (McElroy and Horney, 1980; Manser and Brown, 1980). There exists
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a threat point for each member, which represents the maximum utility one
can get from some default outcome, such as divorce. Some other researchers
consider that the default outcome need not be divorce. The threat point
could be the a non-cooperative outcome within a household (Lundberg and
Pollak, 1993). The outcome may also satisfy some form of efficiency. The
collective model, first proposed by Chiappori (1988), assumes that outcomes
within a household are Pareto efficient, without any assumption about the
specific bargaining form. Each individual has her bargaining power, which
is important in determining the final outcome. There are multiple sources
that can affect individual power such as relative income, age, divorce law, etc.
The power of individuals is correlated with the aforementioned threat point.
The household maximizes a weighted sum of each individual’s utility. The
weighting functions can be considered as indicators of the bargaining power
of each member. Another stream of literature assumes that the outcome may
also be a solution to non-cooperative games, which could be inefficient. One
such model is the separate sphere approach of Lundberg and Pollak (1993).
Empirically, a growing body of evidence rejects the unitary setting. The
wide-spread rejection of income pooling in empirical literature has been in-
fluential in weakening the case for the unitary model (Lundberg and Pollak,
2008). Using data of Canadian couples with no children, Browning, Bour-
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guignon, Chiappori, and Lechnen (1994) find that final allocations of expendi-
tures on each partner depend significantly on their relative incomes and ages,
and on the level of lifetime wealth. They examine the expenditure sharing
rule within a household. By exploiting the policy change in United Kingdom
that changes the children’s benefit recipient from male to female, Lundberg,
Pollak, and Wales (1997) find that there is a substantial increase in spending
on women’s and children’s clothing, relative to men’s clothing, which coincides
with this income redistribution. Attanasio and Lechene (2002) examine the
PROGRESA program in rural Mexico. This program transfer money to poor
households in rural Mexico. The implementation of this program was delayed
in a number of randomly chosen villages, and hence, can be viewed as a ran-
domized experiment. They find that as the wife’s income share increases, there
is greater expenditure on food and children’s clothing, and less expenditure
on services and alcohol. Using the Indonesian Family Life Survey, Thomas,
Contreras and Frankenberg (2002) examine the effect of distribution of power
within family on children’s health. They use individual assets brought into a
household when married in order to measure bargaining power. Their results
suggest that in Java and Sumatra households, where mothers are more power-
ful, daughters have fewer episodes of illness than sons. Based on the prevalent
son preference in China, Li and Wu (2011) construct a measure of bargaining
10
power using gender of children. They find that women with first-born sons
have a greater role in household decision making, and are less likely to be
underweight. Using South Korea data, Lee (2007) examines the relationship
between pocket money and income share within a household. This paper finds
bargaining power is stable within a household and is insensitive to income share
once household fixed effect is controlled. However, across households, bargain-
ing power varies with income share. The author attributes these findings to
unobserved bargaining power when the households are formed, which con-
tributes to the correlation between bargaining power and income share across
households. Once such unobserved bargaining power is controlled, within a
household, household members can commit to the pre-specified resource allo-
cation plan, and the income pooling hypothesis cannot be rejected. Hence, the
unobserved bargaining power may play an more important role in determining
resource allocation. These works focus on consumption. One typical difficulty
is tracking consumption identity from household level consumption data. Ex-
cludable and assignable3 goods can be used to solve this issue. For example,
we may assume male clothes are consumed solely by males and female clothes
are solely consumed by females. For tobacco and alcohol, men are more likely
3There is no strict difference between excludable goods and assignable goods. For exam-
ple, male clothes and female clothes are excludable goods as they are consumed exclusively
by corresponding parties. Clothes is assignable good. We can assign male clothes to men
and female clothes to women.
11
to consume these than women.
There are also works examining labor supply. Using Panel Study of Income
Dynamics data for the 1988 cohort, Chiappori and Lacroix (2002) find that
state level sex ratio and divorce laws that favor women affect labor supply
behavior and decision process in the direction predicted by theory, and have
sizable effects. For example, passage of a divorce law that favors women will
induce more money transfer from husbands to wives. Blundell et al. (2007)
estimate a collective labor supply model using data on married couples without
children, derived from the UK Family Expenditure Survey during the years
1978 to 2001. They consider potential wage for males, and find that increases
in the potential wage of husband increases the wife’s labor supply.
In general, empirical counterparts reject the unitary setting in many differ-
ent countries. They also support the prediction of collective model in the sense
that individuals with greater bargaining power can get more of the resources
they prefer. There is also another stream of literature examining whether the
resource allocation within households is efficient. The evidences are mixed
(Bobonis, 2009, Udry, 1996) and beyond the scope of this work.
In this work, I focus on the collective setting and assume the resource allo-
cation within a household is efficient based on the usual assumption adopted
by the collective model. I examine the intrahousehold resource allocation
12
mechanism by examining the relationship between income share and cloth-
ing expenditure share. I adopt control function approach to deal with the
endogeneity issue.
1.3 Data
The data used in this work is derived from the Brazil Family Expenditure
Survey. The survey period is from May 2008 to May 2009 covering 27 states
in Brazil. In my study, I only consider households that consist of a couple
with no children or a couple with one child younger than 15 years old in order
to control potential confounding effects from children. Households with multi-
families are also excluded. There are two reasons to restrict to households with
a child younger than 15. Firstly and foremost, the survey only keeps separate
track of clothing expenditures for children younger than 15. For children older
than 15, their clothing expenditures are combined with their parents’ clothing
expenditures depending on their sex. Second, as children grow older, they
may develop certain bargaining power within households (Dauphin, Lahga,
Fortin and Lacroix, 2011). This may complicate identification. Therefore, I
examine households with one child and households with no children living in
households separately. These two types of households could be different in
terms of resource allocation.
13
The main outcome variable is clothing expenditure share4 for each member
in the household. I divide the child’s clothing expenditure by total clothing
expenditure within the household to generate the child’s clothing expenditure
share. I divide female clothing expenditure by adult clothing expenditure 5
to generate the female clothes expenditure share. Zero expenditure for each
subcategory is allowed. However, if the total clothing expenditure is zero, I
have to drop the data. It is unclear how to define budget share in this way. The
final sample contains 10368 households. Of this total, 5133 households have
one child living in the household, and 5235 households have no children living
in the household. The summary statistics are in Table A.1. Of the sample,
23.9 percent of households live in rural area. More than half (56.7 percent)
of households are in the north part of Brazil. Compared with the south part
of Brazil, the north part is less developed. 92.8 percent of husbands supply
labor and 67.0 percent of wives supply labor. With regard to ownership, 35.5
percent of households own cars, and 60.2 percent of households own houses.
As suggested in literature, car ownerships and house ownerships are important
factors affecting household consumption. To control wealth level, I adopt
4One concern is clothes may show nature of public good. For example, husband may care
about clothes of wife. This would not be an issue as we can model this case using caring
preference. In collective setup, with some mild assumptions, we can transform a problem of
caring preference to a problem of egoistic preference.
5Adult clothes expenditure is summation of male clothing expenditure and female cloth-
ing expenditure.
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a point-based system (Eizenberg, A and Salvo, A., 2015). The points are
calculated based on four factors: bathrooms and sewage system, household
head education, asset holding, and servants. Detailed information regarding
the points calculation is in Appendix C.
1.4 Model
1.4.1 Decision making process
Before I discuss the collective setup, I will introduce the decision-making pro-
cess for my model. The decision process is presented in Figure B.1. A and B
denote household members. L is the amount of labor supply. τ is unobserved
characteristics, which is the main issue I intend to deal with. m is income. q
denotes private consumption, and Q is public consumption. Each Household
decides amount of labor supply and consumption. These two decisions are
made sequentially, as each household enters the labor supply decision period
first, and then consumption decision period. First, in the labor supply decision
period, which is represented by the hollow points in the figure, the household
decides amount of labor supply of each member, which depends on unobserved
individual characteristics τ and observed individual characteristics6. Then, the
household moves to the consumption decision period. Along the line denoting
6The observed characteristics are omitted in the figure, as well as in the following analysis
for clarity. They can be incorporated in the model easily.
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the consumption decision period in the Figure, there are several solid nodes
which indicate the time when a household makes a consumption decision. The
income depends on the labor supply decision of respective household members,
but not on unobserved characteristics conditional on labor supply. Given each
individual’s income, the household makes consumption decisions that depends
on income as well as unobserved characteristics. After several consumption
decisions, the household may reconsider labor supply and enter a labor supply
decision period once again, which is represented by the hollow point on the
right in the Figure.
Several points should be further clarified. First, in real life, a household
makes consumption decisions more frequently than labor supply decisions. The
aforementioned model illustrate this fact by considering many consumption de-
cision periods following one labor supply decision period. In my analysis, I
focus on the consumption decision period and consider income as fixed when
a household makes a consumption decision. I will not be examining labor
supply decisions. Second, over time, I do allow for simultaneity between labor
supply decisions and consumption decisions. Both decisions are affected by
unobserved characteristic τ . A natural question to address is the economic
meaning of τ , which should directly affect labor supply decisions and con-
sumptions decision. One example we may consider is the relative preference of
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consumption over preference of leisure. If an individual has a relatively strong
preference of consumption over leisure, in general, this individual may tend
to supply more labor and also consume more goods. In the aforementioned
sequential game, this means that this individual will supply more labor in
the labor supply decision period. Also, given the income, this individual will
also tend to consume more goods7. This story also explains why failing to
consider unobserved characteristics may lead to misleading conclusions later,
when I consider bargaining power within the household. Thirdly, the unob-
served characteristics could be correlated between husband and wife within
a household. For example, the unobserved characteristics could be positively
correlated due to positive assorting in the initial matching stage. This assump-
tion is not necessary for the derivation of the later section. However, it may
affect the degree of bias if we do not consider these unobserved characteristics.
Considering the previous example, in the extreme case when such unobserved
characteristics are exactly the same for husband and wife within one household,
there will be no bias if the unobserved characteristics are not considered. In
real life, a certain degree of correlation of unobserved characteristics between
husband and wife should be expected.
7This point will be further clarified in model part
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1.4.2 Collective setting
The collective setting allows household members to have different utility func-
tions. The assumption for such model is that resource allocation within a
household is Pareto Efficient. The model can be transformed into the follow-
ing program:
maxqA,qB ,Qμ(p,m)u
A(qA, qB, Q) + [1− μ(p,m)]uB(qA, qB, Q)
st : p(qA + qb + Q) = m
(1.2)
Here, the household maximizes household utility, which is a weighted sum
of individuals’ utility functions8, uA and uB, subject to budget constraints.
qA and qB represent private consumption of each individual. p represents
price and m is income. Q represents consumption in public good. μ(p,m)
and (1−μ(p,m)) represent weights of each individual. A natural explanation
for μ is bargaining power of each individual. Following Browning and Chiap-
pori (1998), I assume there exists a differentiable, zero-homogeneous function
μ(p,m) such that for any (p,m), the vectors (qA,qB, Q) are solutions to the
this program. The assumption postulates that the decision process always has
a unique, well-defined outcome, or there exists a demand function.
Demographic information can be added into this formula. Some factors
could enter into the utility function u(•) directly, such as ownership of house
and car, age, and education. Another groups of factors, distributing factors,
8Usually, we refer to utility of head and spouse within households.
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enter into the weight function μ(•). They affect consumption decisions within
a household by altering the bargaining power of household members. They do
not enter into the individual utility function.
In this work, I incorporate unobserved characteristics of individuals into
the model and examine how this may affect the conclusion of the resource
allocation mechanism within household. The modified program is as follow:
max{qA,qB ,Q}μ(m
A(τA, τB),mB(τA, τB)),p)uA(qA, qB, Q, τA)+
[1− μ(mA(τA, τB),mB(τA, τB)),p)]uB(qA, qB, Q, τB)
st : p(qA + qB + Q) = mA(τA, τB) + mB(τA, τB)
(1.3)
This program demonstrates decisions made by a household in consump-
tion period as in Figure B.1. At this period, the income9 of each member is
provided, and household only makes consumption decisions. If panel data is
available and τ is fixed over time, omitting τ may not cause bias if identifica-
tion comes from variation of consumption and income within the household.
However, in my case, when only cross sectional data is available, omitting τ
may bias the results and favor the collective model.
The unobserved characteristic τ can affect final consumption through three
potential channels. The first channel is utility function, which I refer to as di-
9One may notice the income here is m(τA, τB), and in previous decision making process,
the income is m(L). The full form should be m(L(τA, τB)). Unobserved characteristics
affect income only through labor supply. Labor supply decision depends on unobserved
characteristics, but is determined previously, not in consumption period. Hence, to avoided
the potential confusion that treating labor supply decision as endogeneous in this period, I
omit L here.
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rect effect. The second is income effect. In the labor supply decision period,
τ affects the labor supply decision, and hence, income available in the con-
sumption period. The third channel is bargaining power effect. Since τ affects
the individual labor supply decision, it will also affect the income distribution
within a household in consumption period. If income distribution affects indi-
viduals bargaining power and hence the weighting function μ, τ will also affect
the consumption decision. I refer to the second and third channels as indirect
effect.
In the empirical counterpart, I will examine the relationship between con-
sumption budget share and income share across households. Without control-
ling unobserved characteristic τ , the second effect should not cause a problem
as we can control income directly. However, the first and third channels will
cause problems. The first channel indicates that unobserved characteristic are
correlated with the dependent variable, consumption. The third channel indi-
cates that unobserved characteristic are correlated with independent variable,
income share. To be consistent with my empirical part, I made the following
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change to the above program:
max{qA,qB ,Q}μ(s(τ
A, τB))uA(qA, Q, τA)+
[1− μ(s(τA, τB))]uB(qB, Q, τB)
st : p(qA + qB + Q) = mˉ





s is the income share for A, which I will use to examine bargaining power in
the empirical analysis. As I focus on the consumption decision period, I fix
the total income within households, which can simplify the analysis below.
Income effect can be controlled directly in the empirical analysis. Individuals
are assumed to have egoistic preferences and the utility function is concave in



































Assumption 1 states that fixing a consumption bundle, individual utility
is an increasing function of unobserved characteristic τ . Hence, an individ-
ual tends to consume more as τ increases. Assumption 2 states that indi-
vidual marginal utility is an increasing function of unobserved characteristic
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τ . Assumption 3 states that an individual supplies more labor and earns
more income as unobserved characteristic increases. However, a spouse’s un-
observed characteristics have no direct effect on the person’s own labor supply.
A spouse’s unobserved characteristics can still have an indirect effect on in-
dividual decision of labor supply; for example, through consumption. Next, I
will examine potential bias, the calculation for which is in Appendix D.
As total income is fixed at consumption stage, given Assumption 2, τB can
be expressed as a function of τA10. We denote it as τB = φ(τA). Denote qA∗,
qB∗, and Q∗ as the optimal consumption bundles for aforementioned program.
We can get equations11 below. The key part to distinguish the unitary setting




> 0 rejects the unitary model and favors
the collective model as income share affects bargaining power. If dμ
ds
= 0, the


































In Equation 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7, the left-hand side is what we can observe
from the data. These could be the evidence suggesting the unitary model or
10Refer to Appendix D.
11Any thing that can be controlled empirically is omitted for the equations below, for
example, the income effect.
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the collective model. Focusing on Equation 1.5, if dq
A∗
ds
is positive, this means
individual A consumes more as her income share increases, which suggests the
collective model. However, the term dμ
ds
on the right-hand side of the equation
is direct evidence suggesting the collective model or the unitary model. If dμ
ds
is positive, this means income share affects individual weight, or bargaining
power within a household. Hence, the unitary setting is rejected. The second




The exact direction of bias depends on the magnitude of the first order deriva-
tive of utility function, which is nontrivial to examine. Moreover, imposing
assumptions on the relative magnitude of first order derivative of utility func-
tion has little empirical implication. Hence, I consider the following simplified
cases.
Begin by assuming that there are no public goods in the household, and




is positive. Basically, a higher weight favors the individual and





is either positive or 0, which indi-
cates the collective setting or the unitary setting respectively. The remaining
term on the right-hand side ∂q
A∗/∂τA
ds/dτA
is positive, which is the bias if we do
not control unobserved characteristics of individuals. Even if dμ
ds
is zero, which
means the weight or the bargaining power of individual does not depend on
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income share, we still observe that an individual consumes more as her in-
come share increases. The concept is illustrated by the following: Considering
two households 1 and 2, they are identical except that individual A1 has a
higher unobserved characteristic12 in household 1 while individual A2 has a
lower unobserved characteristic in household 2. In the labor supply decision
period, A1 will supply more labor compared with A2, and hence obtains a
higher income share within the household. Conditional on income, in the con-
sumption period, A1 will also consume more private goods compared with A2.
Comparing these two households, we can find a positive relationship between
individuals’ income share and consumption within the household. However,
the effect does not go through bargaining within the household. Hence, we may
falsely conclude the unitary setting as the collective setting without control
for unobserved characteristics of individual.
Second, for the case in which public goods are considered, I discuss from
these two perspectives: stage budgeting and relative preference for public
goods. The stage budgeting assumption states that consumers can allocate
budgets in stages. In this work, I adopt two-stage budgeting assumption. To
be more specific, consumers allocate resources to public goods first, then they
allocate resources among private goods. For the second stage, when consumer
12One may consider high unobserved characteristic as high valuation for consumption or
lower valuation for leisure.
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allocates private goods, the analysis of bias for private consumption is the
same as no public goods case, as public goods expenditure is fixed. Hence, the
bargaining is within the context of private consumption. For the direction of
bias of public goods, which is the second term ∂Q
∗/∂τA
ds/dτA
in Equation 1.7, this de-
pends on individual relative preference for public goods. Consider the extreme
case in which individual A cares about public goods and individual B derives
no utility from public goods, the bias term ∂Q
∗/∂τA
ds/dτA
will be positive. On the
other hand, if individual A does not care about public goods and individual
B cares about public goods, then the bias term ∂Q
∗/∂τA
ds/dτA
will be negative. The
direction of bias depends on empirical context. In my empirical analysis, I con-
sider the effect of female income share on children’s clothing expenditure. As
suggested by literature, women tend to care more about children than do men.
Therefore, intuitively, the bias term should be positive. This means without
considering unobserved characteristics, the results favor collective models.
In general, from these simplified cases, without controlling unobserved
characteristics, we get biased results when we use income share and expendi-
ture share to examine the mechanism of household resource allocation. With
cross-sectional data, the bias may lead us to accept the collective model when
the true model is the unitary model. For public consumption, the bias is less
clear and depends on the empirical context. In the empirical segment, I will
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impose stage budgeting assumptions to make the situation parallel to these
simplified cases.
1.4.3 Dynamic issue
In my model, I assume static efficiency while making no assumptions as to
dynamic efficiency. Basically, within the consumption decision period, I as-
sume that allocation within a household is efficient. However, overtime, I do
not impose any restrictions on dynamic efficiency. There are at least two ex-
planations in literature regarding the existence of dynamic inefficiency. First,
household members may over supply labor to boost their bargaining power in
the consumption period (Basu, 2006). Second, a household may have limited
ability to stick to a pre-specified plan, and instead makes decisions based on
current state (Mazzocco, 2007). The first explanation does not contradict nor
support my model. Essentially, my model does not need restrictions on the
efficiency of labor supply. The second explanation can support my model.
One problem people may have is that a household may make labor supply
decision and consumption decision simultaneously, not sequentially. This does
not cause problem for my model. It is possible that the household makes both
decisions jointly. However, when they make consumption decisions later, they
cannot commit to the pre-specified plan, and make decisions based on current




As mentioned previously, there exists a demand function that can represent
the aforementioned model. I use the Quadratic Almost Idea Demand System
proposed by Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997). This demand system is
flexible and gives an arbitrary first-order approximation to any demand system
wj = δzj + α(xj, τj) + Γpj + β(xj , τj)(lnEj − lna(xj, τj ,pj))
+ λ
(lnEj − lna(xj , τj ,pj))2
b(xj , τj ,pj)
(1.8)





b(xj , τj ,pj) = exp(β(xj , τj)
′pj) (1.10)
α(xj, τj) = α





β(xj , τj) = β





wj is the vector of budget share of goods for household j. zj is the vector
of distributing factors. xj is the vector of observed demographic information,
(xj1, xj2, ..., xjs), that enters the utility function directly. Additionally, τ is
unobserved characteristics that enter the utility function. pj is the vector
of log price faced by household j. Ej is the total expenditure for goods in
consideration.
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I incorporate x and τ nonlinearly into the system, and incorporate z lin-
early into the system. There are two reasons for doing this. First, there is
one proportional results from the theoretical model of the collective setting







The simple way to incorporate or test such a restriction is to model z
linearly. The second reason is for identification of z. Basically, I need linearity
in z and nonlinearity in τ to separate the effect of z on consumption from the
effect of z on τ through control function.
1.5.2 Control function
Following Olley and Pakes (1996), I model consumer unobserved heterogeneity
using a scalar in the empirical segment. Based on the collective model in
previous section, consumption can be written as:
(qA∗, qB∗) = h(x, z,m, p, τA, τB) (1.14)
Conditional on x, z,m, p, qA∗ is increasing in τA,13 and decreasing in τB;
while qB∗ is increasing in τB, and decreasing in τA. This is the same as the
monotonicity assumption of Olley and Pakes. Hence, I can invert this equation
13Refer to Part 7 in Appendix D.
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and obtain the following:
(τA, τB) = hˆ(x, z,m, p, qA∗, qB∗) (1.15)
Then, I plug this equation above into the right-hand side of the demand
system by replacing τ with hˆ:
α(xj) = α
0 + α1xj1 + α
2xj2 + .....α
sxjs + α
τ hˆ(xj , zj ,mj , pj , w˜j) (1.16)
β(xj) = β
0 + β1xj1 + β
2xj2 + .....β
sxjs + β
hhˆ(xj , zj ,mj, pj , w˜j) (1.17)
The basic idea here is to use one group of goods to invert for unobserved
characteristics, and use another group of goods to examine the variable in
which I am interested, or the test income pooling hypothesis. I use clothing
expenditure share to test the income pooling hypothesis, and use the personal
service expenditure share14 to control for unobserved individual characteristics.
One assumption I need to validate using the demand system and control
function approach is weak separability. This assumption states that prefer-
ences for products of one group are independent of product-specific consump-
tion of products from other groups. To be more specific, conditioning on total
expenditure of clothes and total expenditure of personal service, the way that
a household allocates expenditures among clothes is independent of the way
that the household allocates expenditures among personal service. This as-
14For example haircut, massage, etc.
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sumption reduces the dimension of analysis, which means I can concentrate
on examining clothing expenditure without considering other expenditures.
Hence, it is valid to use expenditure of personal service to control for unob-
served characteristics and plug into the demand system of clothes. Otherwise,
I should consider expenditures in all cases as dependent variables.
The weak separability assumption has been commonly used for previous
literature, especially when the researchers examine a specific category of con-
sumption, such as food, or clothes. Under the framework of current work, one
potential issue could involve the possibility of collective trade off and bargain-
ing at a higher level. For example, it is possible that a female may require less
food for herself and argue for more clothes. Such an argument can be applied
to all categories of consumption. To fully address this issue, I must consider all
the consumption categories in the regression which would be costly. Moreover,
it is challenging to identify such collective trade off behavior across different
categories of goods from general preference, as much data are not available; for
example, personal consumption of food. Finally, in current work, this would
not be a major threat to my results as long as the collective bargaining at a
higher level is not systematically correlated with income share. For example, it
is hard to rationalize a female with higher income share systematically arguing
for more female clothes by consuming less food, or vice versa.
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1.5.3 Estimation
I use the iterated linear least square estimator proposed by Blundell and Robin
(1999) to estimate the system. I parameterize hˆ linearly. As mentioned, I con-
sider two groups of consumption in the empirical segment, clothes and personal
service. I use personal service to control for unobserved characteristics, and
use clothing expenditure to examine the mechanism of resource allocation. To
be more specific, I examine whether female income share within a household
affects expenditure on female clothing, and children’s clothing. The param-
eter of interests is δ. I examine the model using two steps: I consider the
expenditure share of children of all clothes purchased within a household, and
I consider the expenditure share of the female’s clothing over all adult cloth-
ing purchased within a household15. Basically, I examine the expenditure on
public goods first, and then examine the bargaining for private consumption 16.
For the controlled variables in the demand system, distributing factors include
female income share 17, age and education difference of husband and wife, and
head sex dummy. Demographic information entering the utility function in-
clude monthly household total income, female age and education, children’s
15Adult clothes is the summation of male clothes and female clothes.
16This process can be validated by two stage budgeting assumption.
17I use female income share in demand function as distributing factor and use log income
ratio in control function as distributing factor. The main reason is to reduce standard error
and improve precision of estimation.
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age and sex if applicable, labor supply decision, car ownership, house owner-
ship, household points, clothing prices, rural fixed effect, monthly fixed effect
and state fixed effect.
1.6 Results
Table A.2 presents the results of female income share on clothing expenditure
for households with no children and households with one child. Column (1) is
for households with a child and column (2) is for households with no children.
Results without control for unobserved characteristics are presented in Panel
A, and results with control for unobserved characteristics are in Panel B.
If unobserved individual characteristics are not controlled, as female in-
come share increases from 0 to 1, budget share for children’s clothes increases
by 8 percentage point. Female clothing expenditure share increases by 8.6
percentage point for households with one child, and by 8.4 percentage point
for households without children. As a female earns relatively more income
within her household, she has higher bargaining power. Hence, she can allo-
cate more resources to her own. Moreover, similar to previous literature, the
female also allocates more resources to her child as she gains more bargaining
power within the household. These results support the collective setting.
After controlling for individual unobserved characteristics, all the effects
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become smaller. Children’s clothing expenditure share increases by 5.4 per-
centage point, as female income share increases from 0 to 1. Female clothing
expenditure share increases by 3.6 percentage point for households with one
child, and increase by 7.9 percentage point for households with no child. The
results are consistent with the prediction based on the model; without con-
trolling unobserved characteristics, we may overestimate the effects of income
share on expenditure share. The effect of income share on female clothing ex-
penditure share changes much smaller for households with no children, about
one-tenth of the change for the households with one child, after control for
unobserved individual characteristics. This means that omitting individual
unobserved characteristics has a smaller effect on the bias for households with
no children. One explanation could be, if I consider unobserved characteris-
tics as a relative preference of consumption over leisure, household members
without children have more free time available. If marginal utility from con-
sumption of leisure decreases, with enough time available, individuals will
supply labor eventually even if they have low unobserved characteristics, or
strong preferences for leisure. For households with a child, free time is more
limited as members have to spend time taking care of the child. For those who
have a low unobserved characteristics, or a high preference for leisure, they will
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supply less labor, compared with counterpart members18 in a household with
no children. In general, we may expect the bias to be higher for households
whose members’ free time is more limited.
Considering the significant level, all the results become insignificant after
unobserved individual characteristics are controlled. This means we cannot
reject the unitary setting. However, if we compare standard errors in two cases,
the standard errors become larger when unobserved individual characteristics
are controlled. This could be due multicollinearity as both demand system
and control function contain indicators constructed by income as distributor
factors. Hence, the inability to reject the unitary model could be due to lack
of power here.19 Future studies should attempt to address this issue. One
potential way to solve this issue is to find two groups of goods that depend on
different distributing factors.
Clothing expenditure makes up a small part of total household expenditure.
For the sample I use, the mean share of clothing expenditure of monetary
monthly income is about 13.8 percent within households. For poor households,
the share is 14.4 percent, which is higher than the 11.8 percent spent by
rich households. We may expect such bargaining could be more likely to
18We can think two exactly same individuals, but one in household with a child, and one
in household without children.
19The standard errors for the following results also show similar pattern.
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occur in poor households. Resources in these households are more limited and
their members have more incentive to bargain over individual consumption for
clothes. Table A.3 presents rich-level specific effects20. In general, the effects
are higher for poor households compared with rich households. No matter
whether unobserved individual characteristics are controlled or not, all the
effects are insignificant for the rich households. Hence, the unitary setting
cannot be rejected for the rich households. However, we should be cautious
when interpreting the results. Based on clothing expenditure, individuals in
rich households seem not to bargain; however, they may still bargain about
expenditures of other more expensive goods.
In the empirical segment, I only consider monetary income and use it to
construct income share to measure the bargaining power of individuals. One
concern is that a household may still have non-monetary income; for exam-
ple, crops or home production, that is not marketable. Income share con-
structed using monetary income may not be a good measurement of control
over economic resources. Hence, I consider urban and rural specific effect.
The assumption is that in urban areas, households are less likely to have non-
monetary income, or that the monetary income is the major component of
household income. Hence, income share using monetary income is a good in-
20Based on household points constructed, top 20% are considered as rich households and
remaining are considered as poor households.
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dicator of control over economic resources. For rural areas, households are
more likely to have nonmonetary income, or nonmonetary income is the larger
component of household income. The monetary income share will be a noisy
measurement for bargaining power. Table A.4 presents the urban and rural
specific effects
In the rural area, the effects are very small. After unobserved individual
characteristics are controlled, the effect becomes negative for female clothing
budget share in the household with a child. First, monetary income is a noisy
measurement of bargaining power for the rural household. Hence, the sign
may not make any economic sense. Second, it is possible that there is a neg-
ative relationship between monetary income and nonmonetary income within
a household; for example, each member focuses on one part. Nonmonetary
income could be a major source of income in rural areas. A negative relation-
ship could be possible in this case. For urban households, the effects are much
bigger as compared with rural households; this is as expected. Hence, when
using control over economic resources as an indicator for bargaining power
within households, researchers should be careful about the source of income
for households with different demographic characteristics.
In Brazil, the southern part of the country is more developed than northern
part. Based on the sample, in the northern region, 33 .6 percent of households
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are from rural areas, whereas 20 percent of households are from rural areas
in southern part. Hence, it is interesting to examine whether there are any
regional differences. I categorize the sample into south and north based on the
state. The south consists of the south region, southeast region, and central
region of Brazil. The north consists of the north region and northeast region.
The results are presented in Table A.5.
Comparing north and south, the effects on female clothing expenditure
share are similar for both households with one child and households with no
children. However, the effect is different for children’s clothing expenditure
share. The effect is much greater for households in the south region. One
explanation could be that monetary income is not a good indicator for north-
ern region. For example, the northern region consists of more rural areas.
However, it is unclear how this explains the different patterns of effect on
children’s clothing expenditure share and female clothing expenditure share.
Another explanation could be that children in the north region may contribute
to household income earlier than children in the south. Since these areas are
less developed, it is possible that children may also have to supply labor21.
In this case, children themselves may have bargaining power and ability to
allocate resources to themselves. Considering this as a possibility, there would
21It is possible that the income is not enough and children have to supply labor. It is also
possible the return of education is low.
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be less incentive for the female to further allocate resources to her children.
In all the cases above, after unobserved individual characteristics are con-
trolled, the effects of female income share become smaller and tend to be
insignificant. This is important for policy makers to consider when they make
monetary transfers to households. Distribution of benefits to different re-
cipients could lead to different final resource allocations, depending on the
recipient; however, the difference may not be huge. Moreover, the effects are
heterogeneous across households. Usually, such policies target poor house-
holds. For households in the north region, if policy makers intend to improve
children’s welfare, it seems that such a policy is indifferent between differ-
ent recipients based on my results. However, such a policy may also change
other factors; for example, children are more likely to withdraw from the labor
market if the female receives the money. This is outside of the scope of this
work.
One concern is how robust the results derived from this paper may be, due
to the restrictive sample. In this work, I focus on households with either one
child or households with no children. One may question whether conclusions
derived from this paper can be extended to households with multiple chil-
dren. In the theoretical model part, the discussion is insensitive to number of
children. Hence, potential bias due to ignorance of unobserved characteristics
38
could also exist in households with multiple children. The assertion that we
may extend to the whole population is to be careful with such bias. Moreover,
the method adopted in this work can be extended to households with multiple
children.
1.7 Conclusion
In this work, I examine the mechanism of household resource allocation. The
primary framework I adopt is the collective setting, and the unitary setting
can be considered as a special case. This study assumes outcome within a
household is Pareto efficient. I modify the model by incorporating unobserved
individual characteristics. I show how omitting these variables could cause
biased results, and favor the collective setting over the unitary setting if income
share is considered as the indicator for measuring bargaining power. The bias
of effect on private consumption is clear. However, for public goods, the bias
is unclear and depends on the empirical settings.
I then parameterize the model using the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand
system and test the prediction using Brazil data. I adopt control function ap-
proach by Olley and Pakes to control for unobserved individual characteristics.
In general, after unobserved characteristics are controlled, effects of female in-
come share on clothing expenditure for both children and females decrease and
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become insignificant. The empirical results do support the theoretical predic-
tion. Previous literature suggests that regarding money transfer policies, by
transferring money to the female, more will be allocated to children, compared
with giving money to the male. My results do not completely reject such a
suggestion, however; the difference may not be that huge.
Based on my empirical content, I further study heterogeneous effects by
considering rich households versus poor households, urban households versus
rural households, and households in the north part of Brazil versus households
in the south part of Brazil. Depending on the demographic characteristics
of households, different measures for bargaining power and outcome variables
should be selected for examining the resource allocation mechanism within
households. This is also important for government officials when considering
the implementation of cash transfer policies. Depending on the goal of the
government, households with different demographic characteristics may react
differently. Policy makers should recognize their main target and consider
the effects of such policies accordingly. Finally, this paper focuses on Brazil;




Stability of Married Households
and Cohabiting Households
2.1 Introduction
Cohabitation has gained popularity as a potential substitute for marriage over
the past few decades. This trend has emerged across different continents. The
meaning of cohabitation without formal marriage depends on the social con-
text. Some societies have considered cohabitation a common practice for a
long time. For example, many Latin American countries have long histories of
socially accepted consensual unions, which may substitute for formal unions
in some groups (De Vos, 1999; Parrado and Tienda 1997). In the European
Union, cohabitation is common in many countries. For example, premari-
tal cohabitation in Sweden is nearly universal. In many northern European
countries, cohabitation has progressed further into the direction of becoming a
replacement for marriage (Pollak and Lundberg, 2013). In some other places,
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cohabitation has become acceptable, emerging quickly in recent decades. In
the US, cohabitation has increased from roughly 500,000 couples in 1970 to
more than 7.7 million couples in 2010. This growth is evident across racial
and ethnic, education, and age groups (Lofquist, Lugaila, O’Connell, Feliz,
2012).
Many factors contribute to this emerging trend. Individuals can get ben-
efits from cohabitation similar to marriage, such as economies of scale, risk
sharing, consumption of public good, and overcoming credit constrain, but
these benefits may be to varying degrees. Moreover, in many countries, cohab-
iting individuals are required to take less responsibility toward their partner
and the union, both from the perspective of law and social convention. There
are fewer legal concerns when cohabiting couples want to separate compared
with separation of married couples. But still, this varies country by country.
For example, in Canada, common-law partners, referring to couples that live
together without an actual ceremony or legal documents, have the same fun-
damental rights as married couples after two years of cohabitation. In most
Asian countries, there is no such law protecting cohabiting couples. Some peo-
ple may also use cohabitation as a trial period for marriage. The social norm
has changed over time making people more tolerant of premarital sex and liv-
ing together without getting married. The stigmas associated with nonmarital
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sex, cohabitation, nonmarital fertility, and divorce have declined dramatically
(Thornton and Young-DeMarco, 2001). With more options available, people
also delay marriage nowadays. Some people value the freedom of their leisure
time. Others want to pursue their own career. Women in particular have
more opportunities in the labor market than in the past. Getting married
is more likely to hamper a woman’s career development compared with the
career development of a man. At the same time, individuals may also desire
certain levels of intimacy. Cohabitation could be a better choice compared
with marriage. Finally, people may also face financial constraints when they
want to get married, such as expenditure related to wedding or dowry. In such
cases, people might choose cohabitation as an alternative.
The standard economic model assumes only two living arrangement for
households, getting married or living alone (Becker, 1981, 1991, Weiss, 1997).
This would have been a reasonable assumption in the past. However, with co-
habitation becoming more popular, such an assumption may not be adequate
and might over-simplify the analysis of households’ behaviors and decision
making. One natural question to address would be whether it is necessary
to model cohabiting unions and married unions separately. Scholars have
different views about behaviors between married households and cohabiting
households. Some consider that behaviors between households of both types
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of living arrangement; that is, marriage and cohabitation, should converge
over time. The second demographic transition theory posits that cohabita-
tion should become more normative and look increasingly like marriage over
time. Childbearing should become more common for cohabiting households
and cohabiting families should become more stable over time (Kiernan 2000;
van de Kaa 1987). With the trend that social norm defining married part-
ners’ behavior becomes weaker and social norm defining cohabitation becomes
stronger, the deinstitutionalization hypothesis also predicts that the distinc-
tion between marriage and cohabitation should fade over time (Cherlin, 2004).
One opposing view suggests the increasing privilege of marriage, due to people
self-selecting into marriage and the social status, which may make behaviors of
cohabiting households and married households diverge from each other, such
as with regard to stability of households (Cherlin 2009; Furstenberg 1996).
Many countries are still in a transitional stage. Depending on social norms
and cultural convention, it is also possible that different countries may transit
along different directions. For most countries, cohabitation is still not viewed
as a perfect substitute for marriage. Existing research shows that cohabiting
couples are less stable than married couples. Cohabiting households are less
likely to invest in long term public goods, such as a house or children (Pollak
and Lundberg, 2013). These facts themselves could be correlated. For ex-
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ample, the instability of cohabiting households could be the reason for lower
investment in long term public goods. The lower investment in public goods
within households may further contribute to the instability of these cohabiting
households. Hence, behaviors for married households and cohabiting house-
holds are different along certain dimensions and potentially will remain so for
the next few decades.
Past studies suggest that economically disadvantaged groups, such as low
education and low income individuals, are more likely to cohabit. Upon union
dissolution, these people could be prone to financial problems. With children
bearing activities becoming more common within cohabiting unions, children
from cohabiting households may suffer more from union dissolution compared
with children from married households. This could be due to the economic
disadvantage of cohabiting households. Many countries do not have laws pro-
tecting children from cohabiting households in case of union dissolution.
In this paper, I examine the stability of cohabiting households and mar-
ried households, including reasons for the difference between the divorce rate
for married households and separation rate for cohabiting households. One
complication facing this study is that married households and cohabiting
households are different along many dimensions. I categorize these differences
into three groups: unobserved matching qualities, outside options, and demo-
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graphic characteristics. Unobserved matching qualities measure how well the
male and female partners are matched with each other. These are observed by
the male partner and female partner, but not observed by the econometrician.
On average, married couples and cohabiting couples may have different un-
observed matching qualities for two reasons: different initial selection process
and different in-house investment after unions are formed1. Outside options
are referred as individuals’ utility if unions are dissolved. They measure how
well individuals can live on their own2. Given one married household and
one cohabiting household with exactly the same demographic characteristics
at individual level, the outside options for individuals from these two living
arrangement could be different. In most countries, cohabiting couples and
married couples face different regulations when unions are dissolved. Such
regulation could affect individual outside options; for example, through asset
allocation.
I examine to what extent these three factors, unobserved matching quali-
ties, outside options, and demographic characteristics, can explain the differ-
ences in stability between married households and cohabiting households. I
model these three factors together by considering a dynamic household collec-
1This work cannot separate the effects from these two factors.
2This applies for cooperative model, which is considered in this paper. For non-
cooperative model, outside options could mean outcome of non-cooperative game, not nec-
essarily living alone.
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tive model with limited commitment. I quantify the effect of different factors
using the Mexican Family Life Survey.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a
literature review, and focuses on reasons explaining differences between mar-
ried households and cohabiting households. Section 3 shows data and reduced
form analysis. Section 4 describes the model. Section 5 presents results and
section 6 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
Cohabitation can afford similar benefits as marriage, such as joint consump-
tion and production. However, behaviors between cohabiting households and
married households are different in certain dimensions. One important dif-
ference is in the stability of households. Cohabiting unions are found to be
less stable compared with married unions. Today’s cohabiting unions are less
likely to culminate in marriage and more likely to end in separation. Even if
cohabiting couples eventually move to marriage, premarital cohabitation is as-
sociated with a higher subsequent risk of divorce, as suggested by many studies
(Balakrishnan et al. 1987; Bennett, Blanc, and Bloom 1988; Hoem and Hoem
1992; Bracher et al. 1993; Lillard, Brien, and Waite 1995; Weiss and Willis
1997; Brien, Lillard, and Stern 2006). Compared with married households,
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cohabiting households are less likely to invest in long term public good, such
as a house or children (Pollak and Lundberg, 2013). There are several possible
explanations for the aforementioned differences in households’ behaviors.
Firstly, married households and cohabiting households face different costs
for union dissolution. Such cost could generate differences in households’ be-
haviors, both directly and indirectly through intertemporal commitment. The
legal process and cost for dissolution of union greatly distinguish marriage from
cohabitation. It is more costly for married households to dissolve their union
compared with cohabiting households. Moreover, social convention may im-
pose an additional psychological cost on married couples if they get divorced.
Cohabiting households may just consider their arrangement a temporary or in-
formal union. Individuals may care about a failed marriage, but are less likely
to care about a failed cohabitation. These factors could enhance the stability of
married households directly compared with that of cohabiting households. Due
to the lower cost of dissolution of a union and informal property from cohab-
itation, the intertemporal commitment generated within a cohabiting union
is limited. Moreover, within marriage, divorce law usually favors the more
vulnerable side, in most cases women, by allocating more assets or requiring
alimony transfer. This further enhances the intertemporal commitment within
marriage. To understand the persistence of marriage once cohabitation is rec-
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ognized as an alternative, the economic approach emphasizes the potential
returns to intertemporal commitment (Pollak and Lundberg, 2013). Intertem-
poral commitment can provide credit that facilitates long-term investment,
both for tangible assets (e.g, house) and intangible assets (e.g, education),
and risk pooling (Weiss, 1997). Devices ensuring intertemporal commitment
are important, especially for women, as women have been specialized to child-
bearing and other domestic activities, leaving them vulnerable to abandonment
and other adversities (Becker, 1991). Regulated by law and social convention,
marriage itself could serve as a contract or device that guarantees the intertem-
poral commitment within households (Matouschek, Rasul 2008). As such, the
intertemporal commitment would be strengthened and more cooperation could
be expected within married households. Married households are more likely
to invest in public goods within their households. These additional benefits
further ensure the stability of married households.
Secondly, couples that select themselves into marriage or cohabitation
could be different in both observed and unobserved ways. In the US, co-
habitation is strongly decreasing in education (Pollak and Lundberg, 2013).
Serial cohabitation is much more prevalent among economically disadvantaged
men and women (Lichter and Qian, 2008). As suggested by Pollak and Lund-
berg (2013), there is an education and income gradient between the decisions of
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marriage and cohabitation. One explanation is the competing force of decreas-
ing return from labor specialization and increasing return from investment in
children. Market substitutes for housework, such as cooking and cleaning,
are more easily accessible and affordable today. Additionally, with more op-
portunities for women in the labor market, traditional gains from marriage
such as joint consumption, production and labor specialization decrease over
time. For investment in children, researchers find that parents with higher
education and income spend more time and money on children (Ramey and
Ramey, 2010). The elasticity of expenditures on many children items is higher
than one. Moreover, recent works also document the complementarity between
early human capital stock and the productivity of later investment in children
(Aizer and Cunha 2012; Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Todd and Wolpin, 2003,
2007). Thus, these results suggest the return from investment in children will
be much higher for households with higher education and income. Marriage
would be a more optimum environment for raising children; for example, due
to the aforementioned intertemporal commitment. Thus, for high education
and income households, the increasing return from investment in children out-
weights the decreasing return from labor specialization, making marriage a
more attractive option. The contrary is the case for the low education and in-
come households, which makes cohabitation a better option. It is also possible
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that individuals prefer to be matched with high education and income part-
ners. Such chance would be small for low income and education individuals.
Hence, some of them may form temporary cohabiting unions with other low
education and income partners, while searching for a better match.
Cohabiting households and married households could also differ in unob-
served ways. People who select to cohabit may not be ready for a stable
relationship. This may also make the households less likely to invest in long
term assets. Such unobserved heterogeneity due to self-selection could also be
one explanation for the fact that marriages preceded by cohabitation are less
stable (Lillard, Brien, and Waite 1995). Another reason for couples to choose
cohabitation could be that they don’t have enough information about their
partners. Hence, there will be greater uncertainty with cohabiting. Moreover,
it is also possible that the couple realize their matching qualities are low, and
hence they choose cohabitation. Similar to any long-term investment, married
households are also more likely to invest in pursuits of matching qualities, such
as more family bonding activities, which improves the potential for matching
qualities compared with cohabiting households. Susan et al. (2015) com-
pared the relationship quality of cohabitors and marrieds. They found that
the relationship between union type and relationship quality is bifurcated,
with direct marrieds reporting the highest relationship quality and cohabitors
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without marriage plans reporting the lowest marital quality. Marrieds who
premaritally cohabited and cohabitors with plans to marry fell in the middle.
Thirdly, outside options could be different for married couples and cohab-
iting couples. We can also consider this one unobservable factor that makes
individuals self-select into marriage or cohabitation. Outside options are usu-
ally referred as individuals’ utility when couple get divorced and separated,
or utility from being single. Such options are considered the threshold of in-
household utility for couples under cooperative models, which could reflect
individuals bargaining power and resource allocation in households. If current
resource allocation scheme within a household makes one particular individ-
ual’s utility lower than the threshold, that individual can initiate negotiation
to increase her resource share within the household. If no such option can
be found, divorce or separation will be triggered. This framework applies to
cohabiting households as separation can be triggered unilaterally. However,
for married households, this outcome depends on whether the law states uni-
lateral divorce or mutual consent divorce. Under the mutual consent regime,
the union can survive as long as one of partners prefers staying together over
living alone. Under the unilateral regime, resource allocation within house-
holds needs to guarantee that both members prefer staying together over liv-
ing alone. In this work, following the law in Mexico, a unilateral regime for
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married households is adopted. The utility from living alone could depend on
individuals education, income, assets and other demographic characteristics.
It could also depend on unobservable factors such as an individual’s attractive-
ness, confidence, or ability to network. One common factor considered in the
literature affecting outside options is income. One possibility for instability of
cohabiting households could be that couples have better outside options. It is
more difficult for them to reach consensus in terms of resource allocation that
keeps both of them preferring to stay within the union rather than separating.
However, this explanation seems to contradict the literature that contends
that economically disadvantaged groups are more likely to choose cohabita-
tion, but have worse outside options. Another possibility could be that these
individuals may generate more gains from forming unions. And cohabitation
is more easily formed than marriage.
In this work, I examine three main factors: unobserved matching qualities,
outside options, and demographic characteristics. The effect of demographic
characteristics on outside options can be modelled directly. Unobserved match-
ing qualities are modelled as a random process. For connection between demo-
graphic characteristics and unobserved matching qualities, I focus on education
based on literature and allow that households with different education levels
have different random processes for unobserved matching qualities. Given de-
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mographic characteristics, unobserved matching qualities and outside options
are independent in the model. Policy intervention; for example, imposing di-
vorce law on cohabiting households, can change outside options in the short
run, but not unobserved matching qualities. However, such a policy interven-
tion may change unobserved matching qualities in the long term3. Through
the counterfactuals, I fix demographic characteristics. I change the unobserved
matching qualities, and asset division rule which changes outside options of
individuals. I then examine how the separation rate for cohabiting households
changes.
A dynamic household collective model with limited commitment can in-
corporate these factors and would be a suitable framework. This model was
proposed and tested by Mazzocco (2007). The collective model, formalized by
Chiappori (1988,1992) is a special case of the Nash bargaining model (Manser
and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981), whereas households maximize
a weighted sum of utility across each member. The weight reflects individ-
uals’ bargaining power, which could depend on individuals’ outside options.
The original works for the collective model are static. The dynamic model
is necessary here as one important channel to explain the results is through
3With similar regulations imposed on cohabitation and marriage, people may consider
these two living arrangements similar. The observed and unobserved demographics of these
two groups may converge over time. However, this issue is not examined in this work.
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intertemporal commitment. Married households and cohabiting households
may invest differently within households; for example, buying a house, pur-
chasing cars, given different probability of separation. And such investments
may affect surplus generated within households. Moreover, I want to examine
movement between living arrangements, among marriage, cohabitation, and
divorce or separation. Full commitment assumes that households consider all
the possible uncertainties in the future and design a consumption plan at the
beginning of union formation. This is rejected by Mazzocco (2007) and lim-
ited commitment is favored. The limited commitment model assumes that in
states where individuals utility within households are lower than outside op-
tions, renegotiation within households will be triggered. The model adopted in
this paper is similar to that of Voena (2015), where she examines how divorce
law change in the US affects married household members’ behavior. Another
similar work is by Gemici and Laufer (2011), who consider cohabitation using
a similar model with the National Longitudinal Survey for the US. However,
they focus on the efficiency issue within households while this paper focuses
on union stability.
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2.3 Data and Reduced Form Analysis
The data set used in the empirical analysis is from the Mexican Family Life
Survey. This panel data set consists of three waves: the years 2002 to 2003,
2005 to 2006, and 2009 to 20124. The initial sample from 2002 consists of
8400 households in 150 urban and rural communities. In this work, I focus on
households that were already formed with one male partner and one female
partner in 2002. One of the partners has to be the head of household. Both
the male partner and female partner have to be living in the household in the
year 2002. The male partner should be aged at least 25 years old and younger
than 55 years old. In total, there are 3352 eligible households in year 2002,
with 2848 married households and 504 cohabiting households. Cohabitation is
not uncommon in Mexico, even back to the 1990s. In the 2000 Mexico census
and 2010 Mexico census, there were 23% and 38% cohabiting unions among
all unions, respectively. Cohabitation has become more common over time.
The summary statistics for the households in 2002 are illustrated in Table
E.1. Male partners and female partners in cohabiting households are on aver-
age 2 years younger than partners among married couples. In this year, the
average number of years cohabiting in the sample is 13.5 years. The average
4For the last panel, the majority of interviews were completed in 2010. Due to tracking
issues, some households were only reached until year 2012.
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number of years married in the same sample is 18 years, 4.5 years longer than
cohabiting households. The age difference may explain part of the difference in
number of years of union formation. The average age for men when forming a
union is 22 for married households and 24.5 for cohabiting households. In my
empirical analysis, I assume all unions are formed when male partners are 25
years old. Cohabiting households have fewer children than do married house-
holds. In this work, I do not model decisions on having children, and consider
the number of children as given. For education, I consider two categories: hav-
ing finished high school or above, and not having finished high school. Similar
to other literature, the average education level is higher for married house-
holds than for cohabiting households. In married couple, 24% of males and
16% of females finished high school, while 18% of males and 10.5% of females
finished high school in cohabiting households. Married households have about
70% more asset than do cohabiting households. There could be several expla-
nations for such differences in assets. First, the difference could partially be
explained by the difference in education level. Second, couples may require a
certain level of asset possession in order to get married. Third, married house-
holds may invest or save more as mentioned previously due to intertemporal
commitment. The income difference is smaller than the difference in assets.
Males in married households earn 10% more than in cohabiting households,
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and the difference is insignificant. However, females earn 54% more in cohab-
iting households than in married households. And conditional on the female
who earns income, females in cohabiting households still earn 35% more than
the females in married households. Facing a higher separation rate, women
in cohabiting union may have more incentive to maintain an income source,
as they will need money to survive if they separate from their male partner.
In general, the data is consistent with literature that states that cohabiting
households are more likely to be in economically disadvantaged groups, with
lower education levels and lower asset values.
Of the 2848 married households, 2546 (89.40%) households stayed married
throughout the period of study (three waves of panel). 101 (3.55%) house-
holds changed to cohabitation. 19 households in the 101 households changed
to married again5. The remaining 2016 (7.05%) households got divorced. For
the 504 cohabiting households, 224 (44.44%) households stayed cohabiting
over the period of study. Another 157 (31.15%) households got married later,
and 58(11.51%) households got married, but changed to cohabiting again. Fi-
nally, 65 (12.90%) households got separated. In general, married couples are
less likely to get divorced (separated) compared with cohabiting couples. Ta-
5This behavior seems odd. There could be some errors or typos in the data. However,
the sample size is small and the results are not sensitive if we assume these households
stayed married for entire survey period.
6For households with changing partners, they are considered as divorce or separation in
previous period.
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ble E.2 shows results examining separation and marriage rates for cohabiting
households based on 2002 demographics using multinomial logistic regression.
Households are considered separated if they separated in either 2005 or 2009
panels. Households are considered married if they are married for both 2005
and 2009, or cohabiting in 2005 and married in 2009. All the other house-
holds are considered status quo, which is the base outcome in the regression.
Female income and male asset share7 are positively correlated with separation
rate. These two variables could be indicators of outside options. As men-
tioned previously, individuals facing higher separation rates may deliberately
maintain higher outside options, and higher outside options make individuals
more likely to separate. Total assets and number of children are negatively
associated with separation rate. These two factors can be considered in-house
investments. Households can gain from such investments and hence are rela-
tively more stable. Female education is positively correlated with probability
of cohabiting households getting married. One interpretation could be that
a high education female can manage family bonding better, which may help
households move to marriage. Table E.3 shows results examining divorce rates
for married households. Households are considered divorced if they got di-
vorced in either 2005 or 2009 panels8. Female income is positively correlated
7Discussions on generating male asset share are presented later.
8Households changing to cohabitation are considered in the same category as households
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with divorce rate. Male education and female age are negatively correlated
with divorce rate. Based on this analysis, education and income affect move-
ment among households’ living arrangement. In the empirical part, I consider
households with different education levels separately. The effect of income can
be examined in the model, as it can enter budget constraint. However, effect
of education is hard to model directly. One way could be to model income
process differently for different education levels9, which may not be enough to
capture the differences from education. Another way is to assume that match-
ing qualities differ between different education levels. Hence, I conduct the
empirical analysis separately based on education level of household members.
Literature usually considers three categories for education: combining col-
lege graduate and some college education, high school graduate, and not fin-
ishing high school. Due to sample size concerns, I only consider two categories
for education: finishing high school and above, and not finishing high school
and below. For households, I consider two categories for education match:
households with both partners not finishing high school, and households with
at least one finishing high school. I refer to the first group as low education
households and the second group as high education households. In 2002, there
staying married. The goal for this regression is to examine divorce behaviour. Moreover,
moving to cohabitation still requires certain level of cooperation between male partners and
female partners.
9I do model income process differently based on education level.
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are 2409 low education households, with 2022 (83.94%) of them being married
households and 387 (16.06%) cohabiting households. There are 943 high ed-
ucation households, with 826 (87.59%) married households and 117 (12.41%)
cohabiting households in 2002. I assume high education households and low
education households have different matching qualities, for both cohabitation
and marriage. A high education male or female may care more about quali-
ties with their partners and spend more effort searching for potential partners
before the union is formed. Moreover, education itself could serve as a signal
for matching qualities, which could positively affect matching qualities as well
as reduce variance of matching qualities. Hence, at the beginning, matching
qualities for high education households could be better than that for low edu-
cation households, both in terms of higher mean and smaller variance. After
the union is formed, high education women may enlist more effort to improve
matching qualities within households. This is to say, even if the matching qual-
ities start purely randomly for high education households and low education
households, high education households may invest more in family bonding.
Overtime, matching qualities would become better for high education house-
holds. The results shown in Table E.2 and E.3 may support these arguments,
as education of both the male and female have a positive effect on household
stability.
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To model union dissolution, I need to consider how households allocate
assets and potential money transfer between partners. For married households
in Mexico, the asset allocation depends on the judge. Females may expect to
get 50% to 70% of assets in a divorce, depending on the economic status
of each individual. For cohabiting households, I assume they take the share
of assets belonging to them. The specific question I use to infer the asset
share from the survey is in the section of survey entitled Household Asset.
The question asks: If the household had to sell or make use of the (...), how
many people would make the decision of doing it? Then, respondents have
to indicate the exact members who would make such a decision, including:
themselves, their partners, children, parents, parents in law, brothers and
sisters, and brothers in law and sisters in law. If certain members can make
such a decision, I assume they own part of the asset. I only consider the male
partner and female partner for ownership of the asset. For a specific asset,
the share of ownership for male partner is 1 if he can make the decision on
selling and using while the female partner cannot. The share of ownership is
1/2 if both male partner and female partner can make the decision. A similar
idea applies to female partner. The categories of assets considered in the
questionnaire include; for example, houses, domestic applications, trucks, and
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so on10. Then, I calculate individual owned share of total assets by considering
the value and share of ownership for male and female partners for each asset.
One might worry about the reliability of this indicator as I do not observe the
exact share of each asset. On the one hand, the indicator generated here could
be considered as the true asset share plus noise. Two assumptions to validate
using this indicator are, firstly, there is a positive correlation between true
asset share and the indicator I use; secondly, the noise is purely random and
not correlated with other factors. On the other hand, results in Table E.2 and
Table E.3 may partially justify the validity of this indicator. Male asset share
affects the separation rate for cohabiting households, but not divorce rate for
married households. Another type of regulation to consider is money transfer
between partners; for example, alimony. I do not model this in the current
work for two reasons. Firstly, I do not observe such money transfer in the
data. Secondly, considering the case of money transfer from men to women,
such a transfer can be stopped if the woman gets remarried. This complicates
tracking money transfer in the model. Hence, in this work, I assume married
women get 70% of assets during a divorce, to compensate for the fact that I
do not consider money transfer.
10There are in total 7 categories: 1. House occupied by this household including land;
2. Other house, construction, real estate, plot, agricultural ground or land, 3. Bicycle;
4. Motorcycle, automobile, truck, or any other motorized vehicle; 5. Electronic appliances
(radio, TV set, VCR, Computer, etc.) 6. Washing machine and dryer, stove, refrigerator,
and furniture; 7. Electronic and domestic appliances (blender, iron, microwave, etc.))
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In the following section, I examine income and time allocation for house-
holds and how these evolve over time. These are related to the moments I use
to estimate the model in a later section. The main objective is to demonstrate
that married households and cohabiting households are similar in these aspects
and that it is reasonable to consider these two living arrangement using one
model.
Households are categorized into five groups: 1. Households that stayed
married for three waves of interview; 2. Households that stayed cohabiting
for three waves of interview; 3. Households that changed from married to
cohabiting; 4. Households that changed from cohabiting to married, but not
the other way around11; 5. Households that divorced or separated.
Figure F.1 shows the proportion of male partners having incomes among
all households. Figure F.2 shows the proportion of female partners having in-
comes among all households. In 2002, more than 90 percent of male partners
had incomes. The proportion is similar in 2005, except in the case of married
households that changed to cohabiting. There, the proportion dropped to 85
percent. In 2009, there is a drop in the proportion of male partners that have
incomes. One potential explanation could be the negative economic shock
11For example, a cohabiting household in 2002, that changed to married in 2005 and
changed back to cohabiting in 2009, is not in this category. This household is in previous
category.
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in Mexico in 2009. The GDP growth rate was 1.4% in 2008, and dropped to
−4.7% in 2009. The proportion of male partners that have incomes is the high-
est for households cohabiting for all three waves of interviews. The lines appear
parallel between households remaining cohabiting and married. In 2002, 28%
to 37% of female partners have incomes. The proportions are stable for house-
holds that stay married and cohabiting in 2005. If there is any change, the
proportions drop. This could suggest more labor specialization over time. For
divorced or separated households, the proportion increases to 45%, as now,
female partners are living on their own. They have much stronger incentive
to find an income source. In 2009, the proportion of divorced women that
have income still increases. For households that changed from being married
to cohabiting, and from cohabiting to being married, they seem follow the pre-
vious trend with slightly decreasing proportions. For households that stayed
married and cohabiting over three panels, the proportion of female partners
that have incomes increases in 2009, even despite the negative economic shock.
One explanation could be the add-work effect. As male partners lose jobs or
their income source, the female partners will go out to find jobs or an income
source to support their family. As mentioned previously, the proportion for
male partners having income drops for all five groups of households. But po-
tential for the add-work effect only exists for households staying cohabiting
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or married, which may suggest more cooperation within these two types of
households. In 2002 and 2005, households staying married or cohabiting for
the entire study period have the lowest proportion of female partners having
incomes. This may also suggest the higher degree of labor specialization within
these two types of households. The lines appear parallel between households
staying cohabiting and staying married. To further examine the time alloca-
tion within households, Figure F.3 shows the average number of working hours
per week for men, and Figure F.5 shows the average number of working hours
per week for women. Figure F.4 shows average housework hours per week
for men and Figure F.6 shows average housework hours per week for women.
The graphs suggest labor specialization in all types of households, with men
spending more time working and women spending more time on housework.
Notable is that the women’s hours of housework dropped for all types of house-
holds over time. One explanation could be a better production asset within
households. In the household production function I consider in later section, I
model household production function depending on production asset value to
account for decreasing female housework hours.
To summarize, based on summary statistics and reduced form analysis, co-
habiting households are less stable than married households. Female income is
negatively correlated with household stability. Male asset share decreases sta-
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bility of cohabiting households, but not that of married households. All types
of households show labor specialization, with the households continuing stay-
ing married and cohabiting showing this to the greatest extent. Education also
interacts with living arrangement. Compared with low education households,
a greater proportion of high education households choose marriage. Moreover,
over time, high education cohabiting households are more likely to result in
marriage, with female education playing a significant role. Male education de-
creases the divorce rate within married households. In next section, I develop
a model to further examine these effects.
2.4 Model
The model I consider is a household collective model with limited commit-
ment. Male partner and female partner jointly decide savings, labor supply
and household production. This model focuses on households that are already
formed. Only married households and cohabiting households are examined. I
do not consider the matching process between male and female partners.
The household lives from period 1 to period T. Male partner and female
partner work from period 1 to period T-R, and retire from period T-R+1 to
period T. In each period, each household chooses from the following three living
arrangements: being married, cohabiting, or getting divorced or separated. 12.
12In this work, divorce means that husband and wife divorce and no longer make decisions
67
2.4.1 Preferences
Male and female partners derive utility from leisure li, and composite good Qi
produced within household, for i = H,W 13. If the male partner and female
partner choose to stay together, either married or cohabiting, they derive a
utility θjt , which is observed by the couple but unobserved by econometricians,
depending on their living arrangement, where j = M,C14. Thus, the flow
utility for male partner and female partner in each period can be expressed as
follows:
uMarriedit = u(lit, Qit) + θ
M
t
uCohabitit = u(lit, Qit) + θ
C
t
uDivorceit = u(lit, Qit)
(2.1)
Utility from leisure and composite good are assumed to be separable. I use a
CRRA utility function for composite good and linear utility function for leisure
as shown in Equation 2.2. There is an additional penalty for men if they do
not work. hwHt denotes hour of work for men. IhwHt=0 is indicator function. φ is
a number between 0 and 1. Men lose part of the utility from leisure if they do
not work. There are two potential explanations. Firstly, as men are usually
as one household. If a household changes from being married to cohabiting, this means
they divorce but still make decisions as a household. If a household changes from being
married to divorced, this means they no longer make decisions as a household. Similarly,
if a cohabiting household changes to separated, this means male and female partners no
longer make decisions as a household.
13H indicates male partner and W indicates female partner
14M indicates married and C indicates cohabiting.
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considered the main income source within households, they may suffer certain
psychological costs if they do not work. In such cases, they may not fully enjoy
their leisure time. Secondly, if men do not work, they may spend time looking
for a new job, rather than spending their time for leisure. For women, there
is no such penalty if they do not work.










The unobserved matching qualities, shown in Equation 2.3, follows random
walk both for being married and cohabiting, which captures the persistency in
taste within marriage and cohabitation. If a household stays in the same living
arrangement, the expected matching quality for that specific living arrange-
ment increases over time. Household members gain more from living together,
and are less likely to separate or divorce. If a household moves from being
married to cohabiting, or from cohabiting to being married, there will be no
persistency transmitted. The process for unobserved matching qualities can





t , jt, jt−1 = M,C
²jtt ∼ N(μjt , σ2jt)
θj00 ∼ N(μj0 , σ2j0)
(2.3)
Ijt=jt−1 is indicator function, which takes a value of 1 if the current period living
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arrangement is the same as in the previous period. ²jtt is random shock drawn
in each period. Households draw tastes for marriage and cohabitation for
every period. θj00 is initial matching quality and follows the same distribution
as random shock in each period.
2.4.2 Household production
The composite good produced within a household depends on the amount of
time devoted to in-house production by male and female partners, hhwi for
i = H,W , goods purchased from market are denoted as input, and household
production technology which depends on household capital is denoted as capt.
Qt = input
α
t ∗ (hhwHt + hhwWt)1−α ∗ log(capt) (2.4)
The household production function, presented in Equation 2.4 is in Cobb-
Douglas form. log(capt) captures decreasing return from capital. In-house
labors are assumed to be perfectly substitutable between men and women. In
the literature, researchers usually assume labor specialisation by considering




As it is unclear how cohabiting households and married households can be
differentiated from this aspect, I do not focus on this point. The labor special-
ization in my model is reliant on wage. High wage individuals work outside
70
and contribute to input, and low wage individuals focus more on housework.
Total composite good available for the male and the female partner depends
on equivalent scales et.
QHt + QWt = Qt/et (2.6)
The equivalent scale depends on the number of children in the household. In
this model, the fertility choice is not modeled. Hence, the number of children
is considered exogenous. If households choose to divorce, the amount available
within households for particular individuals is15:
Qit = input
α
it ∗ hhwit 1−α ∗ log(capit), i = H,W (2.7)
2.4.3 Income
From period 1 to period T-R, a household earns both labor income and non-
labor income. From period T-R+1, a household only earns non-labor income.
Non-labor income is considered exogenous in each period. Labor income de-
pends on wage, which is arrived at according to Equation 2.8 below16:
log(wageikt) = max{β0ik + Ihwi,t−1>0β1iklog(wageik,t−1) + ωikt, 0}
ωikt ∼ N(0, σωik)
(2.8)
Ihwi,t−1>0 is an indicator function, with a value 1 if individuals supplied labor in
the previous period and 0 otherwise. This part captures human capital accu-
15Equivalent scale applies similarly if there are children.
16I add 1 peso to all wages to avoid 0 when estimating the transition for wage.
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mulation in the labor market. The process is gender and education specific. i
denotes male partner (H) and female partner (W). k denotes education level.
2.4.4 Budget constraint
The budget constraint for married household and cohabiting household from
period 1 to period T-R if they stay together is:
At + capt + inputt = nlincomet + h
w
Ht ∗ wageHkt + hwWt ∗ wageWkt
+ R ∗ At−1 + capt−1
(2.9)
Total flow of income for each period is the summation of non-labor income




Wt are labor supplied by male partner
and female partner, given wage wageHkt and wageWkt respectively. From
period T-R+1 on, the total flow income is non-labor income only. At is non-
production asset and capt is production asset. inputt is expenditure on goods
purchased from market.
If households move from being married to divorced, household members
will split the assets according to law. There will be a separate budget for each
member. The budget constrain for each member is:
Ait + capit + inputit = sharenlii ∗ nlincomet + hwit ∗ wageikt
+ R ∗ shareasseti ∗ At−1
+ sharecapitali ∗ capt−1
(2.10)
shareasseti ∗At−1 and sharecapitali ∗ capt−1 are the amount of assets the
male partner and female partner can expected to get based on law. sharenlii∗
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nlincomet is the amount of non-labor income that belongs to the male partner
and female partner. Ait and capit are the assets that each individual chooses
in this period. The flow of income consists of labor income of each respective
member and the proportion of non-labor income that belongs to respective
member. If a household moves from cohabiting to separation, the budget
constraint for each individual is similar as above. However, asset division
depends on ownership. Finally, each household member devotes her time to










In each period, for both married households and cohabiting households, the
household maximizes the utility function which is the weighted sum of the
male partner’s and female partner’s individual utilities. The Pareto weight is
denoted by μ, which represents the bargaining power of the male partner and
female partner. In this work, a unilateral divorce regime is adopted. Let st be
the relevant state variable to be considered for each situation excluding living
arrangement, in which the state variable at time t, besides living arrange-
ment, includes: male age17, production assets, non-production assets, asset
17When I solve the model, I only track male age to reduce calculation burden
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share of male partner and female partner, male wage, female wage, non-labor
income, equivalent scale, male education, female education, Pareto weight of
male partner and female partner, and matching qualities.
2.4.5.1 Married household
In each period, a household can choose to continue being married, cohab-
iting, or getting divorced. Let V jt , j = M,C,D, denotes household living-
arrangement specific value function. Vt denotes household value function con-
sidering optimization over the living arrangement. Vjit, i = H,W , denotes
living arrangement specific value function for the male partner and female
partner. Vit denotes individual value function with the living arrangement
being considered at the household level.
If a household chooses to continue being married, they solve the problem
below:
V Mt (st|M) = maxAt,capt,inputt,hwHt,hhwHt ,hwWt,hhwWt,lHt,lWt
μHMt {u(lHt, QHt) + θMt + β ∗ E[VH,t+1(st+1|st,M)]}
+ μWMt {u(lWt, QWt) + θMt + β ∗ E[VW,t+1(st+1|st,M)]}
(2.12)
subject to budget constraint 2.9, time constraint 2.11 and in-house production
constraint 2.4 and 2.6. β is the discounting factor. Households maximize the
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weighted sum of the male partner’s utility and female partner’s utility.
V MHt = u(lHt, QHt) + θ
M
t + β ∗ E[VH,t+1(st+1|st,M)]
V MWt = u(lWt, QWt) + θ
M
t + β ∗ E[VW,t+1(st+1|st,M)]
(2.13)
If a household chooses to cohabit, they solve the problem below:
V Ct (st|M) = maxAt,capt,inputt,hwHt,hhwHt ,hwWt,hhwWt,lHt,lWt
μHCt {u(lHt, QHt) + θCt + α ∗ E[VH,t+1(st+1|st, C)]}
+ μWCt {u(lWt, QWt) + θCt + α ∗ E[VW,t+1(st+1|st, C)]}
(2.14)
V CHt = u(lHt, QHt) + θ
C
t + β ∗ E[VH,t+1(st+1|st, C)]
V CWt = u(lWt, QWt) + θ
C
t + β ∗ E[VW,t+1(st+1|st, C)]
(2.15)
subject to similar budget constraints as choosing being married.
If household members choose to divorce, each member solves the problem
below:
V Dit (st|M) = maxAit,capit,inputit,hwit,hhwit ,litu(lit, Qit) + α ∗ E[Vi,t+1(st+1|st, D)]
(2.16)
subject to individual budget constraint 2.10 and time constraint 2.11. I assume
children live with the wife if divorce occurs. In such a case, the available
consumption for male partner is:
QHt = inputHt ∗ hhwHt ∗ log(capHt) (2.17)
The consumption for the female partner is
QWt = inputWt ∗ hhwWt ∗ log(capWt)/eWt (2.18)
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Utilities for individuals in each case are V MHt (st|M), V MWt(st|M), V CHt(st|M),
V CWt(st|M), V DHt(st|M), and V DWt(st|M). The parameters μijt = μit−1 + κijt , i =
H,W , j = M,C, are chosen to make sure the participation constraints below
are satisfied, where κijt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the respective
participation constraints. Participation constraints for choosing marriage are:
V MHt (st|M) > V DHt(st|M)
V MWt(st|M) > V DWt(st|M)
(2.19)
and participation constraints for cohabiting are:
V CHt(st|M) > V DHt(st|M)
V CWt(st|M) > V DWt(st|M)
(2.20)
Consider households choosing being married. Given their bargaining power 18
from the previous period, households solve Equation 2.12 subject to budget
constraints. Similarly, households solve the problem for choosing cohabitation
and divorce. If both constraints in 2.19 can be satisfied, in that case, we say
marriage is feasible and bargaining power for each member stays the same. If
neither constraint in 2.19 can be satisfied, marriage is infeasible. And if only
one partner is satisfied, we suppose the female partner’s constraint is satisfied.
In such a case, the woman prefers staying in the marriage, while the man wants
to get a divorce. That household will renegotiate bargaining power, increasing
the man’s bargaining power to induce him to stay in the marriage. At the
18I may use bargaining power and weight interchangeably. They mean the same thing.
76
same time, the women should still prefer marriage over divorce. Empirically,
we assume renegotiation continues until the man is indifferent between mar-
riage and divorce, and at same time, the woman considers whether marriage
is still preferable. If such new bargaining power can be found, marriage is still
feasible. Following a similar idea, households also decide whether cohabitation
is feasible. If neither marriage nor cohabitation is feasible, the household gets
a divorce or separates. If only one is feasible, either marriage or cohabitation,
the household chooses the feasible arrangement. If both arrangements are fea-
sible, the household moves to the next stage, and chooses the optimal choice
between these two feasible living arrangements with updated bargaining power
if applicable..
If either constraint 2.21 or constraint 2.22 is satisfied, households will
choose the corresponding arrangement. If neither constraint 2.21 nor con-
straint 2.22 is satisfied, consider the case that the male partner prefers cohab-
itation and female partner prefers marriage.
V MHt (st|M) > V CHt(st|M)
V MWt(st|M) > V CWt(st|M)
(2.21)
V CHt(st|M) > V MHt (st|M)
V CWt(st|M) > V MWt(st|M)
(2.22)
Unlike divorce, cohabitation is not a credible threat, which requires the coop-
eration of the other side. In such a case, I assume the female partner is the one
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who initiates the negotiation19. The female partner will increase the weight
of the male partner in a cohabiting arrangement and induce him to partici-
pate in cohabitation. At the same time, the female partner is also better off
cohabiting. In other words, the female partner tries to find a new weight to
satisfy constraint 2.22. If such a new weight can be found, the household will
choose to cohabitate with the weight changed to the new one20. Otherwise,
the household will remain married.
Following the steps above, after a feasible and optimal living arrangement
is chosen, Vt(st|M), VHt(st|M), and VWt(st|M) can be determined. For a
cohabiting household, the decision process is similar to the above. Vt(st|C),
VHt(st|C), and VWt(st|C) can be evaluated.
2.4.5.2 Divorced household
For the divorced household member, there is probability π that she gets mar-
ried or cohabits again in each period, which is exogenous. With probability
1−π, the household member remains divorced and maximizes individual util-
ity. To make the model empirically trackable, I assume the household member
expects to meet a potential partner the same as the previous partner in terms
of observed characteristics. The unobserved matching qualities are drawn ran-
19In case of divorce, suppose husband wants to be married and wife wants to get divorced.
Since divorce is a credible threat, husband will initiate the negotiation.
20To minimize the distortion, I assume household has the tendency to stay in the original
living arrangement. Hence, at least one of the constrain in (21) has to be strictly satisfied,
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domly. Let sit be the relevant state variables for household member i at time
t. If the divorced household member does not meet a potential partner in this
period, she solves the problem below :
V Dit (st|D) = maxAit,capit,imputit,hwit,hhwit u
Divorce
i,t + α ∗ E[Vi,t+1(st+1|st, D)] (2.23)
subject to budget constraint for a divorced household member with no divorce
cost involved, time constraint 2.11 and in house production constraint 2.7.
If the divorced individual meets someone in the current period, she and the
potential partner have the same status as cohabiting. They can then choose
whether to cohabit, get married or not be together according to the decision
process above. Thus, the expected utility21 for household member i at time t
is
Vit(st|D) = (1− π) ∗ V Dit (st|D) + π ∗ Vit(st|C) (2.24)
and the expected utility22 at the end of period t− 1 is
E(Vi,t(st|st−1, D)) = (1− π) ∗ E(V Dit (st|st−1, D)) + π ∗ E(Vit(st|st−1, C))
(2.25)
2.4.6 Estimation
I solve the model using backward induction. In this model, unions are con-
sidered formed when men are 25 years old. All individuals retire at age 65,
21The expectation is over whether the potential partner can be met
22The expectation is over state variables.
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and die at age 75. In the last period, they spend all the assets with no be-
quest motive. To mitigate potential problems from this assumption, I only
consider households with a male partner between 25 years old and 55 years
old in 2002. There are six parameters to be estimated for each education type
of households: mean and variance of unobserved matching qualities for both
marriage and cohabitation, parameter for utility from leisure, and parame-
ter for penalty if men do not work23. Remaining parameters are borrowed
from literature or estimated using the reduced form analysis. Table E.4 shows
lists of preset parameters. Wage process, decision on capital, re-marriage rate
and re-cohabiting rate are estimated separately based on data. To estimate
parameters for unobserved matching qualities, I consider these four moments:
movement from marriage to cohabitation, movement from marriage to divorce,
movement from cohabitation to marriage, and movement from cohabitation to
separation. I consider female housework and male labor supply to estimate
parameters for utility from leisure and penalty for men not working.
2.5 Results
Results for estimation are presented in Table E.6. Figure F.7 shows matching
between Mexican data and simulated data of living arrangement movement for
23The mean and variance for unobserved matching qualities are education match specific.
Parameter for utility from leisure, and parameter for disutility if men do not work are the
same for two education match types.
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low education households. Given that households are married in the current
period, Figure F.7a shows the distribution of the living arrangement for these
households in the next panel for low education households. The colored bar
shows distribution in the data, and the empty bar shows distribution in the
simulated data. Figure F.7b shows the results for cohabiting low education
households. Figure F.8 shows matching of living arrangement movement for
high education households. Table E.5 shows the corresponding percentage.
Figure F.9 shows matching for male labor supply and female housework. For
male labor supply, the interpretation for 8 to 10 hours is working 8 hours or
more, but less than 10 hours. Similarly, for female housework, the interpre-
tation for 0 to 4 hours is working 0 hours or more, but less than 4 hours.
Remaining categories can be interpreted in similar ways.
Focusing on the living arrangement, the match of movement across living
arrangements is better for married households than for cohabiting households.
One discrepancy for cohabiting households is that there are more households
getting separated rather than married in simulated data compared with real
data. There are two potential explanations for such a mismatch. Firstly, the
unobserved match qualities could be correlated within households. In each
period within one household, the shocks of unobserved matching qualities for
marriage and cohabitation could be correlated. For example, one explanation
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for a negative shock of cohabitation could be that a household wants to move
to marriage, and is no longer satisfied with cohabitation. Hence, they draw
negative shock for cohabitation and positive shock for marriage, and transit
into marriage. However, as I model these two shocks independently, the model
cannot capture such movement and will therefore predict more movement from
cohabitation to separation. Secondly, I model that persistence for unobserved
matching qualities only exists within the same living arrangement. In my
current model, when a household moves from marriage to cohabitation, or
from cohabitation to marriage, I assume the household loses all the previous
accumulated unobserved matching qualities. This could be considered as a
reasonable assumption for a household moving from marriage to cohabitation.
For household moves from cohabitation to marriage, this assumption could be
too strong. Most likely, a cohabiting household will also bring along part of the
previous cumulated matching qualities when it moves to marriage. Without
considering such a possibility, marriage will be less attractive for cohabiting
households and more separation will be predicted based on the current model.
The main concern for not modeling in these two ways is a lack of empirical mo-
ment for identification. For the first case, the correlation between two shocks
needs to be estimated and for the second case, the proportion of unobserved
matching qualities that can be transferred when households move between
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marriage and cohabitation needs to be estimated. Moreover, the true model
could also be the combination of these two explanations.
In the sample, 90% of divorces and separations are triggered by men unilat-
erally, and the remaining 10% are triggered by both men and women mutually
based on simulation. Individuals will trigger divorce and separation if the
utility from the current union with highest power assigned is lower than the
utility from living alone. To explain why men are more likely to trigger di-
vorce, I examine the outside options for all the individuals in the sample as
shown in Figure F.10. Figure F.10a shows female outside options, or the esti-
mated value when households separate or get divorced24. Figure F.10b shows
male outside options. To generate the graph, I calculate the value for each
individual in case of divorce or separation from their current union. Then,
I generate mean within each age interval for each household’s type, based
on current living arrangement and education match. On average, men have
better outside options than do women, which provides one explanation for
men being more likely to trigger divorce or separation. Individuals from high
education households have better outside options compared with individuals
from low education households. Married women have better outside options
than do cohabiting women, in both high education and low education house-
24The results for 60 years old are noisy. The sample size is very small here and could be
the explanation for noisy results.
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holds. Cohabiting men have better outside options than do married men for
low education households. For high education households, the comparison is
less clear. However, if we average over all age groups, cohabiting men still
have better outside options than married men. Two factors here can explain
the differences of outside options between cohabiting individuals and married
individuals: different demographic characteristics and laws related to asset
division. In a later section, I will illustrate to what extent the difference in
outside options can be accounted for by different asset division rules. One
important point here is that men have better outside options, especially co-
habiting men. This is one of the channels to explain the differences between
the stability of married households and cohabiting households.
Figure F.11 shows gains from forming unions for low education households
and high education households respectively, based on the sample25. Consider-
ing low education households, each line represents the average gain for a gender
and living arrangement group. The gain is defined as the difference between
the value from forming a union and from being single, either getting divorced
or separated. The figure shows a snapshot of the gain for the Mexican sample.
In married couples, young women gain more from forming a union than do
25The gain is at each specific age, not discounted to one age. As we are considering limited
commitment model, households will consider the gain during each period. Hence, any policy
should consider the gain for household at each period, not a discounted gain to one specific
period, for example the first period.
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young men. Such a difference disappears for older couples. Women gain more
from forming a union at an earlier stage of life and men gain less. Over time,
the gain from forming a union converges for women and men. One explanation
for this convergence of gain from marriage is because of convergence of outside
options. At an earlier stage of life, men have higher outside options compared
with women. Over time, the outside options of men and women converge.
A similar trend of convergence of gain between men and women from form-
ing a union can also be observed in cohabiting households. One implication
here is that over time, men become more attached to the union. As limited
commitment model emphasizes on participation and incentive compatibility
for each period, policy intervention may have different impacts on households
along age dimensions; for example, when a policy is implemented to improve
female welfare within households. This policy could be more effective in older
households. For younger households, such a policy may violate the participa-
tion constraint for men and simply trigger renegotiation of bargaining power
within households, or make forming a union less attractive.
Another observation based on Figure F.11 is that at earlier stage of life, life-
time gain from cohabitation and marriage are very similar for men and women
respectively. Over time, the gain from these two types of union diverges, with
the gain from marriage becoming greater with age. Hence, younger individu-
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als choosing between marriage and cohabitation may get similar benefits from
these two living arrangements. However, over time, due to different match-
ing qualities and their accumulation, the gain from marriage becomes higher.
Similarly, due to the limited commitment for each period, marriage becomes
more stable over time compared with cohabitation. The aforementioned re-
sults hold true for both high education and low education households. This
provides another explanation for the difference between the stability of married
and cohabiting households.
Since the above results are from snapshots of the sample, one may inter-
pret the previous results are due to cohort differences. The demographics and
the sample size could also be different for different age groups and household
types. To make interpretation of results easier, I consider a representative
median household26 from the low education group and one from the high ed-
ucation group. Figure F.13a shows gains from forming a union for these two
households if they are married at age 25, while Figure F.13b shows gains from
forming a union if these two households are cohabiting at age 25. Firstly,
if we compare two living arrangements for each representative household, we
can still obtain similar conclusions as using a snapshot of sample, as shown in
Figure F.12. Over time, the gain for men and women converges within each
26A median household is defined as having wage and asset at the median among all
households. There are two children. Male and female each owns 50 percent of asset.
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living arrangement, and the gain between marriage and cohabitation diverges.
Secondly, referring to Figure F.13, comparing two households across educa-
tion groups, and within each living arrangement, men from high education
households gain more from forming a union than do men from low education
households. The difference between gains is greater in marriage compared with
cohabitation. For women, the gain from marriage is greater for women from
high education households, except at age 30. The gain from cohabitation is
similar for women from both types of households. Over time, married high
education couples gain more from forming a union compared with married low
education couples . However, such a pattern is not observed within cohabita-
tion. One explanation could be that high education households invest more
in marriage than do low education households. However, these two types of
households invest similarly when cohabiting, which could be due to a lack of
intertemporal commitment.
To sum up, the above results suggest that men have better outside options
compared with women. Men are more likely to trigger divorce or separation
for both types of unions. Married men have lower outside options than do
cohabiting men. Since the law for asset division in divorce favors women, this
provides one explanation for marriage being more stable than cohabitation.
Over time, individuals gain more from marriage than from cohabitation. As
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participation constraints need to be satisfied for every period, married couples
are more likely to satisfy constraints. Both differences in matching qualities
and demographic characteristics contribute to such divergences. Next, I con-
sider three counterfactuals to examine to what extent unobserved matching
qualities, asset division law, and difference in demographic characteristic dif-
ferences explain the differences between the divorce rate for married households
and the separation rate for cohabiting households.
In the first counterfactual, I change matching qualities for cohabiting house-
holds in the same way as married households. In the second counterfactual, I
assume cohabiting households follow the same asset division rule as married
households when they separate, in that female gets 70% of assets. In the third
counterfactual, I combine both changes above. I calculate how the simulated
separation rate for cohabiting households changes based on the data.
If cohabiting households have the same matching quality process as married
households, the simulated separation rate decreases from 13.19% to 5.33 %,
59.6% decrease, for low education households. For high education households,
the simulated separation rate decreases from 12.24% to 3.06%, 75.0% decrease.
For both low education and high education households, changing unobserved
matching qualities decreases the separation rate for cohabiting households by
more than 50%.
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If cohabiting households follow the same asset division rule as married
households when a union dissolves, which means the cohabiting female also
gets 70% of assets, cohabiting females are expected to gain and cohabiting
males are expected to lose. Simulated data suggests that the average differ-
ence between the cohabiting female’s outside options and the married female’s
outside options is reduced by 79.2% for low education households, and 49.1%
for high education households. Previous analysis suggests that cohabiting
women have lower outside options than do married women. Married women’s
outside options stay the same. Such a change is driven by improvement of co-
habiting women’s outside options. The number above also shows the extent of
differences in outside options that can be explained by the law of asset division
between cohabiting women and married women. One important rationale for
such a policy is to improve women’s utility upon separation from cohabiting
unions. The average difference between cohabiting men’s outside options and
married men’s outside options shrinks by 73.4% for low education households,
and by 96.6% percent for high education households. On average, cohabiting
men have better outside options than married men. Similar to married women,
married men’s outside options stay the same in this counterfactual. Cohabit-
ing men’s outside options decrease. This is a potential channel to explain the
decrease in separation rate for cohabiting households through such regulation.
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Since men are more likely to trigger separation, by decreasing their outside op-
tions, separating from their partners is less attractive. The simulated results
suggest, with the same asset division rule imposed on cohabiting households,
for low education households, the separation rate decreases from 13.19% to
11.56%, a 12.4% decrease. For high education match households, separation
rate decreases from 12.24% to 11.73%, a 4.2% decrease.
In the third counterfactual, the separation rate for low education house-
holds decreases from 13.19% to 4.59%, a 65.2% decrease. For high educa-
tion households, the separation rate decreases from 12.24% to 3.06%, a 75.9%
decrease. Comparing cohabiting households with married households in the
current counterfactual, the only differences now are the observed character-
istics. These explain the remaining differences between the separation rate
of cohabiting households and the divorce rate of married households in the
sample.
Hence, for low education households, unobserved matching qualities ex-
plain 72.64% of the difference between the separation rate of cohabiting house-
holds and divorce rate of married households. Divorce law explains 15.06%.
Jointly, these two factors explain 79.48% of differences. For high education
households, unobserved matching qualities explain 93.96% of the difference
between the separation rate of cohabiting households and divorce rate of mar-
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ried households. Divorce law explains 5.22%. Jointly, these two factors explain
93.96%.
The unobserved matching qualities explain the majority of the difference
between the separation rate of cohabiting households and divorce rate of mar-
ried households. The effect is much higher for high education households.
As mentioned previously, both self-selection and different in-house investment
contribute to differences in matching qualities. From the point of view of
different in-house investment, this result could support literature suggesting
the increasing return from in house investment along income and education
dimension. Marriage can facilitate in-house investment. Such investment is
more productive in high education and income households. For example, re-
turn from investment in children is much higher for high education and income
households. Such a phenomenon may also exist along other dimensions of in-
vestment. Many tangible in house investments may show discrete natural, and
low income households may not be able to purchase these huge assets. High
education individuals may manage in-house bonding activities much better
than do low education individuals. Potentially, high income and education
households could gain more from forming unions. Hence, unobserved match-
ing qualities may play more of a role in differentiating cohabiting households
and married households for high education households.
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The law of asset division explains around 15.06% and 5.22% of the differ-
ences between the separation rate of cohabiting households and divorce rate
of married households for low education and high education households, re-
spectively. This shows a short-run effect of such a regulation, as all the other
factors stay the same. However, in the long run, the effect could be much
larger depending to what extent the difference in matching qualities can be
explained by different in-house investment and self-selection, respectively. If
self-selection explains most part of the differences in matching qualities, such
a regulation on cohabiting households will have little impact on improving
matching qualities for existing couples. Otherwise, with additional regula-
tion for cohabiting households, cohabiting couples may invest more in family
bonding and public goods. The unobserved matching qualities for cohabit-
ing households may converge to married households. As unobserved matching
qualities have a much larger effect on decreasing the separation rate, the aim
of such policies should be to improve matching qualities of couples, rather than
to decrease outside options of individuals.
For future couples, the consequence of such a regulation would be more
complicated. One important issue to consider is how such a policy affects the
selection process into different unions. One concern would be that couples
that can cohabit with no regulation may choose not to form a union in light
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of the additional regulation. Especially for men, forming a union may not
be attractive compared with living alone. Women may get hurt in such a
case as they gain more from forming the union. Without modeling the union
formation, it is unclear how such a regulation will affect future generations.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I examined factors affecting households’ stability by adopting
a dynamic household collective model with limited commitment. I consid-
ered three factors: unobserved matching quality, asset division which affects
outside options, and different demographic characteristics. Specifically, I com-
pared married and cohabiting households and examined to what extent the
differences in stability between these two types of living arrangement can be
explained by each factor. As suggested by literature, there is an education
gradient for living arrangement preferences. I separated households into two
groups based on education level.
Unobserved matching qualities explain most differences between the sta-
bility of married households and cohabiting households, and explain more for
high education households than low education households. Differences be-
tween unobserved matching qualities could be due to the selection process at
the initial stage when the union is formed. It could also be the results of
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different investments within households after a union is formed. Current work
cannot separate effects from these two aspects. This could be studied in the
future. For example, a framework with an initial matching process could be
incorporated. From the literature, it was also found that high education and
income households get a much higher return from their in-house investments,
for example on children. This could be one explanation for the fact that un-
observed matching qualities matter more for high education households. Due
to the stronger intertemporal commitment generated within marriage, mar-
ried households invest more within their households than do corresponding
cohabiting households. Return from such investments could be higher for high
education households compared with low education households. Hence, such
unobserved matching qualities would matter more for high education house-
holds. On the other hand, it is also possible that high education individuals
spend more time searching for suitable partners, which leads to better ini-
tial matching qualities. As mentioned before, studies considering the initial
matching process should be performed to confirm this possibility.
Asset division explains 5% to 15% of differences in stability between mar-
ried households and cohabiting households depending on education level, with
a smaller effect on high education households. For married households, divorce
law usually favors women by allocating more assets to them. By adopting a
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similar law for cohabiting households in the counterfactual, on the one hand,
it can increase women’s welfare upon separation from their current partners.
One the other hand, it can decrease men’s outside options, or utility upon sep-
aration. Both are confirmed by the simulated results. It is the second channel
that can potentially decrease the separation rate for cohabiting households.
In general, men tend to have better outside options, and are more likely to
trigger separation. By decreasing men’s outside options, they are less likely
to trigger separation. From the perspective of couple as a whole, there is a
possibility that dissolution of the current union is ideal. If matching qualities
for the couple are low, it is not obvious whether it is ideal to force them to
stay together by imposing additional laws. However, one important issue not
calculated in this work is the welfare of children. Presumably, upon separa-
tion of a couple, children will suffer. And children from a cohabiting union are
expected to suffer more. Further work should also be done to consider welfare
changes for children.
Results of the counterfactual of asset division for cohabiting households
could be interpreted as a short run effect. In the long run, the effect could
be larger as it may change investment behavior within households for the
cohabiting couple. Moreover, it can also alter the initial matching qualities
for future couples. As argued in this paper, polices should be designed to
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help improve matching qualities of couples, rather than decrease individuals’
outside options, if policy makers aim to increase stability of unions.
With cohabitation becoming more popular, works examining welfare im-
plications of such a trend are relevant. This work examines this issue from
the perspective of household stability. Future work from other perspectives,
such as focusing on welfare distribution within a cohabiting union, children’s
welfare, and transition between cohabitation and marriage, are also impor-
tant. Mexico, Latin American countries, and some north European countries
are unique in the sense that cohabitation has a long history. These countries
could serve as future reference for countries in which cohabitation is not yet
common. This paper only considers asset division. Other regulations should





Policy and Ozone Pollution in
Sao Paulo
3.1 Introduction
In recent decades, effective emissions control policies, particularly of volatile
organic compounds (VOC), may have shifted the ozone production regime
in urban atmospheres in the United States and elsewhere, from the “VOC-
saturated” to the “VOC-limited” regime. Under such atmospheric conditions,
further reductions in the volume and reactivity of VOC emissions can reduce
the formation of ozone, a secondary pollutant that at the ground level harms
human health, whereas reductions in nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions can
actually cause ozone concentrations to rise (Jacob 1999). Conversely, under
VOC-saturated (“VOC-insensitive” or “NOx-limited”) conditions, ozone pro-
duction is insensitive to variation in VOC emissions and increasing in NOx
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emissions.
Knowledge of the atmospheric ozone production regime, and how it may be
changing over time, is therefore critical to designing successful ozone control
strategies. Such knowledge is not acquired without cost, however, as evidenced
by a large atmospheric modeling literature that studies the chemistry of atmo-
spheres over specific metropolitan areas or regions, and how its composition
evolves over the annual, weekly and daily cycles. Models build on our current
understanding of chemical and physical reactions of species in the atmosphere,
and are based on often incomplete inventories of anthropogenic and biogenic
emissions, by chemical species over time and in space. These computationally
intensive differential-equation models are then used to predict how specific
emissions control policies, for example, changes in the mix or composition of
fuels utilized in the urban transport fleet, impact ambient pollutant concen-
trations, such as ozone (O3) and particulate matter (PM). Madronich (2014)
states: “uncertainties in numerical models often preclude firm conclusions re-
garding the dominant control over ozone chemistry in a city” (p.397). The
difficulty in diagnosing the state of the local atmosphere is also suggested by
the fact that, whereas decades of pollution control have led to the abatement
of urban pollutants such as carbon monoxide (CO), NOx and PM, the record
on ozone abatement is more mixed.
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A case in point is the metropolis of Sao Paulo, in southeastern Brazil.
Home to 20 million people, the Sao Paulo metropolitan area combines 40 mu-
nicipalities and accounts for one-fifth of the country’s GDP. Over the 1980s
and 1990s, the metropolis experienced a steady process of deindustrialization,
as factories moved inland or out of state. The economy today is dominated by
services, and power generation is mostly hydroelectric. With a mild climate
that requires minimal winter heating, the predominant source of anthropogenic
emissions of ozone precursors—NOx, VOC and CO—is road transport. The
circulating fleet is comprised of 6 million passenger cars, burning a mix of
gasoline and ethanol that has varied over time, 1 million motorcycles pre-
dominantly powered by gasoline, and 120,000 diesel buses and trucks. Both
gasoline fuel—in fact a blend containing a 20 to 25% volumetric component
of pure ethanol, thus referred to as E20/E25—and ethanol fuel—in the form
of E100—are universally available at the pump, one nozzle typically alongside
the other. Among regulated air pollutants, ozone often exceeds the standard
(CETESB 2013) and is the one species that did not exhibit a downward trend
in the period 2000 to 2013 (Perez-Martinez et al. 2015).1
1Sao Paulo’s maximum daily 8-hour ozone standard is 140 μg/m3, or about 71 parts per
billion (ppb). Sao Paulo State Decree 59113, issued April 23, 2013, signals a long-run reduc-
tion to 100 μg/m3 (51 ppb), citing current scientific knowledge of the health damage of ozone.
For comparison, the new (2015) US NAAQS for ozone is 70 ppb. The US EPA summarizes
trends for the US as follows: “Nationally, average ozone levels declined in the 1980s, leveled
off in the 1990s, and showed a notable decline after 2002” (epa.gov/airtrends/ozone.html,
accessed on May 10, 2016).
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An atmospheric modeling study, calibrated to Sao Paulo using the avail-
able emissions data, predicted that if all passenger cars were to run on ethanol
(E100) rather than a combination of the ethanol and blended gasoline (E20/E25)
fuels that heterogeneous consumers purchase at retail, then ozone levels would
fall by up to 55% (Martins and Andrade 2008a). However, a recent empirical
(econometric) study found the opposite effect (Salvo and Geiger 2014). The
study exploited drivers of “flexible fuel” vehicles (FFVs) substituting between
blended gasoline and ethanol as relative prices fluctuated at the pump, and
concluded that substitution into ethanol caused ozone levels to rise. This sin-
gle test suggested that modern-day Sao Paulo’s atmosphere is VOC-limited,
by which higher ozone levels associated with an increased ethanol fraction in
the fuel mix was due either to (1) higher reactivity of VOCs from ethanol rela-
tive to gasoline use, whether via combustion or evaporation processes, and/or
(2) lower NOx emissions from ethanol combustion relative to gasoline.2 Salvo
and Geiger’s empirical finding was consistent with a controversial atmospheric
modeling study that predicted that ozone levels would rise in Los Angeles,
and elsewhere in the US, were passenger cars to adopt E85 ethanol over E10
gasoline (respectively, ethanol and gasoline fuels that are retailed in the US)
2Section 2 cites vehicle emissions standards legislation that allows carmakers to exclude
(i.e., simply ignore) the mass of unburned ethanol, itself a reactive VOC, that is emitted
from the tailpipe.
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(Jacobson 2007, Ginnebaugh et al. 2010).
This paper, based on four separate quasi-experiments, provides an impor-
tant second empirical test of the combined hypotheses that the Sao Paulo
megacity’s atmosphere is VOC-limited and that higher fractions of ethanol at
the expense of gasoline in the light-vehicle fuel mix cause ozone levels to rise.
Rather than take as identifying variation FFV owners choosing either E20/E25
gasoline or E100 ethanol at the pump as relative prices vary, the present study
exploits discontinuities in the composition of gasoline fuel, between E20 and
E25, mandated by the central government. We adopt a regression discontinu-
ity design (RDD), with time as the forcing variable, and separately examine
four discontinuities that occurred in recent years: out of E25 and into E20 in
February 2010, back to E25 in April 2010, again into E20 in October 2011,
and back to E25 in May 2013. On each occasion, the ethanol discontinuity
in the volume of gasoline fuel sold at retail, of 5 percentage points, was not
large. This design feature, coupled with the natural variability in ozone levels,
suggests that the power of the test might not be high. On the other hand, the
limited shift in fuel composition that the policy mandated—i.e., 5 percent of
gasoline fuel—is an advantage of the design, since fuel changes were not salient
to gasoline consumers, some of whom might otherwise have responded along
the extensive margin of fuel choice (substitution with E100) or the intensive
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margin of driving (usage), potentially confounding our inference.3 Moreover,
it is fortunate for the purpose of our empirical test that, at the time of each
of the four discontinuities, E20/E25 gasoline users accounted for a majority
share, in terms of distance traveled, of light vehicles including motorcycles. 4
Our results weigh in favor of the hypothesis that Sao Paulo’s current at-
mosphere is VOC-limited and that raising the ethanol fraction in the fuel mix
causes ozone levels to rise. Our preferred point estimates, based on local lin-
ear regression, suggest that ozone levels rose by 7-9% when E25 substituted
for E20 (with standard errors of 2 to 3 log points), and these estimates are
consistent with what Salvo and Geiger found using identifying variation of
different design. Thus, our empirical finding joins the single empirical study
to date in countering modeling work that suggested that ethanol use would
abate ozone levels in Sao Paulo. As we argue below, to the extent that rela-
tive atmospheric concentrations of pollutants in Sao Paulo, interacted with its
meteorology, reasonably resemble conditions found in some urban areas and
seasons in the US today, our results suggest that ozone levels could rise as the
ethanol fraction in gasoline grows beyond 10%, e.g., from E10 to E20, to meet
statutory Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) requirements (36 billion gallons of
3We also verify that prices per liter at the pump were not discontinuous at the four
cutoffs.
4A parallel can be made with Auffhammer and Kellogg (2011)’s study, also based on
RDD, of the effect on ozone pollution of policies shifting US gasoline content; fortunately,
they do find that their tests have power.
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biofuel by 2022, up fourfold since 2008).5
In contrast to ozone, we fail to detect changes in PM2.5 concentrations as
the composition of gasoline shifted between E20 and E25. To the best of our
knowledge, ours is the first empirical test of the relationship between gasoline-
ethanol use and ambient PM2.5 levels (particulate matter with aerodynamic
diameter up to 2.5 μm). Our findings for ozone and PM2.5 guard against
statements, including those by industry-funded groups and subsidy-seeking
politicians, that advocate ethanol on air quality or public health grounds. 6
The paper makes three main contributions. First, it provides significant
empirical evidence on the causal relationship between ethanol use and ground-
level ozone in Sao Paulo (population 20 million). It detects a positive ethanol-
ozone response by employing credible and different quasi-experimental variation—
regulatory discontinuities in gasoline content—compared to Salvo and Geiger
(2014), where consumers’ response to prices also had to be estimated. Our
result, as does Salvo and Geiger’s, counters predictions for Sao Paulo based
5Arguing against the 10% “blend wall” and “arcane barriers” in the form of gasoline va-
por pressure regulations, the US ethanol trade association claims: “research...demonstrates
that gasoline blends containing 20-40% ethanol can deliver the octane needed to maximize
efficiency in advanced internal combustion engines” (p.8, RFA 2016).
6For example, in a radio interview in 2010, a former Secretary of the Environment claimed
that “last time the government mandated a reduction in the ethanol fraction in gasoline
from E25 to E22, the environmental authority’s air quality monitors, which are scattered
throughout the city, immediately indicated a deterioration in air quality... and that was
only with a 3 percentage point reduction” (CBN Noticias 2010). In the US, the American
Lung Association of the Upper Midwest asserts that “E85 has been recognized as a Clean
Air Choice” (cleanairchoice.org/fuels/e85.cfm, accessed on May 10, 2016).
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on atmospheric modeling of a hypothetical shift in the fuel mix.7
Second, our paper enables subsequent research on the health effects of
ozone. Deschenes et al. (2012) describe the “contentious current academic
and policy debates about ambient ozone pollution” (p.3), in particular, sur-
rounding the US EPA’s recent tightening of ambient ozone standards.8 By
using a different design to validate a recently established empirical result, we
aim to make shifts in the fuel mix a credible instrumental variable for ozone
variation in the analysis of health outcomes, including hospitalizations and
mortality. Research into how ozone in Sao Paulo affects public health lies
beyond the scope of this paper and is being pursued separately. By helping
to inform on ozone’s health damage, our result has policy relevance beyond
regions that share Sao Paulo’s atmospheric conditions. Third, by targeting an
economic policy audience and bringing added evidence to bear on what ozone
chemistry theory indicates is an empirical question, the paper highlights a re-
sult that is relevant beyond Sao Paulo, such as US regions that share features
of Sao Paulo’s atmosphere and where policymakers are considering regulation
to raise the ethanol content in gasoline. We further discuss ozone produc-
7Madronich (2014) argues that “a purely empirical approach (can) circumvent the prob-
lems associated with atmospheric chemistry modeling,” adding that “empirical analysis...(is)
needed to evaluate the reliability of atmospheric chemistry models designed to simulate the
effects of the transportation sector on air quality” (pp.395-7).
8Deschenes et al. (2012), citing ten references in the academic and policy literatures, add:
“These ozone standards are so contentious partly because there is substantial uncertainty
about how ozone affects health” (p.3).
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tion regimes in Section 2 and cite literature arguing that, following decades
of VOC emissions control programs (US EPA 2004, Table 1), VOC-limited
conditions similar to Sao Paulo’s might be increasingly relevant in the US,
including locations where ozone concentrations are not lower on weekends rel-
ative to weekdays (Stedman 2004, Stephens et al. 2008, Fujita et al. 2016).
Chicago provides one such example where (1) recent research argues that “O 3
production in Chicago became more sensitive to VOCs starting in 2008/2009
and may have switched from being NOx-limited to VOC-limited” (Jing et al.
2014), and (2) higher ethanol penetration in the fuel mix in the form of an
“E15 gas station ordinance” is being debated (e.g., Chicago Tribune 2015).
The balance of the paper is as follows. Section 2 lays out the hypothesis
and discusses its potential relevance to the US. Section 3 presents key features
of the policy setting and the data. Sections 4 to 5 describe the design we
adopt, our specification, and our results. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Hypothesis and increased relevance to the
United States
To develop the hypothesis that increases in the ethanol fraction of blended
gasoline raise ozone pollution in urban centers such as Sao Paulo, we (1)
discuss the relevant ozone chemistry, including its relevance to US cities. We
then briefly (2) report on tailpipe emissions (and associated) studies of gasoline
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and ethanol combustion, focusing on ozone precursors, and (3) describe the
variation used in the single empirical test of a positive ethanol-ozone response
to date.
3.2.1 Cross-disciplinary theory
Jacob (1999, Ch.12) provides a textbook treatment of photochemical ozone for-
mation in the troposphere, whereby sunlight triggers reactions involving the
interaction of nitrogen oxides (NOx = NO + NO2) and VOCs (reactive hydro-
carbons). These ozone precursors are emitted from local and regional anthro-
pogenic and biogenic sources, such as vehicles, industry, crops and trees, and
their relative abundance in the local (i.e., unmixed) atmosphere determines
the ozone production regime. Two regimes, with ozone production character-
ized by a very different sensitivity to precursors, are described most simply by
way of comparative statics; in particular, see Jacob (1999) Fig. 12-4 showing
ozone concentration isoquants as a function of VOC and NOx emissions.
In a NOx-limited regime, say a rural area downwind of a city or suburb,
ozone concentrations are increasing in NOx emissions and are insensitive to
VOC emissions. In contrast, in a VOC-limited (VOC-sensitive) regime such as
a large urban center, ozone concentrations are increasing in VOC emissions yet
are decreasing in NOx emissions. Thus, formulating a strategy to abate ozone
pollution requires knowledge of the regime. For example, in a VOC-limited
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environment, NOx control that is not accompanied by VOC control may allow
ozone levels to rise. Alluding to the imprecision of emissions inventories that
feed into computer simulations of atmospheric science, Jacob (1999) writes
that “(t)he early models were in error in part because they underestimated
emissions of hydrocarbons from automobiles, and in part because they did not
account for natural emission of biogenic hydrocarbons from trees and crops”
(p.238).9
Stedman (2004) provides a readable explanation (including to non-chemists)
of time-dependent ozone production processes. Triggered by sunlight, reaction
rates are increased at high temperature, e.g., in the afternoon hours, outside
the colder months of the year. Stedman divides the physical time path of
ozone—driven by wind and suppressed or produced by local precursors—into
four distinct segments. In an “upwind segment” A, ozone typically flows in
from sources that are upwind to an urban area, and even descends from the
stratosphere. In a subsequent (time and space) “titration segment” B, having
reached the urban area characterized by high economic activity, ozone blowing
in from upwind is depleted by nitric oxide (NO) emissions, such as from road
vehicles: “The more NO is emitted, the longer the ozone concentration level is
9For more on ozone chemistry, including the use of (estimated or assumed) emissions
inventories as an input to atmospheric modeling studies, see Seinfeld and Pandis (1998) and
Finlayson-Pitts and Pitts (2000).
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suppressed. We expect to see ozone levels increasing sooner in time and closer
to the urban area during weekends than during weekdays, because NO emis-
sions are lower on weekends” (p.65).10 Lower NOx emissions accompanied by
higher ozone concentrations on weekends relative to weekdays, particularly on
sunny summer afternoons, are observed in Sao Paulo. Stephens et al. (2008)
references “the many locations throughout the world (where) (o)bservations of
this effect have been made” (p.5318).11 Of relevance to gasoline versus ethanol
combustion, not only greater NO emissions but also lower VOC emissions in-
crease the length (duration) of the ozone suppression segment.
Subsequent to the ozone-inhibiting titration segment B, say in the urban
area in the early afternoon following high NO emissions during the morning
commute, complex photochemistry in a “VOC-limited segment” C leads to the
buildup of ozone. The higher the mass concentration and reactivity of VOCs,
the faster ozone builds up. Thus, abating VOC emissions—limiting the ethanol
fraction in gasoline being a possibility—has the twin benefit of lengthening the
ozone suppression segment B and of reducing the rate of ozone buildup in the
10Under titration, NO reacts with O3 (ozone) to produce NO2 and oxygen. Thus, NO
depletes ozone.
11For Sao Paulo, Salvo and Geiger (2014, Tables SV and SVI) report afternoon mean
ambient ozone levels of 80 μg/m3 on Sundays and public holidays compared to 68 μg/m3
on non-holiday weekdays—divide by 1.97 to convert to ppb (at US STP). Stephens et al.’s
(2008) list includes US cities/areas such as New York, Baltimore-Washington, Northern,
Central and Southern California, Atlanta, Chicago, and Philadelphia. Fujita et al. (2016)
predicts daily maximum 8-hour ozone concentrations in VOC-limited Los Angeles to rise 18%
under 2030 baseline emissions—NOx and VOC emissions down 61% and 32%, respectively—
relative to 2008, a situation referred to as “NOx disbenefit.”
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subsequent segment C.
Finally, Stedman (2004)’s account of ozone dynamics includes a fourth
“NOx-limited segment” D that is only reached if VOC levels are sufficiently
abundant relative to the amount of NOx input. As a consequence of VOC/hydrocarbon
(including carbon monoxide, CO) emissions control in recent decades, Stedman
explains that segments B (higher NO inhibiting ozone) and C (lower VOCs
reducing photochemical ozone formation) are increasingly relevant across US
metropolitan areas: “As hydrocarbon emissions have gone down nationwide
in the United States, the rate of ozone buildup has decreased nationwide. As
a result, even places like Los Angeles rarely, if ever, reach segment (D), the
NOx-limited regime... The hydrocarbon-limited regime is lasting longer in
time and larger in space as hydrocarbon emissions are reduced...” (p.66).
Critically, in an increasingly prevalent VOC-limited United States, in-
creases to the ethanol content in US retailed gasoline that were to increase
VOC or lower NO emissions might lead to rising ozone levels: “The impor-
tant understanding of recent trends is that hydrocarbon concentrations and
reactivity have gone down so much that even Riverside (well downwind of
Los Angeles) hardly ever reaches this NOx-limited ozone segment before the
sun sets... The continued trend to lower mobile source VOC emissions means
that there are fewer places that benefit from NOx reduction. Most people live
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where ozone levels increase if NOx is reduced” (Stedman 2004, p.66).12
In sum, all other things being equal, fuel/engine combinations that raise
VOC emissions and/or reduce NO emissions in a large urban area may increase
the levels of ozone to which a population is exposed. Higher VOC and/or lower
NO emissions are the likely mechanisms for ethanol consumption in urban Sao
Paulo causing ozone levels to rise, as Salvo and Geiger (2014) found in a single
study to date. In the setting they study, over one million bi-fuel vehicle owners
shifted between gasoline and ethanol combustion as relative fuel prices varied
markedly over time—the consumer price of ethanol (made from sugarcane)
moving in tandem with the world price of sugar, and the price of gasoline
fixed at a roughly constant level by the central government.
3.2.2 Tailpipe emissions, smog chambers, and atmospheric
modeling
Unfortunately, one does not observe emissions from a large, representative
circulating vehicle fleet—not only exhaust but also evaporative emissions—and
operated under real-world conditions. These conditions include vehicle age,
12Among criteria air pollutants in the US, ozone has arguably been the trickiest to
abate over the past decades. Stedman (2004) writes: “The observation of lower CO and
hydrocarbon—ozone precursors—would lead all interested parties to expect continued re-
duction in ozone concentrations. Ozone concentrations however seem to be steady or even
increasing in the last few years. This unexpected observation is partly explained by the
discussion above which indicates that the improvement expected from the reduction in ur-
ban hydrocarbon and CO emissions has been offset by the concomitant reduction in NO
emissions” (p.66). Also see Lin et al. (2000, 2001).
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maintenance, engine setup including air-fuel ratio and temperature, driving
behavior, powered by the fuels that are actually purchased by consumers,
and so on. Attempting to fill this void, a large environmental engineering
literature has developed, often reporting laboratory (chassis dynamometer)
measurements of tailpipe emissions for a few vehicle/fuel combinations at a
time. With regard to increasing the ethanol content in gasoline, or comparing
ethanol- to gasoline-dominant blends, one reading of this emissions testing
literature is that it is inconclusive, showing large variance for NO and the
wide range of VOC species.13
Though NO emissions trends appear inconsistent, the significantly higher
heat of combustion of gasoline compared to ethanol14 suggests a potential
for higher NO emissions from gasoline combustion. Salvo and Geiger (2014)
discuss why one “may expect that more NOx will be produced during gasoline
relative to ethanol combustion” (p.S11). For example, Hubbard et al. (2014)
report tests for which “(e)missions of NOx decreased by approximately 50% as
the ethanol fraction increased from E0 to E30-E40” but caution that because
“(e)ngine calibration effects are manufacturer and model specific; emission
13See references in Salvo and Geiger (2014, Supplement Part B), and Wallington et al.
(2016). Hochhauser and Schleyer (2014) write: “it is well known that the presence of ethanol
in gasoline results in higher levels of evaporative emissions due to increased permeation of
fuel through fuel system components such as elastomers and plastics” (p.3242).
14Hubbard et al. (2014) report 43 and 29 MJ/kg for gasoline- and ethanol-dominant E0
and E80, respectively.
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trends... will not be the same for all FFVs” (p.861).
A more consistent pattern associates ethanol use with significant emissions
of aldehydes, a class of VOCs with “strong potential for ozone formation”
(p.512, Nogueira et al. 2014). Suarez-Bertoa et al. (2015) report an ozone-
formation potential for E85 that is twice that of E5-E15. Even small changes in
the gasoline ethanol content can have a large proportionate impact on aldehyde
emissions. For example, Durbin et al. (2007) report that “(f)or acetaldehyde, a
significant effect was found for ethanol, with an increase of 73% when ethanol
increased from 0 to 10%” (p.4062). Consistent with ethanol’s penetration
in the light-vehicle fleet, studies of Sao Paulo’s atmosphere report elevated
concentrations of acetaldehyde. Studies include Martins and Andrade (2008a,
2008b), Martins et al. (2008), Orlando et al. (2010) and Nogueira et al.
(2015). These studies also find high concentrations of atmospheric ethanol, i.e.,
emitted unburned out of the tailpipe or through evaporation along the ethanol
supply chain. Tellingly, Brazilian Ministry of the Environment’s Normative
Instruction 54 of November 19, 2004 authorizes reported test results of vehicles
powered by ethanol to exclude the unburned ethanol mass from reported VOC
emissions.15 In a recent field campaign in the US, de Gouw et al. (2012) find
15Specifically, Article 6 states: “On quantifying emissions of non-methane hydrocarbons
from road vehicles powered by hydrated ethanol, the unburned ethanol component of emis-
sions can be excluded.” A personal conversation with an atmospheric scientist indicated
that the neglected unburned ethanol mass and reactivity are likely significant.
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that ethanol has become a ubiquitous compound in urban air, associating this
development with the increased penetration of E10 gasoline blends. US fuel
ethanol use as a proportion of gasoline use rose tenfold from 1% in 2000 to
10% by 2010.
Beyond tailpipe emissions tests, a few studies attempt to simulate the
effect of gasoline and ethanol motor fuels on atmospheric chemical composi-
tion. In a study that was restricted to a smog chamber, Pereira et al. (2004)
suggested that E100 ethanol use could raise ozone levels by 30% relative to
E22-E24 gasoline. An atmospheric modeling study of the Los Angeles basin
concluded that powering vehicles with E85 ethanol versus gasoline would raise
ozone concentrations by a range of 7 to 39 ppb for the conditions studied, and
also increase ambient levels of acetaldehyde, formaldehyde, and peroxyacetyl
nitrate (Ginnebaugh et al. 2010).16
In contrast, a mathematical modeling study calibrated to Sao Paulo’s at-
mospheric system predicted significantly decreased levels of ozone from adding
ethanol to the transportation fuel mix (Martins and Andrade 2008a). A recent
review article underscores the need for air quality studies that are based on
observational (field) rather than simulated data (Anderson 2009).17
16In other modeling studies of the US, Cook et al. (2011) simulated that adoption of
E85 and E10 would raise ozone levels, while Nopmongcol et al. (2011) predicted a negligible
change from E85. Results are very sensitive to assumed tailpipe emissions, e.g., NOx, across
fuels.
17Anderson (2009) writes “(f)or the most part, we ignore the hundreds of individual com-
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3.2.3 Empirics on ethanol and ozone: A single test to
date
E100 ethanol and E20/E25 gasoline are widely available to Sao Paulo’s con-
sumers, and relative prices for the two fuels have moved significantly—though
smoothly—over time. Salvo and Geiger (2014) examined variation in the pro-
portion of bi-fuel (flexible fuel) vehicle owners choosing ethanol over gasoline
fuel at the pump, i.e., the “ethanol share in the bi-fuel fleet,” as relative prices
varied between late 2008 and mid 2011. Bi-fuel gasoline-ethanol engines ac-
counted for about one-half of vehicle miles traveled (VMT) by passenger cars
circulating in the Sao Paulo metropolis; dedicated (single-fuel) gasoline engines
burning E20/E25 accounted for the other half of VMT.
The present study focuses on gasoline blend discontinuities—i.e., E20 ver-
sus E25—as a source of identifying variation, rather than consumers substitut-
ing between gasoline (E20/E25) and ethanol (E100). Before examining these
blend discontinuities, it is useful to describe Salvo-Geiger’s source of variation.
Figure I.1(a) indicates how the price of one liter of ethanol evolved relative
to the price of one liter of blended gasoline at the pump, which was quite
stable; panel (b) plots the ethanol share in the bi-fuel fleet estimated from
pounds that are actually emitted from the vehicle in that broad range of VOC compounds.
As fuel composition changes, it is necessary to look at the details of the VOCs and how they
change with changing fuel composition. If we do not, there can be dramatic effects on air
quality, as we have seen in Brazil” (p.1034).
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these prices. Because Salvo-Geiger did not observe fuel shares, they imputed
these from a first-step demand model estimated from observed fuel prices and
a surveyed distribution of consumer and vehicle characteristics for Sao Paulo
city (Salvo and Huse 2013). As we explain below, we flexibly use relative price
data (a) to control for such variation. Controlling for the estimated ethanol
share (b) would be almost equivalent, given the almost linear empirical rela-
tionship between shares and relative prices (Salvo and Huse 2013),18 except
that we would need to correct for sampling variation in generating (rather
than observing) series (b).
In the Appendix, we use a longer sample than that used by Salvo-Geiger,
55 months from late 2008 to mid 2013, estimating a positive ethanol-ozone
response in Sao Paulo. We also estimate two variants to their two-step empir-
ical model of fuel shares and ambient ozone concentrations. Madronich (2014)
discusses the possible chemical mechanism in support of the observational ev-
idence on ozone, and cautions that “the observed reduction in ozone levels
should not be taken as evidence that a switch from ethanol to gasoline would
improve air quality overall... a switch from ethanol to gasoline probably stim-
ulates the production of secondary organic aerosols” (p.397). Motivated by
Madronich’s perspective, we take advantage of the present study’s regression
18To see this, note that in Figure I.1 series (b) is almost the mirror image of series (a).
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discontinuity design and extended sample period to look for an effect of the
ethanol fraction also on fine particles. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first observational study to examine the relationship between a change in
the ethanol-gasoline fuel mix and ambient PM2.5 levels.19
3.3 Policy setting and data
We exploit discontinuities in the volumetric proportion of (anhydrous) ethanol
that distributors are required to blend into gasoline to test whether ozone con-
centrations in Sao Paulo rise as the light-vehicle fuel mix shifts from gasoline
to ethanol and, similarly, whether ozone falls when the mix shifts back to
gasoline. Over the period between 2008 and 2014, the central government
mandated four changes in ethanol-blended gasoline fuel—see Table H.1. Dur-
ing these years, unblended gasoline E0 was not available at retail, only in
blended form, either E20 or E25, and only a single blend was dispensed at
any given point in time. Blended gasoline was known to consumers simply as
“gasoline.” The mandates applied to all fuel sold by distributors to retailers
across the country. Compliance was likely very high, in part because fuel dis-
19Madronich (2014) conjectures: “ozone is just one component of photochemical smog.
Particulate matter, another key component, accounts for a large fraction of the health
impacts. Urban particulate matter is largely composed of secondary organic aerosols, the
product of photochemical reactions between volatile organic compounds, nitrogen oxides and
ozone. Although yields of secondary organic aerosols rise with ozone concentrations, they
also increase in the presence of heavier volatile organic compounds, such as those emitted
by the combustion of gasoline” (p.397).
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tribution was very concentrated among a few firms (even more so than fuel
retail). These policy shifts and reversals in gasoline content were motivated
by the administration’s industrial policy, including bargaining with the sugar
industry, and were not induced by air pollution in the Sao Paulo metropolis
(Angelo 2012, Salvo and Huse 2011, 2013).
Labeled in chronological order, discontinuities # 1 and # 3, effective for
distributor shipments beginning February 1, 2010 and October 1, 2011 re-
spectively, each consisted of 5 percentage point (percent) decreases in the
proportion of ethanol in blended gasoline, from E25 to E20, i.e., one-quarter
to one-fifth by volume. Discontinuities # 2 and # 4, effective for distributor
shipments beginning May 1, 2010 and May 1, 2013, each consisted of 5 per-
centage point increases in the ethanol fraction, from E20 back to E25.20 For
ease of exposition, we present all results as corresponding to an increase in the
ethanol fraction. Thus, for discontinuity # 1, February 15 2010 would fall in
the “5 percent less ethanol” period (E20), and January 15, 2010 would fall in
the “5 percent more ethanol” period (E25).
20The shift from E25 to E20, effective from February 1 to April 30, 2010, was announced
as temporary on January 11, 2010 (Ministry of Agriculture Ordinance 7). Discontinuity #
3, again from E25 to E20, was announced on August 31, 2011 (Ordinance 678-2011) as open-
ended, as was discontinuity # 4 back to E25, announced on February 28, 2013 (Ordinance
105-2013). Announcing a change a month or two ahead of its implementation is intended
to allow the supply chain to adjust. Thus, ethanol production, which is concentrated in
northwestern Sao Paulo state at least 400 km from the metropolis, was unlikely to adjust
at the date cutoffs. Moreover, in an email interview, a former head of the sugar industry
trade association (UNICA) stated that distributors were unlikely to make the change ahead
of the mandated deadline.
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Over this period, there were no changes in the composition of (hydrated)
ethanol sold to retailers, namely E100, known to consumers as “ethanol.”
The two retailed fuels, ethanol (E100) and blended gasoline (E20 or E25)
were ubiquitously available for consumers to purchase at the pump. Weekly
surveys of about 350 retail stations in Sao Paulo city indicate that distribution
of both gasoline and ethanol remained essentially universal throughout our
study period.21
As described in Section 2, about one-half of miles traveled by passenger
cars in the Sao Paulo metropolis, with a fleet size of 6 million, were equipped
with dedicated (single-fuel) gasoline engines. Bi-fuel vehicles accounted for the
other half of VMT, and their drivers tended to substitute at the pump between
gasoline (E20/E25) and ethanol (E100) as relative prices varied. Whereas an
individual bi-fuel vehicle driver might substitute between gasoline and ethanol
at a given relative price point, substitution in aggregate occurred smoothly
over a wide range of price variation (Salvo and Huse 2013). This means that
changes in fuel shares in the bi-fuel vehicle subpopulation can be captured by
a flexible trend, as discussed in the next paragraph. Also circulating across
the metropolis were, roughly, 1 million motorcycles. These motorcycles were
predominantly equipped with single-fuel gasoline engines.22
21Pump-level prices and availability are from the National Agency for Oil, Biofuels and
Natural Gas (ANP).
22About 120,000 diesel trucks and buses complete the road vehicle fleet (Salvo and Geiger
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Whereas Salvo and Geiger (2014) examined smooth changes in the bi-
fuel vehicle share across gasoline and ethanol, in this study we focus on the
relatively narrow time window around each discrete, abrupt change in the
gasoline blend, from E25 to E20 and back to E25 repeatedly, among consumers
who used gasoline fuel. Gasoline users consisted of dedicated engines and a
gradually varying share of bi-fuel engines, substituting gasoline for ethanol
at the pump. We control for this gradual substitution between gasoline and
ethanol among bi-fuel vehicles by employing a flexible polynomial as well as
observed fuel prices. This is done separately by discontinuity, taking a window
of plus and minus 90 days around each cutoff date, which we explain below.
Figure I.2 shows that fuel prices at the pump (including diesel fuel used by
heavy-duty vehicles) varied smoothly, if at all, in the neighborhood of each
gasoline blend discontinuity. We also include other time-varying controls that
move smoothly, such as traffic congestion to proxy for vehicle use.
As Table H.1 indicates based on available fuel quantity data, at the time
of each discontinuity, blended gasoline fuel accounted for the majority share
2014). Diesel combustion is a major source of NOx and particles (He et al. 2016). These
emissions contribute smoothly to “background” variation in pollution since the volume of
diesel combustion did not jump at the blend discontinuities. Moreover, to the extent that
road emissions in other cities (or highways) in the state affected, through atmospheric trans-
port (Lin et al. 2000, Lin 2010), pollution in the metropolis, shifts in the fuel mix were
similar. In particular, blending requirements applied throughout the country on the same
dates, and gasoline and ethanol prices and usage were similar throughout the state (Figure
I.1). Thus, changes in background pollutants are unlikely to confound our inference of the
ethanol-ozone relationship. The largest city within 600 km of the metropolis has 3% of its
population.
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of light-vehicle fuel sold in the state of Sao Paulo. At the available level of
aggregation, blended gasoline usage ranged from 53% of total VMT by the
light-vehicle fleet around discontinuity # 2, to 76% of VMT around disconti-
nuity # 4. From the fuel market regulator (ANP), we obtained monthly fuel
shipments reported by distributors, separately for E20/E25 gasoline and for
E100 ethanol, and converted millions of cubic meters into approximate ag-
gregate VMT shares. While these reported quantities include supplies to the
state’s highway market, which can vary by season, the quantity data supports
two points we made previously. First, that gasoline fuel dominated ethanol
fuel at the pump on all four occasions, justifying why our research designs
exploits 5-percent discontinuities in its composition. Second, the aggregate
gasoline fuel share varies across discontinuities, e.g., higher for discontinuity
# 4, lower for discontinuity # 2, again justifying why we choose to examine
each discontinuity separately, despite the cost of statistical power.23
Though E20/E25 gasoline was the main source of combustion in the metropo-
lis (CETESB 2013), one empirical challenge we face is that a 5 percentage point
shift in the blend is not large, and we may lack statistical power. At the same
time, a somewhat small shift in fuel composition, which was not salient to
23The blended gasoline share reported in Table H.1 is one minus the aggregate ethanol
share shown in Figure I.1(c). Converting fuel quantities from m3 to VMT requires assump-
tions on the fleet’s fuel economy (see the notes to Table H.1), but using “barrels of oil
equivalent” also reported by ANP yielded similar shares.
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consumers,24 is less likely to induce confounding changes in consumer behav-
ior, whether along the extensive or intensive margins. An example of a con-
founding shift along the extensive margin would be bi-fuel vehicle drivers who
might substitute between E100 ethanol and gasoline at the pump whenever the
composition of gasoline shifts abruptly between E20 and E25. Confounding
intensive margin changes would be driven by motorists who might adjust their
vehicle usage as the composition of gasoline shifts. Consistent with Figure
I.2, in the Appendix we use station-level data (and a regression discontinu-
ity design) to show that the price per liter of gasoline did not significantly
change (neither statistically nor economically) as its composition shifted by 5
percent. Thus, confounding shifts along the extensive and intensive margins
of consumer choice are likely insignificant, or not a source of concern.25 The
change that matters at each discontinuity point is the regulator mandated shift
in gasoline composition.
Another empirical challenge is that the shift in the gasoline blend might
have materialized over a few days. Whereas the ordinances set a sharp dead-
24To emphasize, there were no changes in the labeling of gasoline at the pump as the
blend shifted.
25The usable energy content in ethanol, a partially oxidized hydrocarbon, is about one-
third less than that in E0 gasoline (already accounting for differences in combustion effi-
ciency). Hence, fixing the price per liter, a gasoline blend change from E20 to E25 would in
effect raise the price of the fuel in $ per km by about 1.7%. To the extent this effective price
change is salient to some gasoline consumers and they respond by switching to a choice of
ethanol at the pump, this would help us detect a change in ozone pollution from increased
ethanol use.
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line to distributors for changing the blend, and were announced at least sev-
eral weeks ahead, to impact Sao Paulo’s atmosphere each change had to work
through downstream inventories, particularly in the tanks of cars and motor-
cycles circulating in the metropolis. Our preferred specification uses a sharp
design, with the regression discontinuity falling three calendar days after the
government’s deadline to distributors, e.g., February 4 for the first disconti-
nuity’s shipment deadline of February 1, 2010 (Table H.1). This three-day
lag is meant to account for downstream inventories of older fuel, in tanks at
both retailers and consumer vehicles. Salvo and Huse (2013) found that the
majority of consumers purchase less than half a vehicle’s tank every time and
thus stop to refuel every few days. This suggests that aggregate fuel invento-
ries downstream of distributors should be low, providing some support for our
sharp design with a three-day lag. Note that the blend change can additionally
impact emissions via evaporation along the supply chain, prior to combustion
at the end point of usage, and that there is no separate deadline for retailers.
It is also worth emphasizing that we choose to flexibly examine each of the
four discontinuities separately. This comes at the potential cost of statistical
power. The benefit is that this allows us to control for otherwise potentially
important confounders of air pollution, including seasonality in meteorological
conditions, and confounding variation in economic activity and anthropogenic
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emissions. This matters since the different discontinuities happened at dif-
ferent times of the year, such as the fall month of May versus summertime
February, and in different years, e.g., 2013 versus 2010.
Data. We combine highly spatially and temporally resolved observations
of pollutant concentrations and meteorological and road traffic conditions for
the four 180-day windows, each with a blend discontinuity at the center. From
the Sao Paulo State Environmental Protection Agency (CETESB), we ob-
tained hourly mass concentrations, in μg/m3, for O3 and PM2.5 at all the
EPA’s air monitoring sites in the metropolitan area of Sao Paulo. Besides
ozone, our main pollutant of interest, we consider fine particles as their con-
centration is now monitored (this was not the case in the sample period Salvo-
Geiger considered) and the conjecture that ethanol use may impact PM2.5
levels differentially to gasoline (Madronich 2014). We also obtained concen-
trations for CO and NOx (and its separate components, NO and NO2) in their
measured units, parts per million (ppm) and parts per billion (ppb), respec-
tively. Table H.2 reports summary statistics for the combined four 180-day
samples.
Figure I.3 shows the location of the sites monitoring one or more pollu-
tant.26 During the sample period, there were many more O3 monitoring sites
26Pictures of sites are available in the online appendix to Salvo and Geiger (2014), specif-
ically, page A-S21 on.
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than there were PM2.5 sites. Historically, ozone is the pollutant that has
most often exceeded ambient air quality standards (CETESB 2011). Ozone
exceedance episodes tend to occur outside of the winter months of June to
September.27 Fortunately, each of the four discontinuities we examine also
happened outside of this brief winter period. Table H.2 illustrates ozone’s re-
activity: ambient O3 concentrations in the afternoon hours are about triple
those in the morning, when radiation and temperature are lower, i.e., 1-hour
means (maximums) of 66 versus 23 (353 versus 179) μg/m3, respectively. For
perspective, Brazil’s federal standards include a 1-hour mean ozone level of 160
μg/m3, and the US EPA recently revised its 8-hour ozone standard to 70 ppb,
or about 138 μg/m3. Ozone levels also vary widely in space, with afternoon
means ranging from 77-84 μg/m3 for sites 31 and 5 to 55-56 μg/m3 for sites 29
and 27 (not reported for brevity). Reflecting both the spatial variability and
the public health risk, in 2012 the EPA increased the number of O3 monitors
in the metropolis by 40%.
Likely because the literature on health effects of fine-particle pollution is
relatively recent (Dominici et al. 2014), PM2.5 monitoring began only in Jan-
uary 2011 and at a single site. PM2.5 monitoring had increased to only five
27Solar radiation and temperatures, and thus atmospheric ozone production, fall in winter
relative to the remaining months of the year, but the winter is mild compared to winters in
much of North America.
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sites by 2013. In addition to O3, as Figure I.3 indicates, there is widespread
monitoring of CO and NOx. This is likely due to road transport being the
main source of anthropogenic emissions in the Sao Paulo metropolitan area:
emissions inventories published by the EPA consistently put: (i) passenger
cars and motorcycles (powered by E20, E25 or E100) as accounting for the
majority share of CO and VOC emissions across all sectors of economic activ-
ity, e.g., 91.1% and 70.8%, respectively, according to CETESB (2012); and (ii)
heavy-duty vehicles (trucks and buses burning diesel) as accounting for the
majority share of NOx emissions, i.e., 60.3% according to CETESB (2012).
Beyond O3, PM2.5, CO and NOx levels, VOCs are not automatically mon-
itored by the EPA,28 and SO2 monitors have been gradually deactivated or
moved inland as the Sao Paulo metropolis deindustrialized over the 1980s and
1990s (industrial emissions tend to be the main source of SO2, CETESB 2012).
Importantly, power generation in southeastern Brazil is mostly hydroelectric,
and mild winters imply minimal residential heating.29
Several of the EPA’s pollutant-monitoring sites double as weather stations
measuring, also on an hourly basis, ground temperature, solar radiation, rela-
28Routine monitoring of VOCs is uncommon, presumably due to cost. For example, in a
study of the Chicago area Jing et al. (2014) recommend “(i)ncreased attention should be
paid to improving the quantification of VOC sources, enhancing the monitoring of reactive
VOC concentrations” (p.630).
29For example, hydroelectric plants accounted for 14,226 MW out of a total 19,555 MW,
or 73%, of the electricity generating capacity that was installed in the state of Sao Paulo in
2009 (Negri 2010).
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tive humidity, and wind speed and direction. To these meteorological data we
added hourly precipitation and daily hours of sunshine, recorded by the Insti-
tute for Meteorology (INMET) at a site in the metropolis. We also obtained
readings, every 12 hours, of the presence and height of thermal inversions, as
these interfere with the dispersion of pollutants (Arceo et al. 2016, He et al.
2016). Thermal inversions are monitored by the Brazilian Air Force (FAB)
from one location in the city. Table H.2 shows the conditions we control for
(for brevity, we omit evening meteorology).
To further control for variation in pollutant concentrations, we use data on
road congestion from the city’s traffic authority (Companhia de Engenharia de
Trafego, CET). We observe, at 30-minute intervals, which parts of an extensive
fixed grid, totaling 840 km of road corridors, were congested. Following He et
al. (2016), we partition these roads into geocoded segments of average length
80 meters and observe, at every point in time, whether each segment was
congested (i.e., experienced stop-and-go traffic) or not. We can then integrate
over space to obtain a measure of road congestion that is local to each air
monitor, e.g., within a 2 km radius, or aggregate across the 840-km grid for a
measure of citywide road use.
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3.4 Research design and specification
3.4.1 Regression Discontinuity
Regression discontinuity designs have recently gained popularity among re-
searchers seeking to identify causal relationships. The method takes advan-
tage of a discontinuity in treatment probability near a cutoff point in a running
variable, to identify the treatment effect for a subgroup of the population. Po-
tential confounding factors are assumed to change continuously around the
cutoff point. An example of a potential confounder in our setting would be
price-induced variation in gasoline versus ethanol choices by consumers driv-
ing bi-fuel vehicles. There are two classes of RDD: sharp and fuzzy. In sharp
RDD, treatment is a deterministic function of the running variable, changing
from a weight of 0 to 1 at the cutoff point. In fuzzy RDD, the probability of
receiving the treatment need not change from 0 to 1 at the cutoff.
Hahn et al. (2001) develop formal identification assumptions for treatment
effects in this framework. They propose local linear nonparametric regres-
sion techniques to avoid the poor boundary behavior of the kernel regression




where Y is an outcome variable, X is a running variable that governs the
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treatment probability, and c is a cutoff point. Ti(x) is the treatment status
for individual i for x in some small neighborhood around c. Ti(x) is equal to
1 if individual i receives treatment. In sharp RDD, the preceding expression
is simply τ = limx↓cE[Y |X = x]− limx↑cE[Y |X = x].
In empirical implementations, researchers may choose to use data that, in
terms of the running variable, are realized at some moderate distance from the
cutoff. For example, sample size might be a concern. To reduce potential bias
from including such observations, one may control for additional covariates.
Imbens and Lemieux (2008) find that including covariates likely does not affect
identification and may improve the precision of estimates.
Even in the presence of control variables, one might not feel confident that
limx↓cE[Y |X = x] and limx↑cE[Y |X = x] can be well approximated by a
global linear function. It is therefore common practice in RDD applications
to specify a variety of high-order polynomial functions of the running variable
with the hope of fitting the data on either sides of the cutoff point. The treat-
ment effect is then obtained from the behavior of the polynomial tails near the
cutoff point. Recently, Gelman and Imbens (2014) argued against such prac-
tice, since high-order polynomials can assign excessive weight to observations
that are distant from the cutoff, conflicting with the idea of RDD. There are
no clear guidelines for choosing the order of polynomial, and estimates can
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be sensitive to modeling choice. Gelman and Imbens recommend the use of
estimators based on local linear or quadratic polynomials and other smooth
functions.
Implementing local polynomial regression requires that the researcher spec-
ify the kernel function, polynomial order and the bandwidth. Standard kernels
include the triangular, uniform and Epanechnikov kernels. In our work, we
specify a triangular kernel function. Local polynomials are typically spec-
ified to be linear or quadratic. In our work, we adopt local linear regres-
sion. Perhaps the more controversial choice is specifying the bandwidth. The
nonparametric literature suggests that estimation results can be sensitive to
bandwidth selection (Calonico et al. 2014a). In an RDD framework, Ludwig
and Miller (2007), DesJardins and McCall (2008), Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012), and Calonico et al. (2014b) study bandwidth selection criteria, making
different recommendations. In our work, we adopt bandwidth tests developed
by Calonico et al. (2014b) and, alternatively, by Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012), hereafter referred to as CCT and IK, respectively. These criteria are
asymptotically optimal under square error loss.
RDD in the evaluation of environmental and energy policy. In
the environmental economics literature, specifically with regard to the causal
effect of policies on air pollution, four recent RDD applications are worth
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noting. Davis (2008) and Lin Lawell et al. (2016) examine the effect of policies
restricting driving on urban air in Mexico City and Bogota. Auffhammer
and Kellogg (2011) examine the effect of gasoline content regulation on air
quality, ozone in particular, in the US. Chen et al., (2013) examines the effect
of latitude-based heating subsidies on particle pollution and life expectancy
in China. Our setup is similar to the first three studies in that time is the
running variable, and their authors argue that the policies were implemented
immediately and achieved near universal compliance. We argue that such
assumptions similarly fit our setting. Similar to Auffhammer and Kellogg, our
focus on ozone further makes RDD suitable, in that its chemical reactivity
implies that ambient air concentrations change quickly, for example, over the
diurnal cycle, or upon a step change before and after a policy comes into effect.
Whereas in both Davis’ and Auffhammer and Kellogg’s settings regulation was
introduced with an aim to curb external damage from air pollution, in our
setting any effect on urban air from mandated changes to the gasoline blend
was an unintended consequence. It is this unintended consequence of ethanol
use that our study seeks to uncover. In Chen et al., the running variable is
geographic location (north versus south of the Huai river), and a rise in particle
pollution was the unintended consequence of an energy policy.
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3.4.2 Specification
An observation in our study is an air monitoring site-hour-date triple. For
example, to evaluate the effect on ozone from changing the blend mandate,
a single observation would be the ozone monitor at Site 5 (Ibirapuera) at
3pm on February 15, 2010. Consider the regression model, to be implemented
separately by discontinuity (for brevity we omit subscript d):
yiht = αi0 + α ∗ treatt + fih(dateiht − datec) + βih ∗Wiht + ²iht (3.1)
The dependent variable, yiht, is the natural logarithm of the measured pol-
lutant mass concentration, in the recorded units of μg/m3 or ppm, where i,
h, and t index site (monitor), hour, and date, respectively. Binary variable
treatt is equal to 0 if the gasoline blend combusted on date t is E20, and 1
if the gasoline blend is E25, indicating lower and higher ethanol fractions re-
spectively. To repeat from Section 3, we normalize the reporting of results to
represent the treatment effect of policy that increases the ethanol component,
from E20 to E25.
The eighth-order polynomial in date, fih(dateiht − datec), is centered at
the policy implementation date, datec. The polynomial trend is site and hour
specific, to flexibly capture seasonal and unobservable trends at the site-hour
level over the half-year (180-day) sample. Similarly, the vector of controls,
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denoted Wiht, is allowed to affect or co-vary with pollutant concentrations
differentially by site and hour pair, via the parameters βih.
Included in Wiht is a vector of day-of-week fixed effects, to account for (site-
hour varying) weekly cycles, e.g., systematic differences between, say, Tuesday
3pm and Friday 3pm, in the volume of surrounding vehicle traffic impacting
ozone levels at site 5. Day-of-week fixed effects also capture weekend and
public holiday variation in pollutant concentrations.
Other determinants of pollutant concentrations included in Wiht are me-
teorological conditions, road congestion at one or more levels of proximity to
the monitoring site, and the ethanol-to-gasoline price ratio at the pump, which
smoothly drives the choice of ethanol over gasoline fuel in the subpopulation
of bi-fuel vehicles. Specifically, we control for: a quadratic in log temperature
(0C, measured in the contemporaneous hour h); a quadratic in log radiation
(W/m2); a quadratic in log relative humidity (%), a quadratic in log wind
speed (m/s); indicators for each of four wind direction quadrants (whenever
wind blows in excess of 0.5 m/s); precipitation (mm, from h to h − 3); and
indicators for the base of an atmospheric thermal inversion layer recorded ly-
ing within 200m, or between 200 and 500m, from the ground. We control
for the quantity of road users by taking, on top of site-hour specific day-of-
week intercepts, the extension of traffic congestion across the city recorded
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from 7am to 11am on date t (interacted with an indicator for t being a non-
public holiday weekday).30 The ethanol-to-gasoline price ratio enters vector
Wiht as a third-order polynomial (and we lag this by four days, as in Salvo and
Geiger 2014). We selected these controls based on the sensitivity of pollutant
concentrations to their variation, for example, ozone’s sensitivity to radiation
and temperature, or the sensitivity of pollutant concentrations to wind speed.
These controls have added importance recalling that the effect on air of a 5-
percent discontinuity in the gasoline blend may not be large and we may lack
precision. To emphasize, controls are flexibly interacted with site by hour fixed
effects.31 Appendix Figures I.8 to I.11 summarize variation in meteorology and
road congestion around each discontinuity.
The treatment effect is estimated in two steps. First, using ordinary least
squares (OLS) we estimate a restricted version of equation (1), that excludes
treatt (but includes the site-hour specific eighth-order polynomials in date),
32
generating fitted residuals of ln(pollutant concentration). Intuitively, this de-
30Given the opening on March 30, 2010 of the Greater Sao Paulo beltway, that removed
trucks from specific inner city roads (He et al. 2016), we also add a dummy variable
(interacted with site-hour) to indicate dates post inauguration; these may be relevant to the
first two discontinuities, with cutoffs on February 4 and May 4, 2010.
31In a robustness test, we interact controls only with site, not site-hour, fixed effects
(Appendix Table H.10). For comparison, using a sample over multiple years, Davis (2008)
specifies day-of-week (weekend) by hour fixed effects, but he does not additionally interact
these with monitoring sites in Mexico City.
32Again, these flexible polynomials account for unobserved smoothly varying trends over
each 180-day sample. In robustness tests, we vary the order, e.g., seventh-order, as well as
drop these trends from the specification.
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means the data and partials out the effect of other factors. Second, we imple-
ment local linear regression using the fitted residuals to estimate the treatment
effect.
Denote the residuals generated in the first step by y˜. Formally, the effect
of the “ethanol policy,” α, is estimated as:
(aˆb+, γˆb+) =a,γ i,t,h{(y˜iht − a− γ(dateiht − datec))2 (3.2)
∗Kb(dateiht − datec)1(dateiht ≥ datec)}
(aˆb−, γˆb−) =a,γ i,t,h{(y˜iht − a− γ(dateiht − datec))2 (3.3)
∗Kb(dateiht − datec)1(dateiht < datec)}
αˆ = aˆb+ − aˆb− (3.4)
where b is the bandwidth, Kb(x) = K(x/b)/b and K() is a kernel function,
and 1() denotes an indicator function.
Samples and implementation. Our main analysis of the policy effect of
increased ethanol use on ozone concentrations restricts hourly observations to
afternoon readings between 12pm and 4pm, when the rate of ozone production
is at its highest (Sections 2 and 3). For the other pollutants, we consider
observations during the evening commuting hours from 5pm to 8pm. In short,
we look for effects from the energy policy where we are more likely to find
them. In sensitivity analysis, we examine other hour windows for the different
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pollutants.
In the first step of estimation, we restrict observations to plus and minus
90 days of the cutoff point (for the given discontinuity), namely three days
after the mandated deadline for distributor shipments, to allow fuel stations
and consumers to adjust, as explained.33 In the second step, we use CCT’s
bandwidth selection criterion to determine the number of days before and
after the discontinuity. The tested bandwidth turns out to be about 30 days,
ensuring that the 90 days we consider in the first step suffices for the second
step. Of note, the first and second discontinuities occurred three months
apart. As we examine each discontinuity one by one, we do not vary the 180-
day window, with the objective of making our estimates comparable across
discontinuities.
3.5 Results
As discussed in Section 3, we face the empirical challenge that, although gaso-
line fuel accounted for the majority share of Sao Paulo’s 6 million cars and
1 million motorcycles during each of the four discontinuities, changes to the
composition of gasoline were not large. Also, ozone’s reactivity and sensitivity
33See Table H.1. As a robustness check, we allow the mandated ethanol shift to phase in
over several days, rather than abruptly. As explained, a fuzzy design would require that we
observe the exact composition of downstream fuel inventories—the “compliance rate”—over
these few days.
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to the immediate surroundings implies that concentrations can be quite vari-
able for unobserved, idiosyncratic reasons. This is an empirical challenge that
Auffhammer and Kellogg (2011) likely also faced. In our setting, this variabil-
ity can immediately be seen from the scatter in Figure I.4 showing demeaned
log afternoon ozone concentrations at the level of the data—a site-hour-date
triple—following the first step of the local linear regression estimation proce-
dure (Section 4). The dots indicate log concentration residuals, y˜, with all
covariates accounted for, including meteorology and the eight-order polyno-
mial trend over the whole 180-day period, flexibly by site-hour. To emphasize,
we estimate models separately by discontinuity throughout the analysis, and
“pool” across discontinuities only in a robustness test. The fitted lines on ei-
ther side of each discontinuity are only for illustration, as here they are based
on a fixed bandwidth of 30 days rather than the bandwidth tests reported
below.
Before presenting results for our preferred local linear regression specifi-
cation, Table H.3 presents estimates for regression model (1), estimated from
the 180-day sample in a single step by OLS with treatt included. The esti-
mated effect on ambient ozone concentrations from an increase in the ethanol
content in gasoline is positive and significant at least at the 5% level across
all four discontinuities. The average point estimate and standard error across
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the four discontinuities is 0.125 and 0.042 log points, respectively. (Standard
errors shown in Table H.3 are one-way clustered at the site-date level.) Esti-
mates of the increase in afternoon ozone levels—a 0.11 to 0.16 increase in log
points—caused by a 5 percentage point increase in the ethanol fraction appear
quite large (see below). Given concerns about the extent to which high-order
polynomials can single-handedly account for unobserved confounding factors,
such as seasonality, as we move away from the cutoff, we follow the advice of
Gelman and Imbens (2014) and turn to local linear regression.
Consider again demeaned log ozone concentrations, demeaned separately
by 180-day sample, at the site-hour-date level, y˜iht. To account for correlation
across hourly readings within date and site (i.e., to “cluster” our inference at
the site-date level), we then take the mean of the demeaned log concentrations
across hours within site-date. It is on these residual log concentrations at
the site-date level that we implement local linear regression. (We later check
robustness to implementing local linear regression directly on y˜iht.) Table
H.4, panel A presents local linear regression estimates for the effect on mean
afternoon ozone concentrations from raising the ethanol content in gasoline
fuel, under alternative bandwidths according to either the CCT or the IK
criteria (Section 4). Selected bandwidths range between 22 and 35 days and
turn out to be similar across the two criteria, for example, 22 (CCT) and 24
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(IK) days on either side of the discontinuity # 3 cutoff. Importantly, a 30-day
or so bandwidth coupled with 12 sites (with sites added in 2012) implies that
the number of observations is not large—between 500 and 1,000.
Across all four discontinuities and both bandwidth selection criteria, the
local regression’s estimated effect of ethanol on mean afternoon ozone levels
is positive and somewhat lower than direct estimates of (1) using the whole
180-day period (Table H.3). Point estimates range from 0.041 (discontinuity
# 4, IK) to 0.126 (discontinuity # 3, CCT), and average 0.090 log points
across discontinuities and bandwidth criteria (with an average standard error
of 0.035 log points). Point estimates under the IK criterion average 0.083
compared with 0.097 log points under CCT. These estimated magnitudes,
based on a 5 percent ethanol increase in fuel content among 70% of light
vehicles, that tended to be burning blended gasoline at the cutoff dates (Table
H.1), are comparable to—if slightly higher than—point estimates reported by
Salvo and Geiger (2014, Figure 4) for a shift from E25 to E100 among 60%
of bi-fuel vehicles (bi-fuel vehicles accounting for 50% of VMT by passenger
cars).
Robustness. In Table H.4, panel B we alternatively take the maximum
of each afternoon’s (log) ozone concentrations as the dependent variable, with
the resulting data at the site-date level, and repeat the estimation routine,
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namely demeaning the dependent variable using a 180-day sample followed by
implementing local linear regression on a sample of bandwidth tested according
to each of the two criteria. The estimated effect of ethanol on maximum
ozone levels is again positive across all four discontinuities and both bandwidth
criteria, averaging 0.081 log points.
Figure I.5 shows that the estimated positive effect of ethanol on mean af-
ternoon ozone concentrations, reported in Table H.4A is not overly sensitive to
varying the bandwidth of days around the cutoff point. 95% confidence inter-
vals are quite stable and remain above (or almost above) zero as we decrease or
increase the bandwidth starting at the level selected by either the CCT or the
IK criteria. Perhaps unsurprisingly, estimates can become rather less stable,
with confidence bands widening and shifting, as we reduce the bandwidth by
10 days. Estimates are somewhat more precise as we increase the bandwidth,
though this comes at the potential expense of introducing omitted variable
bias.
Figure I.6 tests robustness to the demeaning of the data (at varying band-
widths). Solid lines indicate point estimates for the treatment effect following
the procedure described above (demean the dependent variable at the observed
level of the data, a site-hour-date triple, and take the mean of the demeaned
values across hours within site-date). Dashed lines indicate point estimates
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under an alternative procedure, whereby we implement local linear regression
directly on site-hour-date level demeaned values, rather than on site-date level
means of these values.34
Our findings are further robust to pooling the demeaned data (that goes
into the second step) across the four discontinuities, while still demeaning
separately by 180-day sample in the first step to flexibly allow for, say, seasonal
variation: Table H.5 reports an estimated effect of 0.081 to 0.083 log points.
Table H.6 reports robustness to hour-of-the-day—mean over morning hours
from 7am to 11am, or the maximum 8-hour average (e.g., Lin et al. 2001)—
and to functional form—ozone, not log ozone, concentration. In panel D, and
pooling ozone residuals across the four 180-day samples, the effect of raising the
ethanol fraction on the daily maximum 8-hour ozone average is 4.8 μg/m3 (s.e.
1.2 μg/m3), or 8.0% of the sample mean of daily maximum 8-hour averages,
of 59.9 μg/m3.
We also implement local linear regression separately by ozone monitoring
site (and discontinuity). Each panel of Figure I.7 plots the distribution of
53 (12 + 12 + 12 + 17) point estimates across sites and discontinuities. Most
density lies on the positive domain, with medians of 0.084 and 0.063 log points,
34Dotted lines in the figure indicate point estimates for the treatment effect under yet
another procedure, whereby we first take means of the data across the afternoon hours from
12pm to 4pm, and only then proceed to demean the site-date varying mean afternoon log
ozone concentrations.
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respectively under the CCT and IK criteria (a median of 0.072 log points
overall).
Finally, Appendix Table H.8 reports robustness to varying the order of
the polynomial trends specified over each 180-day first-step sample. Appendix
Table H.9 reports bootstrap standard errors, in which a bootstrap sample is a
sample of site-date pairs, to account for sampling variation in the first step. As
an alternative to clustering at the site-date level, we alternatively bootstrap
the sample at the site-week level. In the second step, we alternatively fix the
bandwidth selected from the original sample, or select the bandwidth according
to each bootstrap sample. Appendix Table H.11 considers specifications in
which we allow the mandated ethanol shift to phase in over a few days, rather
than abruptly.
Other robustness tests—not shown for brevity—include widening the first-
step sample beyond 180 days, or specifying a uniform rather than triangular
kernel. We add variables (sunshine hours) or high-order terms (quartic rather
than quadratic) in the vector of meteorological controls, or control for meteo-
rology in levels (not log) or bins (temperature every 10C, radiation every 150
W/m2). We include, as separate controls, monthly gasoline and ethanol fuel
shipments reported by distributors to the state market—while too aggregate in
time and space, these are the quantity data that are available (Figure I.1(c)).
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Our findings are also robust to specifying the cutoff point at four days (rather
than our preferred three) from the mandated distributor deadline.
Ethanol and PM2.5, CO and NOx. Table H.7 provides local linear
regression estimates for the effect on ambient PM2.5, CO and NOx levels from
raising gasoline fuel’s ethanol content—see panels A, B and C, respectively.
We follow exactly the same procedure as we implemented when evaluating the
policy effect on ozone (Table H.4A), recalling that now we consider evening
commuting hours of peak traffic congestion, between 5pm and 8pm (Table
H.2), rather than afternoon hours of peak ozone formation.
Averaging across discontinuities and bandwidth criteria, point estimates in
log points are -0.034 for PM2.5, -0.019 for CO and -0.059 for NOx. Estimates
tend to be smaller in magnitude than in the case for ozone, and they tend not
to be significantly different than zero. Estimates on NOx are less precise than
in the case for ozone, i.e., standard errors across discontinuities and bandwidth
criteria average 0.057 and 0.035 log points for NOx and ozone, respectively,
with inference in both cases relying on a similar number of monitors in the
metropolis. Pooling residuals across all 180-day samples in a single (second-
step) regression, point estimates for NOx are a statistically negative -0.077 log
points under the CCT criterion. Salvo and Geiger (2014) found NO levels to
fall with increased ethanol penetration and their estimates for NO were less
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precise compared to ozone.
PM2.5 levels do not appear to fall with higher ethanol penetration, or at
least we are unable to detect a fall, as our inference relies on a low number of
monitors (one and three for the last two discontinuities). Estimates for other
hours (morning commuting hours, 7am to 11am) and separate NO and NO2
components similarly tend to be smaller in magnitude and less precise than
for ozone (not shown for brevity). Unfortunately, atmospheric levels of VOCs
such as formaldehyde, acetaldehyde and ethanol are not routinely monitored
(Nogueira et al. 2014).
3.6 Conclusion
This paper exploits four sharp discontinuities in the ethanol component of
blended gasoline sold across Brazil to assess the effect on air quality in the Sao
Paulo metropolis from raising the fraction of ethanol in the gasoline-ethanol
light transportation fuel mix. These ethanol policy changes, each amounting
to 5 percentage points by volume, were spaced at least three months apart and
were mandated by the central government not as a response to urban air pollu-
tion, but to intervene in the quantity and price outcomes of the sugar industry
(sugar and ethanol products to domestic and export markets), or simply to
reverse previous changes. We test that the blend discontinuities did not lead
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to price discontinuities, and argue that composition changes were not salient
to fuel consumers (and, if they were, likely responses would help us detect the
effect of increased ethanol on urban air outcomes). Using available data, we
check that on each occasion, blended gasoline accounted for the majority of
distance traveled by the fleet of passenger cars and motorcycles in the state
of Sao Paulo. Our focus is on ozone, which often exceeds the local 8-hour
air quality standard (71 ppb, comparable to the US EPA’s 70 ppb), is the
one regulated pollutant whose levels have not trended downward in the past
decade, and whose relevance is likely to grow in a warming climate. We also
test for effects on other monitored species, PM2.5 in particular.
Across the four discontinuities, which we examine separately to allow for
unobserved heterogeneity, we find that ozone levels rose by about 8 percent
as the gasoline blend shifted from E20 to E25, i.e., toward a higher ethanol
fraction. Such observational evidence (1) is consistent (in sign and magnitude)
with the results of a recent empirical study that exploited consumers smoothly
substituting between E20/E25 gasoline and E100 ethanol, (2) is theoretically
consistent with ozone formation over urban Sao Paulo being VOC-limited, (3)
enables the credible inference of the health damage of ozone that, at 70 ppb, is
hotly debated, and (4) is opposite in sign to the predictions of an atmospheric
modeling study for Sao Paulo, based on emissions inventories and modeled
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chemical and physical reactions, that suggested sizable ozone abatement from
a hypothetical shift to ethanol by the light-vehicle fleet. In contrast to ozone,
point estimates of changes to PM2.5 are small in magnitude but confidence
intervals are wide.
Since the ethanol-blended gasoline policy changes were common across the
country, future research can examine their effect on ozone pollution at locations
outside of the Sao Paulo metropolis. For example, over the period 2010 to
2013, ozone monitors were in place in about 15 cities in the state of Sao
Paulo, with distances ranging from 100 to 600 km from the metropolis, and
populations varying by almost an order of magnitude (0.1 to 0.6 million).
To the extent that atmospheric ozone production regimes differ by locality
(and possibly season)—to be proxied, for example, by weekend-weekday ozone
concentration ratios, population size, and/or prevailing winds from the Sao
Paulo megacity transporting NOx-rich air parcels over varying distances—
one may examine heterogeneous effects of increased ethanol penetration on
ambient ozone levels.35
In a country where sugarcane ethanol is commonly perceived by consumers
and described by policymakers as a policy to abate gasoline emissions and im-
prove air quality (e.g., Salvo and Huse 2013, CBN Noticias 2010, Angelo 2012),
35Preliminary analysis suggests that this research direction is promising. We are grateful
to a Reviewer for suggesting it.
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we hope that our research will better inform the public discourse. Our research
is also supportive of recent calls for a review of current vehicle emissions stan-
dards that allow the deduction of the mass of unburned ethanol, itself a reactive
VOC, emitted from the tailpipe. We caution that our findings do not speak
to other potential life-cycle benefits and costs of substituting ethanol (current
or future generation) for gasoline, nor do they make assumptions on how on-
board emissions control technologies might evolve. Moreover, we caution that
our analysis applies only to pollutants that are currently routinely monitored
by Sao Paulo’s (and other) environmental authorities, thus ignoring possible
effects, in particular, on particle levels in the submicron (< 1μm or PM1) and
nanometer (< 0.1μm or PM0.1) size ranges.
Beyond Sao Paulo, our findings may be relevant to urban areas with a
VOC-limited atmosphere—which the literature suggests is common to many
densely populated cities in the US, Europe and Asia—and countries that are
planning to increase ethanol blending requirements, whether to meet local
regulation or international agreements, such as the RFS in the US and the
INDCs pledged during COP21 in Paris.
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Table A.1: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3)
Husband Wife Household
Number of observations 10368
Have one child in house 49.5%
Average age 41.1 37.4
Labor supply rate 92.8% 67.0%
Car ownership rate 35.5%
House ownership rate 60.2%
Living in rural area 23.9%
Living in North area 56.7%
Budget share for clothes 13.8%
Children’s clothing share 34.6%
Female clothing share
-with one child 55.1%
-with no children 54.1%
Notes: The sample consists of all households with one head, one spouse
and at most one child living in house. Column (1) and column
(2) are based on individuals. Column (3) is based on house-
holds. Budget share for clothes is defined as yearly expenditure
on clothes divided by yearly income. Children’s clothing share
is defined as children’s clothing expenditure divided by total
clothing expenditure within a household. Female clothing share
is defined as female clothing expenditure divided by summation
of female clothing expenditure and male clothing expenditure.
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Table A.2: Effects of female income share on clothing expenditure share
(1) (2)
with child without child
Panel A: Without control function
children’s clothing budget share **0.080
(0.036)
female clothing budget share *0.086 *0.084
(0.052) (0.050)
Panel B: With control function
children’s clothing budget share 0.054
(0.099)
female clothing budget share 0.036 0.079
(0.109) (0.105)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The results show effects of female in-
come share on clothing expenditure share. Panel A shows results with-
out controlling individual unobserved characteristics. Panel B shows
results control for individual unobserved characteristics. Column (1)
shows results for households with one child. Column (2) shows results
with no children. Distributor factors include female income share, age
and education difference of husband and wife, and head sex dummy.
Demographic information entering the utility function include monthly
household total income, female age and education, children’s age and
sex if applicable, labor supply decision, car ownership, house ownership,
household points, clothing price, rural fixed effect, monthly fixed effect
and state fixed effect.
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Table A.3: Effects of female income share on clothing expenditure share by
wealth level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
with children without children
rich poor rich poor
Panel A: Without control function
children’s clothing budget share 0.042 **0.094
(0.046) (0.039)
female clothing budget share 0.051 *0.100 0.071 *0.088
(0.068) (0.057) (0.070) (0.053)
Panel B: With control function
children’s clothing budget share 0.024 0.066
(0.103) (0.102)
female clothing budget share -0.007 0.047 0.061 0.082
(0.117) (0.111) (0.123) (0.105)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The results show effect of female income share
on clothing expenditure share. Panel A shows results without controlling individual
unobserved characteristics. Panel B shows results control for individual unobserved
characteristics. Column (1) shows results for rich households with one child. Col-
umn (2) shows results for poor households with one child. Column (3) shows results
for rich households with no children. Column (4) shows results for poor households
with no children. Households are categorized as rich or poor based on household
points. Distributor factors include female income share, age and education differ-
ence of husband and wife, and head sex dummy. Demographic information entering
utility function include monthly household total income, female age and education,
children’s age and sex if applicable, labor supply decision, car ownership, house own-
ership, household points, clothes price, rural fixed effect, monthly fixed effect and
state fixed effect.
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Table A.4: Effect of female income share on clothing expenditure by rural and
urban areas
(1) (2) (3) (4)
with children without children
Urban Rural Urban Rural
Panel A: Without control function
children’s clothing budget share ** 0.093 0.038
(0.039) (0.056)
female clothing budget share *0.111 0.004 **0.108 0.014
(0.057) (0.084) (0.053) (0.079)
Panel B: With control function
children’s clothing budget share 0.075 0.006
(0.101) (0.111)
female clothing budget share 0.073 -0.057 0.101 -0.010
(0.112) (0.124) (0.106) (0.124)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The results show effect of female income share
on clothing expenditure share. Panel A shows results without controlling individual
unobserved characteristics. Panel B shows results control for individual unobserved
characteristics. Column (1) shows results for households with one child in urban
area. Column (2) shows results for households with one child in rural area. Column
(3) shows results for households with no children in urban area. Column (4) shows
results for households with no children in rural area. Distributor factors include female
income share, age and education difference of husband and wife, and head sex dummy.
Demographic information entering utility function include monthly household total
income, female age and education, children’s age and sex if applicable, labor supply
decision, car ownership, house ownership, household points, clothes price, rural fixed
effect, monthly fixed effect and state fixed effect.
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Table A.5: Effect of female income share on clothing expenditure by north
and south region
(1) (2) (3) (4)
with children without children
South North South North
Panel A: Without control function
children’s clothing budget share ***0.112 0.040
0.042 0.047
female clothing budget share 0.090 0.082 0.094 0.076
0.059 0.066 0.063 0.058
Panel B: With control function
children’s clothing budget share 0.095 0.025
0.101 0.106
female clothing budget share 0.037 0.034 0.081 0.077
0.112 0.118 0.115 0.107
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The results show effect of female income share
on clothing expenditure share. Panel A shows results without controlling individual
unobserved characteristics. Panel B shows results control for individual unobserved
characteristics. Column (1) shows results for households with one child in South part
of Brazil. Column (2) shows results for households with one child in North part of
Brazil. Column (3) shows results for households with no children in South part of
Brazil. Column (4) shows results for households with no children in North part of
Brazil. Distributor factors include female income share, age and education difference
of husband and wife, and head sex dummy. Demographic information entering utility
function include monthly household total income, female age and education, children’s
age and sex if applicable, labor supply decision, car ownership, house ownership, house-





Figure B.1: Decision Making Process
Notes: This Figure illustrates decision making process for a household. The hollow
points denote labor supply decision periods, and the black points denote con-
sumption decision periods. A and B denote individuals. L denotes labor supply.
m denotes income. q denotes private goods and Q denotes public goods. τ de-
notes unobserved characteristics. Firstly, individuals make labor supply decisions
which depend on unobserved characteristics. Income of each individual depends
on labor supply decisions only. Conditioning on labor supply decisions, income
is independent of unobserved characteristics. Secondly. individuals make con-
sumption decisions, which depend on income of each individual and unobserved
characteristics. One labor supply decision is followed by several consumption




Chapter 1: Points Calculation
for Household Wealth Level
1. Points from bathroom
• 0 point for no bathroom
• 1 point for 1 bathroom
• 2 points for 2 bathrooms
• 3 points for 3 bathrooms and above
2. Points from households heads education
• 0 point for not finishing primary school or lower
• 1 point for finishing primary school but not finishing high school
• 2 points for finishing high school but not finishing college
• 3 points for finishing college but not finishing other higher degrees
• 5 points for finishing degrees higher than college
If households’ head didn’t obtain any degree or information for degree is
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missing, the points will be re-calculated based on years of schooling as
below:
• 1 point for years of schooling between 4 years and 8 years
• 2 points for years of schooling between 9 years and 11 years
• 3 points for years of schooling of 12 years and above
3. Points from servant
Servants that are paid monthly are considered for points calculation.
• 0 point for no servant
• 2 points for 1 servant
• 4 points for 2 servants and above
4. Points from asset holding
For each asset considered below, additional points are added to house-
holds points depending on the number of specific asset.
Color TVs:
• 2 points for 1 TV
• 3 points for 2 TVs
• 4 points for 3 TVs
• 5 points for 4 TVs and above
Radios:
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• 1 points for 1 radio
• 2 points for 2 radios
• 3 points for 3 radios
• 4 points for 4 radios and above
Cars:
• 2 points for 1 car
• 4 points for 2 cars
• 5 points for 3 cars and above
Hovers and similar:
• 1 point for 1 hover and above
Laundry machines
• 1 point for 1 Laundry machines and above
Videos including DVD players
• 2 points for 1 video and above
Fridges:
• 2 points for 1 fridge and above
Freezers:




1. Existence of function φ such that τB = φ(τA).
Let m(τA, τB) = mA(τA, τB) + mB(τA, τB).
By Assumption 3, ∂m(τ
A,τB)
∂τA




As m(τA, τB) = mˉ, apply Implicit Function Theorem, there exists a







2. Derivation of equation (1.5), (1.6) and (1.7).
Denote λ as Lagrange multiplier associated with budget constrain. So-


















W.O.L.G, assume all the prices are 1. Combined with budget constrain,
the above program can be solved. Optimal consumption bundle depends
on μ1, τA, mˉ. Ignore mˉ as this can be controlled in empirical work, equa-




> 0 for no public good case.





. As utility function




> 0 for no public good case.
∂qA∗
∂τA





























> 0 for the case only A cares about public good.
∂Q∗
∂τA





> 0 for private consumption in second stage of two-stage
budgeting.
1Given μ, s does not affect consumption.
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By Assumption 2, the term on right hand side is negative. The second
















No. of households 2848 504
Male parter’s age 40.02 37.99 2.02***
Female partner’s age 37.15 35.07 2.08***
No. of children 2.73 2.54 0.19***
Log asset value 10.61 9.92 0.69***
Male parter’s education
High school and above 0.24 0.18 0.06***
Female partner’s education
High school and above 0.161 0.105 0.056***
Male parter’s log income 9.48 9.38 0.10
Female partner’s log income 2.84 3.38 -0.54**
Female partner’s log income
conditioning on working 9.31 9.66 -0.35***
Male parter supplies labor 0.876 0.859 0.017
Female partner supplies labor 0.284 0.315 -0.031
Years of union formation 17.96 13.49 4.47***
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This Table shows summary statistics for
sample used in chapter 2 for year 2002. Column (1) shows statistics for married
households. Column (2) shows statistics for cohabiting households. Column
(3) shows difference between two types of households.
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Table E.2: Cohabiting households: living arrangement movement
(1) (2)
separated married
Male education 0.161 0.230
(0.419) (0.280)
Female education -0.981 0.877**
(0.708) (0.340)
Log total asset -0.096* -0.016
(0.054) (0.042)
Number of children -0.172* -0.031
(0.098) (0.069)
log male yearly income -0.051 0.025
(0.049) (0.040)
log female yearly income 0.085** -0.002
(0.033) (0.024)
Male age -0.008 0.015
(0.026) (0.018)
Female age -0.013 -0.020
(0.025) (0.182)




Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This Table shows results examining
living arrangement movement for cohabiting households in year 2002
based on multinomial logit regression. The baseline outcome is staying
cohabiting. Column (1) is for the outcome separated. Column (2) is for
the outcome married. The number shows how different demograph-
ics affect the probability of moving to difference living arrangement
compared with staying cohabiting.
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Log total asset -0.006
(0.013)
Number of children 0.010
(0.025)
Log male yearly income -0.004
(0.013)










Notes: This Table shows results examining divorce behavior of mar-
ried households in year 2002 using Probit regression. The
numbers show the effects of difference demographics on di-
vorce probability.
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Table E.4: Preset parameters
Parameter value Reference
Initial age 25
Years in each period 5
Retirement age 65
Age at death 75
RRA (δQ) 1.5 Attanasio et al. (2008)
Discount factor (β) 0.98 Attanasio et al. (2008)
Input for household production (α) 0.73 Modified OECD scale
Equivalent scale (e) Modified OECD scale
Notes: This Tables shows values for preset parameters with corresponding references
if applicable.
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Table E.5: Moment matching for living arrangement
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low education High education
data sim data data sim data
Panel A: Married Households
Married 93.01% 93.9% 94.99% 94.93%
Cohabit 3.14% 3.73% 2.23% 2.59%
Divorce 3.85% 2.37% 2.77% 2.47%
Panel B: Cohabiting Households
Married 26.37% 21.04% 31.63% 23.57%
Cohabit 65.78% 65.78% 62.67% 64.29%
Divorce 7.85% 13.19% 5.61% 12.24%
Notes: This Table shows results for moment of living arrangement corresponds to Figure
F.7 and Figure F.8. Panel A is for married households and Panel B is for cohabiting
households. Column (1) shows moments for low education households based on
Mexican data. Column (2) shows moments for low education households based on
simulated data. Column (3) shows moments for high education households based
on Mexican data. Column (4) shows moments for high education households based
on simulated data.
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Table E.6: Results: Parameters for Structural Model
Parameter Ceof SE
Panel A: Low education match households
Mean of matching quality for married households (μm) 0.17
∗∗∗ (0.013)
SD of matching quality for married households (σm) 0.05
∗∗∗ (0.016)
Mean of matching quality for cohabiting households (μc) 0.15
∗∗∗ (0.021)
SD of matching quality for cohabiting households (σc) 0.25
∗∗∗ (0.040)
Panel B: High education match households
Mean of matching quality for married households (μm) 0.26
∗ (0.137)
SD of matching quality for married households (σm) 0.05 (0.038)
Mean of matching quality for cohabiting households (μc) 0.21
∗∗∗ (0.007)
SD of matching quality for cohabiting households (σc) 0.30
∗∗∗ (0.115)
Panel C: Common parameters
Utility from leisure (δl) 1.2*10
−6∗∗∗ (2.6*10−8)
Penalty for not working for men (φ) 0.43∗∗∗ (0.084)
Notes: This Table shows results for parameters in structural model. Panel A is for low education
households. Panel B is for high education households. Panel C shows parameters common
























married to cohabit cohabit to married
separated
Notes: This Figure shows proportion of men that have income based on five
types of households. The solid line represents households being married
for three panels. The dash line represents households being cohabiting
for three panels. The short dash line represents households that moved
from marriage to cohabitation. The long dash line represents households
that moved from cohabitation to marriage. The dash-dot line represents
households that got divorced or separated.
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married to cohabit cohabit to married
separated
Notes: This Figure shows proportion of women that have income based on five
types of households. The solid line represents households being married
for three panels. The dash line represents households being cohabiting
for three panels. The short dash line represents households that moved
from marriage to cohabitation. The long dash line represents households
that moved from cohabitation to marriage. The dash-dot line represents
households that got divorced or separated.
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married to cohabit cohabit to married
separated
Notes: This Figure shows average hour of work per week for men based on five
types of households. The solid line represents households being married
for three panels. The dash line represents households being cohabiting
for three panels. The short dash line represents households that moved
from marriage to cohabitation. The long dash line represents households
that moved from cohabitation to marriage. The dash-dot line represents
households that got divorced or separated.
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married to cohabit cohabit to married
separated
Notes: This Figure shows average hour of housework per week for men based
on five types of households. The solid line represents households be-
ing married for three panels. The dash line represents households being
cohabiting for three panels. The short dash line represents households
that moved from marriage to cohabitation. The long dash line represents
households that moved from cohabitation to marriage. The dash-dot line
represents households that got divorced or separated.
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married to cohabit cohabit to married
separated
Notes: This Figure shows average hour of work per week for women based on five
types of households. The solid line represents households being married
for three panels. The dash line represents households being cohabiting
for three panels. The short dash line represents households that moved
from marriage to cohabitation. The long dash line represents households
that moved from cohabitation to marriage. The dash-dot line represents
households that got divorced or separated.
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married to cohabit cohabit to married
separated
Notes: This Figure shows average hour of housework per week for women based
on five types of households. The solid line represents households be-
ing married for three panels. The dash line represents households being
cohabiting for three panels. The short dash line represents households
that moved from marriage to cohabitation. The long dash line represents
households that moved from cohabitation to marriage. The dash-dot line
represents households that got divorced or separated.
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Figure F.7: Moment of matching: living arrangement

























Notes: This Figure shows matching of moments for living arrangements of low
education households. Panel a is for married households and Panel b is
for cohabiting households. The colored bars are based on Mexican data.
The empty bars are based on simulated data.
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Figure F.8: Moment of matching: living arrangement
























Notes: This Figure shows matching of moments for living arrangements of high
education households. Panel a is for married households and Panel b is
for cohabiting households The colored bars are based on Mexican data.
The empty bars are based on simulated data.
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Figure F.9: Moment of matching: male hour of work and female hour of
housework









<8 hours 8 to 10 hours >=10 hours
Data Simulated data










0~4 hours 4~6 hours 6~8 hours 8~10 hours >=10 hours
Data Simulated
Notes: This Figure shows matching of moments for male labor supply and female
housework. Panel a shows histogram of male hour of work per day. Panel
b shows histogram of female hour of housework per day. The colored
bars are based on Mexican data. The empty bars are based on simulated
data.
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Figure F.10: Outside options















20 30 40 50 60
Age of male partner
Married: low edu Cohabiting: low edu
Married: high edu Cohabiting: high edu















20 30 40 50 60
Age of male partner
Married:low edu Cohabiting:low edu
Married:high edu Cohabiting:high edu
Notes: This Figure shows individual outside options, the utilities individuals can
get upon divorce or separation. Panel a is for women and Panel b is for
men. The long dash line represents individuals from low education mar-
ried households. The solid line represents individuals from low education
cohabiting households. The short dash line represents individuals from
high education married households. The dash line represents individuals
from high education cohabiting households.
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Age of male partner
Married women Cohabiting women
Married men Cohabiting men
Notes: This Figure shows individuals’ gain from forming union based on Mexican
data. Panel a is for low education households and Panel b is for high
education households. The long dash line represents married women. The
solid line represents cohabiting women. The short dash line represents
married men. The dash line represents cohabiting men.
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30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Age of male partner
Married men Cobabiting men
Married women Cobabiting women
Notes: This Figure shows individuals’ gain from forming union based on simu-
lation of representative households. Two households are considered. One
for high education and one for low education. The households are assumed
to be either married or cohabiting initially. Panel a is for low education
representative household and Panel b is for high education representative
household. The long dash line represents married men. The dash line rep-
resents cohabiting men. The short dash line represents married women.
The solid line represents cohabiting women.
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Age of male partner
Low education men High education men
Low education women High education women
Notes: This Figure shows individuals’ gain from forming union based on simu-
lation of representative households. Two households are considered. One
for high education match and one for low education match. The house-
holds are assumed to be either married or cohabiting initially. Panel a is
for married household and Panel b is for cohabiting household. The long
dash line represents low education men. The dash line represents high ed-
ucation men. The short dash line represents low education women. The




Appendix Tables H.8 to H.13 (robustness tests) and Appendix Figures I.8 to
I.11 (variation in meteorology and road congestion around each discontinuity)
are referenced directly in the text.
Here we complement the graphical analysis of Figure I.2 by formally testing
whether consumer prices for E20/E25 gasoline fuel, as well as E100 ethanol
fuel, were discontinuous at cutoff dates for the first three discontinuities in
the composition of gasoline—we take these cutoff points as January 31, 2010
(last day of E25 shipments), May 1, 2010 (first day of E25 shipments), and
September 30, 2011 (last day of E25 shipments). (Data are missing from June
2013, thus we exclude discontinuity # 4, on May 1, 2013, from the analysis.)
As in our preferred specification for the analysis of pollution, we adopt local
linear regression, and examine each discontinuity separately. Overall, we fail
to reject that fuel prices varied smoothly at these cutoffs, as suggested by
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Figure I.2, but regression estimates are less robust compared to the analysis
of ozone concentrations, possibly because we do not observe fuel prices every
day.
Our data consists of repeated cross-sections of about 350 fuel retail stations
in Sao Paulo city, available from the fuel market regulator (ANP). Enumerators
surveyed stations from Monday to Thursday each week, and any given station
is visited at most once in a weekly survey. We observe station-level E20/E25
gasoline and E100 ethanol prices, in nominal BR$ per liter, for the regular
grade that is dominant for both gasoline and ethanol (midgrade gasoline is
typically available at a 4% markup over regular gasoline, but the penetration
is low; Salvo and Huse 2013). Despite no data being available for Fridays and
weekends, we are fortunate that the data density is fairly balanced around
each cutoff point.
In a first-step demeaning procedure, we again consider a sample of 90
days on either side of a cutoff date and regress station-date level fuel prices
(E20/E25 gasoline or E100 ethanol, separately) on an eighth-order polynomial
trend, 38 station brand fixed effects (e.g., Shell, Esso), and location fixed
effects, namely 272 “3-digit” zipcodes (e.g., 056 as in the complete zipcode
05610-060).
Local linear regression estimates in a second step are shown in Table H.12.
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As with the analysis of pollution, we normalize the reporting of price effects
to correspond to an increase in the ethanol fraction in gasoline fuel, from
E20 to E25. Panel A reports on gasoline prices, whereas panel B reports on
ethanol prices. Again, we consider both the CCT and IK bandwidth criteria,
with CCT invariably selecting shorter bandwidths compared to IK. Selected
bandwidths tend to shorter for the analysis of ethanol prices compared to that
for gasoline prices. We implement each local linear regression—separately by
fuel (across panels), by discontinuity (across columns), by bandwidth criterion
(within panels)—at two levels of aggregation: (i) directly on the disaggregate
individual station residual prices from the first step; and (ii) taking the mean
of these residual prices by 2-digit zipcode and station brand within date, to
“cluster” our inference at the zipcode-brand level (there are 476 “2-digit”
zipcode by station brand combinations).
We find that both levels of aggregation yield similarly small and statisti-
cally insignificant estimates for the effect of changes in the gasoline blend on
gasoline and ethanol prices at the pump. Across 12 regression samples/variants
for each fuel, the average price effect is -0.01 BR$/liter (about half a US dol-
lar cent) for E20/E25 gasoline, and 0.00 BR$/liter (though somewhat more
variable) for E100 ethanol.
Salvo-Geiger’s design applied to a longer sam-
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ple






W + T ′ihtΔ
T + νih + μit + ²iht
in which, in a second step, ozone mass concentration yiht at site i, hour h,
and date t is regressed on the fuel mix, in particular, the ethanol share in
the bi-fuel fleet, imputed from a discrete-choice demand model estimated in
a first step (e.g., a multinomial probit, Figure I.1(b)). Meteorological con-
ditions Wiht, local road traffic conditions Tiht, and time-by-location fixed ef-
fects (νih, μit) control for temporal and spatial determinants of ozone pol-
lution other than the fuel mix. The identifying assumption is that, condi-
tional on controls, the residual is uncorrelated with the fuel mix, in particular,
E [fuelmixt²iht|Wiht, Tiht, νih, μit] = 0.
Table H.13, columns 1 and 4 report estimates from the second-step of the
Salvo-Geiger model using an expanded 55-month sample period, November
2008 to May 2013 (rather than to May 2011), and the same 12 monitoring
sites across the metropolis. An observation is a date-site pair. (See Sec-
tion 3 for a description of the data.) The dependent variable is the mean
ozone concentration recorded in the afternoon hours between 12pm to 4pm,
in μg/m3 (column 1) or its logarithm (column 4). In column 1, the ozone
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variation that can be attributed to the in-sample range for the share of bi-fuel
vehicle owners choosing E100 ethanol, between 24% and 89%, is estimated at
21.6 × (.89 − .24) = 14.0 μg/m3, with estimated standard error (s.e.) of 4.8
μg/m3. For perspective, 14.0 μg/m3 is equivalent to about 7 ppb, or 10% of
the 8-hour standards set both for Sao Paulo state (140 μg/m3) and the US (70
ppb). A 14.0 μg/m3 rise in ozone from consumers switching into ethanol at
the pump amounts to 20% of the sample mean ozone reading of 69.4 μg/m3.
Standard errors are obtained through a bootstrap procedure to account for
sampling error in the first-step estimation of the ethanol choice probability
in the bi-fuel fleet—see Table H.13 notes. Ozone levels rise in contempora-
neously recorded radiation and temperature, and fall in humidity and wind
speed. Omitted from the table for brevity, ozone levels also tend to rise when
thermal inversions are recorded hours earlier, at 9am, and with increased traf-
fic congestion in the morning commuting hours (7am to 11am). (See Lin et
al. 2001 for references on the meteorological dependence of ozone formation,
including biogenic hydrocarbon emissions.) Estimates are robust to excluding
the colder months of June to September from the sample, and restricting the
sample to non-holiday weekdays, among several other variations.
As a first variant to this bootstrap procedure, we employ two-stage least
squares (2SLS) with the observed ethanol-to-gasoline price ratio (Figure I.1(a))
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instrumenting for the predicted ethanol share in the bi-fuel fleet. Salvo and
Huse (2013) and Salvo (2016) observed consumers making choices at the pump
between 2010 and 2012. They find (see Figs. 4-6 and Figs. 3-4, respectively)
that the relationship between the estimated gasoline choice probability (equiv-
alently, the ethanol choice probability)—an object subject to sampling error—
and the ethanol-to-gasoline price ratio in the data—the instrumental variable
(IV)—is quite linear over a wide range of price variation. Table H.13 columns
2 and 5 (ozone in levels and logs) show that the 2SLS estimator yields sim-
ilar estimates to columns 1 and 4, if somewhat higher coefficients and lower
standard errors.
A second alternative to using an estimated fuel share in the second-step
ozone regression is to use an observed fuel share, were this available. Unfor-
tunately, high-frequency (daily) fuel quantity data are not available for the
Sao Paulo metropolis. However, we obtained ethanol and blended gasoline
shipments reported on a monthly basis by distributors for the state of Sao
Paulo over the sample period (again, see the data section). In spite of its
lower frequency—monthly variation versus daily—and aggregate geographic
coverage—state-level versus metropolis—we use such data in columns 3 and 6
to proxy for the ethanol share (again, with ozone in levels and logs). A simi-
lar result obtains, noting that the estimated coefficient is larger in magnitude
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relative to the other columns as the ethanol share now pertains to the entire
population of light vehicles and motorcycles, not only to bi-fuel engines—this












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table H.3: OLS regression for Ozone using the 180-day sample, with an eighth-
order polynomial trend over the whole period (afternoon hours)
Gasoline blend discontinuity
2-5 # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4
Summer 2010 Fall 2010 Spring 2011 Fall 2013
Dependent variable: Log ozone concentration, by site-hour-date
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 0.110** 0.157*** 0.117*** 0.116***
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.043) (0.050) (0.036) (0.039)
Control variables (all effects by site-hour)
Site by hour fixed effects interacted with:
Eighth-order polynomial time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day-of-week fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Meteorological conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Thermal inversion indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Road traffic congestion Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethanol-to-gasoline price ratio (cubic) Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 82% 86% 84% 83%
Number of observations 9,852 10,056 10,122 13,487
Number of regressors 2,161 2,161 2,101 2,976
Number of sites 12 12 12 17
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. An observation is a site-hour-date triple. The
sample includes all hours between 12pm and 4pm on all dates that are plus and
minus 90 days of the cutoff point (February4, 2010 for # 1; May 4, 2010 for # 2;
October 4, 2011 for # 3; May 4, 2013 for # 4) for all monitoring sites that are
active in the Sao Paulo metropolitan area (by active we require at least 70% of
a maximum of 180 × 5 = 900 hourly measurements to be available in a 180-day
period). The dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly ozone concentration
(μg/m3). Meteorological conditions include quadratics in contemporaneous log
temperature, log radiation, log humidity and log wind speed; indicators for
contemporaneous wind blowing in from each of four wind direction quadrants;
mean precipitation in the contemporaneous hour to three hours earlier. Other
covariates include indicators for the base of an atmospheric thermal inversion
layer lying within 200m, or between 200 and 500m, from the ground, according
to the 9am or 9pm reading, whichever is closest to the given hour; the log
of citywide extension of traffic congestion from 7am to 11am interacted with
an indicator for the date being a weekday and non-public holiday; a cubic in
the ethanol-to-gasoline price ratio lagged by 4 days. All controls enter the
specification interacted with site by hour fixed effects. OLS estimates for four
separate regressions. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by site-date
pair.
210
Table H.4: Local linear regression for Mean Ozone and Maximum Ozone (af-
ternoon hours)
Gasoline blend discontinuity
2-5 # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4
Summer 2010 Fall 2010 Spring 2011 Fall 2013
A: Dependent variable: Mean (of demeaned) log ozone concentration, by site-date
CCT bandwidth criterion
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 0.070** 0.112** 0.126*** 0.078***
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.032) (0.045) (0.036) (0.029)
Bandwidth 30 25 22 28
Number of observations 642 550 482 883
IK bandwidth criterion
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 0.066** 0.105*** 0.118*** 0.041
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.032) (0.037) (0.035) (0.032)
Bandwidth 31 35 24 23
Number of observations 663 778 526 726
Number of sites 12 12 12 17
B: Dependent variable: Demeaned maximum of log ozone concentration, by site-date
CCT bandwidth criterion
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 0.102*** 0.094** 0.054 0.080**
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.033) (0.046) (0.039) (0.036)
Bandwidth 27 27 26 29
Number of observations 568 594 619 1,001
IK bandwidth criterion
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 0.091*** 0.096** 0.054 0.079**
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.032) (0.043) (0.039) (0.036)
Bandwidth 32 31 26 28
Number of observations 679 685 619 965
Number of sites 12 12 12 17
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. An observation in the second step is a site-date
pair within the bandwidth (in days from the cutoff point) specified by either the
CCT or IK selection criterion, for all monitoring sites that are active in the Sao
Paulo metropolitan area. See the text for the first-step procedure: to demean
hourly log pollutant concentrations (12pm to 4pm) using each 180-day sample, and
to collapse residual concentrations to the site-date level taking the mean across
hours (panel A); or to take the maximum log pollutant concentration between
12pm and 4pm, and to demean these site-date varying maximum values using each
180-day sample (panel B). See the notes to Table H.3 for site-hour (site in panel
B) specific eighth-order polynomial trend, day-of-week fixed effects, meteorology,
thermal inversion, road traffic congestion and fuel price controls used to demean
the data. Local linear regression estimates for 16 separate regressions. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
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Table H.5: Local linear regression for Mean Ozone (afternoon hours): Sensi-
tivity to pooling across the four 180-day samples
Gasoline blend discontinuity
2-5 # 1, # 2, # 3, # 4 pooled together,
stacked by day plus or minus from cutoff
Dependent variable: Mean (of demeaned) log ozone concentration, by site-date
CCT bandwidth criterion
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 0.081***
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.017)
Bandwidth 23
Number of observations 2,221
IK bandwidth criterion
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 0.083***
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.016)
Bandwidth 27
Number of observations 2,619
Number of site-discontinuity pairs 12 + 12 + 12 + 17 = 53
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. An observation in the second step is a site-date
pair within the bandwidth (in days from the cutoff point) specified by either
the CCT or IK selection criterion, for all monitoring sites that are active in
the Sao Paulo metropolitan area. The first step (demeaning hourly log ozone
concentrations separately by 180-day sample and taking means across hours
within site-date) follows Table H.4A exactly. Local linear regression estimates for
two separate regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table H.6: Local linear regression for Mean Ozone: Sensitivity to hour-of-the-
day and functional form
Gasoline blend discontinuity All four
2-5 # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 pooled
Sum. ’10 Fall ’10 Spr. ’11 Fall ’13 together
A: Dependent variable: Mean (of demeaned) log ozone concentration, 7am to 11am
CCT E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 0.121 0.187** 0.165*** 0.084 0.121***
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.118) (0.089) (0.057) (0.054) (0.040)
Bandwidth 27 24 34 36 25
IK E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 0.093 0.182** 0.175*** 0.043 0.121***
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.107) (0.087) (0.059) (0.062) (0.038)
Bandwidth 33 25 32 29 27
B: Dep. var.: Mean (of demean.) log ozone conc., 11am to 6pm (modal 8-hour period for max.)
CCT E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 0.054 0.160*** 0.142*** 0.033 0.072***
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.035) (0.046) (0.039) (0.030) (0.018)
Bandwidth 30 24 21 28 24
IK E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 0.051 0.149*** 0.094*** 0.026 0.074***
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.034) (0.040) (0.033) (0.031) (0.017)
Bandwidth 33 32 32 27 27
C: Dep. var.: Mean (of demeaned) log ozone concentration, maximum 8-hour average (realized)
CCT E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 0.080* 0.156*** 0.060* 0.066** 0.072***
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.042) (0.047) (0.035) (0.032) (0.019)
Bandwidth 31 24 25 32 26
IK E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 0.072* 0.095*** 0.068** 0.029 0.072***
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.041) (0.031) (0.032) (0.037) (0.019)
Bandwidth 34 56 32 25 26
D: Dep. var.: Mean (of demeaned) ozone concentration, maximum 8-hour average (realized)
CCT E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 10.99*** 2.06 6.52** 3.74* 4.74***
i.e., higher ethanol content (3.04) (2.18) (2.69) (2.03) (1.23)
Bandwidth 23 35 34 26 27
IK E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 11.07*** 1.80 6.37** 3.47* 4.79***
i.e., higher ethanol content (2.67) (1.97) (3.21) (1.90) (1.20)
Bandwidth 28 41 24 29 28
Mean value dep.var. (max 8-h avg., μg/m3) 62.07 55.70 72.28 52.24 59.85
No. of sites (site-discontinuity pairs) 12 12 12 17 53
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All notes to Tables H.4 and H.5 (respectively,
second-step regressions are separate by discontinuity or pooled across disconti-
nuities) apply here. Instead of afternoon hours (12pm to 4pm), panels A and B
consider morning hours (7am to 11am) and the modal (most common) 8-hour
period for daily maximum 8-hour averages (11am to 6pm), respectively. Panel
C considers the realized 8-hour period, by site-date in each 180-sample, of daily
maximum 8-hour averages. Since this realized 8-hour period varies from day
to day (e.g., 10am to 5pm versus 11am to 6pm), we interact first-step controls
only with site fixed effects, as in Table H.10, with the exception of day-of-week
which we interact with site-hour fixed effects. Panel D follows the third panel
but considers (the mean of demeaned) ozone concentrations rather than log ozone
concentrations as in Tables H.4 and H.5. Local linear regression estimates for 40
separate regressions. For brevity, we omit the number of observations (these scale
with the tested bandwidth). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table H.7: Local linear regression for Mean PM2.5, Mean CO and Mean NOx
(evening hours)
Gasoline blend discontinuity All four
2-5 # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 pooled
Sum. ’10 Fall ’10 Spr. ’11 Fall ’13 together
A: Dependent variable: Mean (of demeaned) log PM2.5 concentration, by site-date
CCT E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) -0.235 0.119 0.028
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.186) (0.085) (0.074)
Bandwidth 25 29 33
Number of observations 49 148 236
IK E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) -0.077 0.057 0.018
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.117) (0.078) (0.067)
Bandwidth 52 48 50
Number of observations 101 250 359
No. of sites (site-discontinuity pairs) 0 0 1 3 4
B: Dependent variable: Mean (of demeaned) log CO concentration, by site-date
CCT E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) -0.078 0.017 -0.083** 0.036 -0.018
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.058) (0.051) (0.033) (0.028) (0.019)
Bandwidth 22 39 30 26 32
Number of observations 461 781 565 730 2,811
IK E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) -0.015 0.017 -0.081** 0.037 -0.021
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.026) (0.051) (0.033) (0.028) (0.019)
Bandwidth 90 39 31 27 30
Number of observations 1,964 781 583 759 2,628
No. of sites (site-discontinuity pairs) 12 11 10 15 48
C: Dependent variable: Mean (of demeaned) log NOx concentration, by site-date
CCT E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) -0.101 -0.121 -0.107* 0.004 -0.077**
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.066) (0.092) (0.061) (0.038) (0.035)
Bandwidth 24 32 20 35 22
Number of observations 465 653 403 858 1,869
IK E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) -0.023 -0.093 -0.023 -0.011 -0.040
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.051) (0.072) (0.041) (0.032) (0.025)
Bandwidth 51 53 41 47 47
Number of observations 999 1,107 838 1,116 3,963
No. of sites (site-discontinuity pairs) 11 11 11 14 47
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. An observation in the second step is a
site-date pair within the bandwidth (in days from the cutoff point) specified
by either the CCT or IK selection criterion, for all monitoring sites that are
active in the Sao Paulo metropolitan area. See the text for the first-step
procedure to demean hourly log pollutant concentrations (5pm to 8pm) using
each 180-day sample, and to collapse residual concentrations to the site-date
level taking the mean across hours. See the notes to Table H.3 for site-hour
specific eighth-order polynomial trend, day-of-week fixed effects, meteorology
(contemporaneous hour), thermal inversion (9am or 9pm reading, whichever
is closest to the given hour), road traffic congestion (mean conditions 5pm to
8pm) and fuel price controls used to demean the data. Local linear regression
estimates for 20 separate regressions. The remaining notes to Table H.4A
apply here.
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Table H.8: Local linear regression for Mean Ozone: Sensitivity to de-trending
in the first step
Gasoline blend discontinuity All four
2-5 # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 pooled
Summer 2010 Fall 2010 Spring 2011 Fall 2013 together
Dependent variable: Mean (of demeaned) log ozone concentration, by site-date
CCT bandwidth criterion
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1)
8th-order polynomial (as 0.070** 0.112** 0.126*** 0.078*** 0.081***
in Tables H.4A and H.5) (0.032) (0.045) (0.036) (0.029) (0.017)
9th-order polynomial 0.071** 0.114*** 0.128*** 0.078*** 0.081***
(0.032) (0.044) (0.037) (0.029) (0.017)
7th-order polynomial 0.077** 0.122*** 0.126*** 0.064** 0.083***
(0.032) (0.044) (0.036) (0.029) (0.017)
6th-order polynomial 0.094*** 0.126*** 0.127*** 0.045 0.081***
(0.032) (0.044) (0.036) (0.029) (0.017)
No polynomial trend 0.100*** 0.114** 0.118*** -0.036 0.052***
(0.033) (0.045) (0.039) (0.030) (0.019)
IK bandwidth criterion
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1)
8th-order polynomial (as 0.066** 0.105*** 0.118*** 0.041 0.083***
in Tables H.4A and H.5) (0.032) (0.037) (0.035) (0.032) (0.016)
9th-order polynomial 0.068** 0.104*** 0.123*** 0.040 0.085***
(0.032) (0.037) (0.036) (0.032) (0.016)
7th-order polynomial 0.074** 0.135*** 0.119*** 0.035 0.086***
(0.032) (0.037) (0.035) (0.032) (0.017)
6th-order polynomial 0.093*** 0.133*** 0.119*** 0.019 0.084***
(0.032) (0.037) (0.035) (0.032) (0.017)
No polynomial trend 0.100*** 0.126*** 0.112*** -0.053 0.055***
(0.033) (0.038) (0.038) (0.033) (0.018)
No. of sites (site-disc. pairs) 12 12 12 17 53
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. An observation in the second step is a site-date
pair within the bandwidth specified by either the CCT or IK selection criterion,
for all monitoring sites that are active in the Sao Paulo metropolitan area.
Compared to the specification reported in Tables H.4A and H.5—which for
convenience here we reproduce under “8th-order polynomial”—we vary the order
of the (site-hour specific) polynomial trend that, in the first step, accounts for
seasonal and unobservable trends over each 180-day sample. The bandwidth and
(number of) observations are fixed at Table H.4A (or Table H.5) values (and for
brevity are omitted), but estimates are similar if bandwidth is re-selected for each
second-step sample. Local linear regression estimates for 50 separate regressions.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table H.9: Local linear regression for Mean Ozone: Bootstrap standard errors,
clustered at site-date or site-week level
Gasoline blend discontinuity
2-5 # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4
Summer ’10 Fall ’10 Spring ’11 Fall ’13
Dependent variable: Mean (of demeaned) log ozone concentration, by site-date
CCT bandwidth criterion
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 0.070** 0.112** 0.126*** 0.078***
Robust standard errors (Table H.4A) (0.032) (0.045) (0.036) (0.029)
Site-date bootst. s. e. (bandw. per original) (0.026) (0.031) (0.026) (0.023)
Site-date bootst. s. e. (bandw. per bootstrap) (0.026) (0.033) (0.032) (0.021)
Site-week bootst. s. e. (bandw. per original) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.024)
Site-week bootst. s. e. (bandw. per bootstrap) (0.025) (0.032) (0.034) (0.027)
IK bandwidth criterion
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 0.066** 0.105*** 0.118*** 0.041
Robust standard errors (Table H.4A) (0.032) (0.037) (0.035) (0.032)
Site-date bootst. s. e. (bandw. per original) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024)
Site-date bootst. s. e. (bandw. per bootstrap) (0.023) (0.032) (0.030) (0.019)
Site-week bootst. s. e. (bandw. per original) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023)
Site-week bootst. s. e. (bandw. per bootstrap) (0.023) (0.031) (0.031) (0.021)
Number of sites 12 12 12 17
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (p-values are based on the largest standard
errors that are listed). Coefficients and robust standard errors estimated by
local linear regression following Calonico et al. (2014a) as in Table H.4A, where
a second-step observation is a site-date pair within the bandwidth specified by
either the CCT or IK selection criterion, for all monitoring sites that are active
in the Sao Paulo metropolitan area. To account for sampling variation in the
first step that generates residuals y˜iht at the site-hour-date level, we repeat the
two-step procedure on 400 bootstrap samples clustered at the site-date level or,
alternatively, clustered at the site-week level. (Site-date or site-week) “bootst. s.
e. (bandw. per original)” shows bootstrap standard errors (standard deviation
over each set of 400 estimates) when the bandwidth is fixed at Table H.4A values,
based on the original sample. “bootst. s. e. (bandw. per bootstrap)” shows
bootstrap standard errors when the bandwidth is re-selected according to each
bootstrap sample.
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Table H.10: Local linear regression for Mean Ozone: Sensitivity to site, not
site-hour, controls
Gasoline blend discontinuity
2-5 # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4
Summer 2010 Fall 2010 Spring 2011 Fall 2013
Dependent variable: Mean (of demeaned) log ozone concentration, by site-date
CCT bandwidth criterion
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 0.100*** 0.116** 0.060 0.100***
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.035) (0.045) (0.038) (0.034)
Bandwidth 29 24 26 27
Number of observations 619 528 574 851
IK bandwidth criterion
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 0.093*** 0.109*** 0.058 0.083**
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.034) (0.038) (0.035) (0.035)
Bandwidth 31 33 31 25
Number of observations 663 733 693 786
Number of sites 12 12 12 17
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. An observation in the second step is a site-date
pair within the bandwidth (in days from the cutoff point) specified by either the
CCT or IK selection criterion, for all monitoring sites that are active in the Sao
Paulo metropolitan area. Compared to the specification reported in Table H.4A,
we interact first-step controls only with site, rather than site-hour, fixed effects.
Local linear regression estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table H.11: OLS regression for Ozone using the 180-day sample: Sensitivity
to linear phase-in
Gasoline blend discontinuity
2-5 # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4
Summer 2010 Fall 2010 Spring 2011 Fall 2013
Dependent variable: Log ozone concentration, by site-hour-date
Abrupt discontinuity (Table H.3)
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 0.110** 0.157*** 0.117*** 0.116***
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.043) (0.050) (0.036) (0.039)
R2 82% 86% 84% 83%
Linear phase-in over 3 days
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 0.123** 0.167*** 0.073* 0.192***
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.047) (0.055) (0.042) (0.048)
R2 82% 86% 84% 84%
Linear phase-in over 5 days
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 0.080 0.113** 0.082* 0.216***
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.050) (0.056) (0.044) (0.057)
R2 82% 85% 84% 83%
Number of observations 9,852 10,056 10,122 13,487
Number of regressors 2,161 2,161 2,101 2,976
Number of sites 12 12 12 17
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. An observation is a site-hour-date triple. The
sample includes all hours between 12pm and 4pm on all dates that are plus and
minus 90 days of the cutoff point. The dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly
ozone concentration (μg/m3). Compared to the specification reported in Table H.3,
we consider a linear phase-in over three days (resp., five days) from the date cutoff
specified in the sharp design, i.e., February 4 to 6 (resp., 4 to 8), 2010, May 4 to 6
(resp., 4 to 8), 2010, October 4 to 6 (resp., 4 to 8), 2011, or May 4 to 6 (resp., to 8),
2013, with weights on successive days increasing by 0.33 (resp., 0.2). For example,
for a 3-day phase-in and the policy shifts from E20 to E25, weights are 0.33 on
calendar day 4, 0.67 on day 5, and 1 on day 6 and beyond. OLS estimates for 12
separate regressions. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by site-date pair.
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Table H.12: Local linear regression for E20/E25 gasoline and E100 ethanol
prices at the pump
Gasoline blend discontinuity
2-4 # 1, Summer ’10 # 2, Fall ’10 # 3, Spring ’11
A: Dependent variable: Price of E20/E25 gasoline (BR$/liter)
CCT bandwidth criterion & 2nd-step obs. is an individual station-date pair
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) -0.008 -0.008 -0.011
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Bandwidth 40 37 31
CCT bandwidth criterion & 2nd-step obs. is a zipcode-station brand-date triple
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) -0.008 -0.005 -0.016*
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Bandwidth 42 31 24
IK bandwidth criterion & 2nd-step obs. is an individual station-date pair
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) -0.004 -0.007 -0.005
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Bandwidth 81 52 52
IK bandwidth criterion & 2nd-step obs. is a zipcode-station brand-date triple
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) -0.006 -0.004 -0.007
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Bandwidth 60 53 69
B: Dependent variable: Price of E100 ethanol (BR$/liter)
CCT bandwidth criterion & 2nd-step obs. is an individual station-date pair
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 0.038 0.003 -0.003
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.042) (0.036) (0.008)
Bandwidth 10 10 21
CCT bandwidth criterion & 2nd-step obs. is a zipcode-station brand-date triple
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) -0.015 0.017 -0.006
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.051) (0.023) (0.010)
Bandwidth 11 11 19
IK bandwidth criterion & 2nd-step obs. is an individual station-date pair
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) 0.008 -0.015 -0.003
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.007) (0.01) (0.008)
Bandwidth 24 21 22
IK bandwidth criterion & 2nd-step obs. is a zipcode-station brand-date triple
E25, not E20, gasoline (yes=1) -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
i.e., higher ethanol content (0.010) (0.013) (0.008)
Bandwidth 23 21 27
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. An observation in a second-step local
linear regression is either an individual station by date pair (shown in
the top half of panels A and B) or a 2-digit zipcode-station brand-date
triple (bottom half of each panel), for all Sao Paulo city stations surveyed
or zipcode-brand combinations within the bandwidth (in days from the
cutoff point) specified by either the CCT or IK selection criterion. In
a first-step demeaning procedure, we regress station-date level prices
observed over a period of minus 90 to plus 90 days from a cutoff point
on an eight-order polynomial trend, station brand fixed effects and 3-
digit zipcode fixed effects. For the second-step estimates shown in the
bottom half of each panel, we collapse residual prices resulting from
the first step to the zipcode-brand-date level taking the mean across
stations within each zipcode-brand combination. Local linear regression






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure I.1: Fuel price ratio and usage
(a) Ethanol-to-gasoline price ratio
(b) E100 ethanol share in the bi-fuel fleet
(choice probability)
(c) E100 ethanol share of E20, E25 and
E100 shipments (VMT equivalent share)
Notes: Evolution of: (a) the E100 ethanol to E20/E25 gasoline price ratio at the pump,
(b) E100 ethanol share in the bi-fuel fleet, and (c) E100 ethanol share of fuel
consumed by passenger cars and motorcycles. The series in panel (b) is imputed
from an estimated discrete-choice demand model (Salvo and Huse 2013). The series
in panels (a) and (c) are based on ANP data—see Table H.1 notes for further details
on panel (c).
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Figure I.2: Fuel price
(a) Fuel prices at retail, discontinuity # 1 (b) Fuel prices at retail, discontinuity # 2
(c) Fuel prices at retail, discontinuity # 3 (d) Fuel prices at retail, discontinuity # 4
Notes: Variation in E20/E25 gasoline, E100 ethanol and diesel fuel prices at the pump
around each discontinuity in the composition of gasoline (see Table H.1). A sepa-
rate panel for each discontinuity marks the cutoff date with a vertical line and plots
fuel price variation over the minus 90 to plus 90 days from this cutoff. E20/E25
gasoline (black, thin line) and E100 ethanol (red, thick line) prices in the left axis,
in Brazilian Real $ per liter (means for regular-grade fuel—the dominant grade for
both gasoline and ethanol—in a cross-section of about 350 retail stations surveyed
weekly in the city of Sao Paulo, up to May 2013, and gasoline and ethanol price
indices to August 2013). Diesel price index (dashed line) in the right axis (base
October 30, 2008 = 100, for the Sao Paulo metropolitan area). Divide by 2 for a
rough conversion from BR$ to US$ over the sample period. Source: ANP, IBGE
IPCA.
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Figure I.3: Location of sites
Notes: Location of the state EPA’s air monitoring sites in the Sao Paulo metropolitan
area (40 municipalities), monitoring ozone, PM2.5, CO and NOx (NO and NO2),
between 2010 and 2013, superimposed on the grid of road corridors that is moni-
tored by the city’s traffic authority for traffic congestion. Only regions in the city
of Sao Paulo, a subset of the metropolitan area, are shaded. Air monitoring site
names are: (1) Parque Dom Pedro II, (2) Santana, (3) Mooca, (5) Ibirapuera, (6)
Nossa Senhora do O, (7) Sao Caetano do Sul, (8) Congonhas, (10) Cerqueira Cesar,
(15) Diadema, (16) Santo Amaro, (17) Osasco, (18) Santo Andre-Capuava, (20)
Taboao da Serra, (22) Maua, (27) Pinheiros, (29) Parelheiros, (31) IPEN-USP, (32)
Santo Andre-Paco Municipal, (33) Itaim Paulista, (35) Guarulhos-Paco Municipal,
(36) Marginal Tiete-Ponte dos Remedios, (37) Capao Redondo. Source: CETESB,
CET.
224
Figure I.4: Residual plot
(a) Log ozone residuals, discontinuity # 1 (b) Log ozone residuals, discontinuity # 2
(c) Log ozone residuals, discontinuity # 3 (d) Log ozone residuals, discontinuity # 4
Notes: Demeaned log ozone concentrations, following the first step of the local linear
regression estimation procedure, based on a 180-day sample separately by discon-
tinuity. An observation is a site-hour-date triple, across afternoon hours (12pm
to 4pm) and active ozone-monitoring sites. Only to illustrate, we plot fitted lines
(with 95% confidence interval) on either side of each cutoff point fixing the band-
width at 30 days. Since the first and third discontinuity involved a shift,
over time, from E25 to E20, the horizontal axis of panels (a) and (c)
shows observations going backward in time. For example, in panel (a),
the day labeled 0 is February 4, 2010, day 1 is February 3, 2010, and
day -1 is February 5, 2010.
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Figure I.5: Robustness: bandwidth
(a) E20 to E25 treatment effect, discontinu-
ity # 1
(b) E20 to E25 treatment effect, discontinu-
ity # 2
(c) E20 to E25 treatment effect, discontinu-
ity # 3
(d) E20 to E25 treatment effect, discontinu-
ity # 4
Notes: Local linear regression estimates of the E25 treatment effect on mean afternoon log
ozone concentrations. 95% confidence intervals are plotted. Sensitivity analysis to
variation in the optimal bandwidth, marked by dashed vertical lines (Table H.4A),
according to the CCT and IK criteria.
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Figure I.6: Robustness: demeaning method
(a) E20 to E25 treatment effect, discontinu-
ity # 1
(b) E20 to E25 treatment effect, discontinu-
ity # 2
(c) E20 to E25 treatment effect, discontinu-
ity # 3
(d) E20 to E25 treatment effect, discontinu-
ity # 4
Notes: Local linear regression estimates of the E25 treatment effect on mean afternoon log
ozone concentrations. Robustness to alternative procedures to demean the data
in the first step, at varying bandwidths. Point estimates are plotted. Solid lines
indicates preferred specification estimates (on means within site-date of demeaned
log concentrations at the site-hour-date level). Dashed lines indicate estimates
directly on demeaned log concentrations at the site-hour-date level. Dotted lines
indicate estimates on demeaned log concentrations, where log concentrations are
averages across hours within site-date.
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Figure I.7: Effects of single sites
(a) CCT bandwidth criterion
(b) IK bandwidth criterion
Notes: Local linear regression estimates of the E25 treatment effect on mean afternoon
log ozone concentrations, implementing the second step separately by ozone moni-
toring site. As in our preferred specification, Table H.4A, local linear regression is
implemented separately also by discontinuity. Each plot shows the distribution of
53 (i.e., 12 + 12 + 12 + 17) estimated site by discontinuity treatment effects, αˆid,
where i and d index site and discontinuity, respectively.
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Figure I.8: Meteorology and traffic: dis 1
(a) Temperature (thin, left) & radiation
(thick, right)
(b) Humidity (line, left) & precipitation
(dots, right)
(c) Wind speed (line, left) & thermal inver-
sion (dots, right)
(d) Road congestion, weekday morning
across city
Notes: Variation in meteorological conditions and morning road congestion around dis-
continuity # 1. In each panel, the cutoff date is marked with a vertical line, and
variation in meteorology or congestion is plotted over the minus 90 to plus 90 days
from this cutoff: (a) temperature (black thin line, left axis, 0C) and radiation (red
thick line, right axis, W/m2); (b) relative humidity (black thin line, left axis, %)
and precipitation (red dots, right axis, mm/h); (c) wind speed (black thin line, left
axis, m/s) and thermal inversion (red dots, right axis, yes=1); (d) road congestion
in the morning across the city (km of extension). We plot the mean, by date, across
hourly readings from 12pm to 4pm, except for thermal inversion where reading is
at 9am, and road congestion for which we plot the mean from 7am to 11am on
weekdays only.
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Figure I.9: Meteorology and traffic: dis 2
(a) Temperature (thin, left) & radiation
(thick, right)
(b) Humidity (line, left) & precipitation
(dots, right)
(c) Wind speed (line, left) & thermal inver-
sion (dots, right)
(d) Road congestion, weekday morning
across city
Notes: Variation in meteorological conditions and morning road congestion around dis-
continuity # 2. In each panel, the cutoff date is marked with a vertical line, and
variation in meteorology or congestion is plotted over the minus 90 to plus 90 days
from this cutoff: (a) temperature (black thin line, left axis, 0C) and radiation (red
thick line, right axis, W/m2); (b) relative humidity (black thin line, left axis, %)
and precipitation (red dots, right axis, mm/h); (c) wind speed (black thin line, left
axis, m/s) and thermal inversion (red dots, right axis, yes=1); (d) road congestion
in the morning across the city (km of extension). We plot the mean, by date,
across hourly readings from 12pm to 4pm, except for thermal inversion where the
reading is at 9am, and road congestion for which we plot the mean from 7am to
11am on weekdays only.
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Figure I.10: Meteorology and traffic: dis 3
(a) Temperature (thin, left) & radiation
(thick, right)
(b) Humidity (line, left) & precipitation
(dots, right)
(c) Wind speed (line, left) & thermal inver-
sion (dots, right)
(d) Road congestion, weekday morning
across city
Notes: Variation in meteorological conditions and morning road congestion around dis-
continuity # 2. In each panel, the cutoff date is marked with a vertical line, and
variation in meteorology or congestion is plotted over the minus 90 to plus 90 days
from this cutoff: (a) temperature (black thin line, left axis, 0C) and radiation (red
thick line, right axis, W/m2); (b) relative humidity (black thin line, left axis, %)
and precipitation (red dots, right axis, mm/h); (c) wind speed (black thin line, left
axis, m/s) and thermal inversion (red dots, right axis, yes=1); (d) road congestion
in the morning across the city (km of extension). We plot the mean, by date,
across hourly readings from 12pm to 4pm, except for thermal inversion where the
reading is at 9am, and road congestion for which we plot the mean from 7am to
11am on weekdays only.
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Figure I.11: Meteorology and traffic: dis 4
(a) Temperature (thin, left) & radiation
(thick, right)
(b) Humidity (line, left) & precipitation
(dots, right)
(c) Wind speed (line, left) & thermal inver-
sion (dots, right)
(d) Road congestion, weekday morning
across city
Notes: Variation in meteorological conditions and morning road congestion around dis-
continuity # 2. In each panel, the cutoff date is marked with a vertical line, and
variation in meteorology or congestion is plotted over the minus 90 to plus 90 days
from this cutoff: (a) temperature (black thin line, left axis, 0C) and radiation (red
thick line, right axis, W/m2); (b) relative humidity (black thin line, left axis, %)
and precipitation (red dots, right axis, mm/h); (c) wind speed (black thin line, left
axis, m/s) and thermal inversion (red dots, right axis, yes=1); (d) road congestion
in the morning across the city (km of extension). We plot the mean, by date,
across hourly readings from 12pm to 4pm, except for thermal inversion where the
reading is at 9am, and road congestion for which we plot the mean from 7am to
11am on weekdays only.
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